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Abstract
This thesis contributes to research by taking a social psychological perspective to
managing privacy online. The thesis proposes to support the effort to form a mental
model that is required to evaluate a context with regards to privacy attitudes or to ease
the effort by biasing activation of privacy attitudes. Privacy being a behavioural
concept, the human-computer interaction design plays a major role in supporting and
contributing to end users’ ability to manage their privacy online. However, unless
privacy attitudes are activated or made accessible, end users’ behaviour would not
necessarily match their attitudes. This perspective contributes to explaining why
online privacy mechanisms have long been found to be in-effective.
Privacy academics and practitioners are queried for their opinions on aspects of usable
privacy designs. Evaluation of existing privacy mechanisms (social network service,
internet browsers privacy tabs and E-Commerce websites) for privacy experts’
requirements reveals that the privacy mechanisms do not provide for the social
psychological processes of privacy management. This is determined through
communication breakdowns within the interaction design and the lack of privacy-
disclosure dialectical tension, lack of disclosure context and visibility of privacy
means.
The thesis taps into established research in social psychology related to the attitude-
behaviour relationship. It proposes persuasive communication to support the privacy
management process that is to enable end user control of their privacy while ensuring
typical usability criteria such as minimum effort and ease of use. An experimental
user study within an E-Commerce context provides evidence that in the presence of
persuasive triggers that support the disclosure and privacy dialectic within a context
of disclosure; end users can engage in privacy behaviour that match their privacy
concerns. Reminders for privacy actions with a message that is personally relevant or
has a privacy argument result in significantly more privacy behaviour than a simple
reminder. However, reminders with an attractive source that is not linked with
privacy can distract end users from privacy behaviour such that the observed response
is similar to the simple reminder. This finding is significant for the research space
since it supports the use of persuasive communication within human-computer
interaction of privacy designs as a powerful tool in enabling attitude activation and
accessibility such that cognitive evaluation of an attitude object can be unleashed and
end users can have a higher likelihood of responding with privacy behaviour. It also
supports the view that privacy designs that do not consider their interaction with
privacy attitudes or their influence on behaviour can turn out to be in-effective
although found to support the typical usability criteria.
More research into the social-psychological aspects of online privacy management
would be beneficial to the research space. Further research could determine the
strength of activated or accessed privacy attitude caused by particular persuasive
triggers and the extent of privacy behaviour. Longitudinal studies could also be
useful to better understand online privacy behaviour and help designs of more
effective and usable online privacy.
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The research within this thesis formed part of a UK-based multidisciplinary research
project called Visualisation and Other Methods of Expression (VOME) whose overall
aim has been to devise better means to engage end users in managing their privacy
online and to help them towards making informed consent decisions (VOMEa, 2012).
This thesis addresses the problem of ensuring usable online privacy mechanisms. It
starts by exploring the theoretical criteria of usable online privacy, designs a
methodological approach that balances the weaknesses of individual research methods
and determines the actual usability criteria. This is followed by identification of
usability weaknesses in existing privacy designs. The thesis then proceeds to present
an approach aimed at clearing the identified weaknesses.
This chapter provides an overall depiction of the thesis. It first defines key concepts
used throughout the context of the thesis. The research problem is then presented
followed by a discussion of the scope of the thesis. The chapter proceeds with the
research approach and a roadmap of the thesis and ends with a summary of the
research contributions.
21.2 Definitions
Several key concepts are used throughout the thesis. Some are defined in literature in
a variety of ways and others were derived from these definitions for the purpose of the
current research. This section presents the definitions and points to the section of the
thesis that provides further reviews and explains the selection and formulation of the
definitions for each of these concepts.
Attitude (reviewed in section 3.3.2): An attitude is a learned, global evaluation of an
object (person, place or issue) that influences thought and action (Perloff 2010a, pp
43). Attitudes can be viewed as an association between the object and the evaluation
(Fazio, 1989).
Privacy (reviewed in section 2.3): Privacy is a human right (Council of Europe, 1950).
It also relates to the control of access to the self (Altman, 1975) including information
about the self (Belloti and Sellen, 1993; Dourish, 1993).
Privacy attitude: Privacy attitude is consequently a learned or global evaluation of a
person, context or situation that influences thought and privacy behaviour.
Availability of attitudes (discussed in section 3.3.2): An attitude is said to be available
if it exists within a person’s cognitive structure that is the person possesses the
attitude due to prior association and evaluation with an object (Fazio, 1989).
Attitude activation (discussed in section 3.3.2): Attitudes are activated (associated
with an object) when individuals categorise some experience in terms of the attitudes
(Fazio, 1989). Multiple attitudes become connected through experiences of co-
activation. Privacy attitudes are therefore activated during interaction with a person
or situation or environment and the experience is categorised as an instance requiring
control of access to the self.
Attitude accessibility (discussed in section 3.3.2): Attitude accessibility is related to
the ease with which a particular attitude (an available attitude) may be retrieved from
memory (Fazio, 1989). The accessibility of the attitude is affected by the strength of
3the attitude and aspects of the context that serve to highlight particular attitudes as
being relevant to that context. Strong attitudes are more accessible.
Strong attitude (discussed in section 3.3.2): An attitude is strong if there is a
consistent, well-rehearsed link between an attitude object and its evaluation
(Augoustinos et al., 2006); therefore individuals have a strong privacy attitude if they
consistently evaluate a context of disclosure as requiring privacy protection. Such
individuals correspond to Westin’s description of privacy fundamentalists
(Kumaraguru and Cranor, 2005).
Behaviour (defined in section 3.3.2): Behaviour is what people do and involves their
actions (Miltenberger, 2011).
Online privacy mechanisms (discussed in section 2.2.3): Online privacy mechanisms
refer to both standalone privacy tools added to systems or embedded privacy designed
within systems.
Effectiveness of online privacy mechanism (defined in section 2.4.1 and discussed in
2.3 and 2.4): ISO 9241-11 defines usability in terms of enabling end users to achieve a
set of goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction (ISO, 1998). An online
privacy mechanism is effective if it enables end users to take privacy actions that
match their attitudes.
1.3 The research problem and thesis scope
Privacy is a human right (Council of Europe, 1950). It is also a behavioural concept
that relates to interactions within an environment (Rachels, 1975; Gerstein, 1978) and
as such the environment both determines privacy behaviour and is influenced by
behaviour. Privacy can therefore be described as a socio-psychological process that is
embedded within and supports interpersonal interactions and communication
(Margulis, 2003). However privacy is tacit in nature and cannot be easily described
by end users (VOME, 2012b). It also depends on the context of disclosure (Joinson
and Paine, 2007). Privacy is consequently a dynamic process (Altman, 1975; Palen
4and Dourish, 2003) such that the extent of privacy protection relies on the value
attributed to the disclosed information at a point in time.
Technology has taken privacy to previously uncharted territory. Technology has
become so omnipresent that sharing and disclosing personal information online is
common. Privacy issues that emanate from online disclosure extend into real world
consequences (Solove, 2006; Detica and Cabinet Office, 2011). Therefore end users’
privacy needs are at a tension with organisations’ requirements to collect personal
information. Organisations however have a legal requirement of ensuring end users’
privacy protection (European Parliament, 1995; UK Government, 1998). Online
privacy mechanisms have been designed to support these requirements. It was
however found that although end users have privacy concerns, their online behaviour
do not match these concerns (Spiekermann et al., 2001; Acquisti and Grossklags,
2005a). This discrepancy has been attributed to end users’ psychological dispositions
(Acquisti, 2004; Strandburg, 2005) and limitations within online designs (Milne and
Culnan, 2004; Jensen and Potts, 2004). Previous research has proposed better
visualisation methods, approaches of presenting information to enhance readability
and performance and ways of aiding privacy task completion (Cranor et al., 2006;
Richter-Lipford et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2009; Kelley et al., 2009; Richter-
Lipford et al., 2010). However, these approaches might not be sufficient in ensuring
end users can use privacy mechanisms according to their concerns (privacy goals) that
is in ensuring effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms.
In addition, although enhancements were proposed and usability was evaluated
through different criteria depending on the aspect of human-computer interaction
under investigation, the requirements for usable online privacy were not determined
first to guide evaluation. Such an approach would direct evaluation of privacy as an
interactional process embedded within a context of disclosure. This would better help
to identify weaknesses within systems that contribute to in-effective privacy
mechanisms.
Furthermore, although seamless privacy management is considered as a socio-
psychological process offline, it is not known whether online designs support such a
5process. The nature of the online environment and the privacy consequences that can
emanate spread beyond end users’ mental pictures during disclosure (Strater and
Richter, 2007). Given that privacy is an interactional process, the human-computer
interaction design is at centre stage in supporting end users’ mental model of privacy
during online interactions. Also, attitude-behaviour discrepancies have been the
subject of much debate and research since many decades (LaPierre, 1934; Campbell,
1963; Schuman and Johnson, 1976; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Regan and Fazio,
1977; Sivacek and Crano, 1982; Stiff and Mongeau, 2003; Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005).
It is believed that attitudes can predict behaviour and that the observed relationship is
dependent on strength and accessibility of attitudes (Fazio and Williams, 1986) and
consistency of the measures of attitude and behaviour (Campbell, 1963; Ajzen and
Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005).
Therefore the research within the thesis revisits concepts and findings from previous
research in social psychology in an attempt to influence the online privacy attitude-
behaviour relationship through persuasive communication. In doing so, it proposes an
innovative approach of ensuring effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms through
a better human-computer communication approach that guides and enables the
reflection of the privacy attitude construct in memory into behaviour. It also
demonstrates whether existing privacy designs provide the processes of privacy
management. The thesis is designed to answer the following three research questions:
 RQ1: What are the requirements for usable online privacy mechanisms?
 RQ2: How usable are existing online privacy mechanisms?
 RQ3: How does persuasive communication impact the effectiveness of online
privacy mechanisms?
This research is innovative in proposing to guide behaviour from attitudes as a means
of enhancing effectiveness of online designs since such an approach has not been used
within the online privacy domain before. The thesis will specifically help designers
assess and enhance the privacy management processes of their designs. It will also
help businesses in ensuring their privacy protection practice supports end users. Such
6support would consequently help end users to discern between those service providers
who genuinely protect their privacy and those who don’t.
The research focuses on the behavioural and interactional aspects of privacy online
and hence does not go in depth into the legal and technological side. The research
does not propose new technological solutions or tools for managing privacy but
proposes a method for enhancing the interaction designs of existing privacy
mechanisms. This method can be applied to any form of privacy designs and even to
designs for other purposes such as security, health and energy conservation.
The research also only evaluates the effectiveness aspect of usability. This is because
research on effectiveness of privacy is important since, as shown by the definition of
effective online privacy mechanisms in section 1.2, it determines whether privacy
designs enable end users to manage their privacy according to their attitudes and
goals. However, other aspects of usability can also contribute to effectiveness and
could be addressed in future research.
1.4 The research approach
The research was undertaken within a mixed method approach that was guided by a
social science perspective. It employed human-computer interactions (HCI) research
methods since a key pillar of the research is usability. It first explored the
requirements for usable online privacy design by querying privacy experts. It then
evaluated privacy designs of three types of online systems. This was followed by an
experimental user study that determined the influence of persuasive communication in
activating end users’ attitudes.
A Delphi approach was used that enabled a multidisciplinary group of privacy experts
to iteratively review their opinion of the requirements of design that would ensure
usability. The Delphi approach in this research space is innovative in providing the
structure to enable legal, technological, psychological and HCI privacy experts to
propose opinions and to reach consensus on the complex issue of usability of privacy.
7Analytical HCI techniques were used to determine whether online privacy designs
provided for the social-psychological processes of privacy management. A real world
theoretical framework guided the evaluation.
After reflecting on the social-psychological implications of the relationship between
attitudes and behaviour, the influence of persuasive communication in influencing that
relationship was addressed. This was enabled through a user study that simulated an
E-Commerce shopping task.
1.5 The thesis overview
Figure 1 below (in the next page) portrays the overall framework that guided the
different sections of the research and the thesis breakdown within this framework. It
essentially consists of two sections: an inductive part and a deductive part. The
inductive part is an exploration that contributes to establishing the theoretical criteria
of the real world problem of ensuring end users’ privacy online, defining the research
gap and research problem, designing methodology to address the research gap,
identifying the real criteria and evaluating existing online privacy designs for
weaknesses in supporting the criteria. This is followed by a deductive experimental
part that assesses the influence of the proposed approach that provides the criteria and
addresses the weaknesses.
The literature review in C
ensuring end user privacy online. It presents the social, organisational and
technological components of
context and research conducted to date in the research space
pillars of this research which are: privacy, usability and persuasive communication.
Chapter 2 concludes by discussing
problem.
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Figure 1: Map of the thesis
hapter 2 theoretically explores the real world
the real world problem. It then reviews the academic
. It focuses




9In Chapter 3, the methodology is elaborated by first restating the research questions
followed by an articulation of the research strategy and the philosophical foundations.
The chapter then describes the research design with a reflection on the validity of the
design. It follows with a list of the data collection and analysis techniques that were
used to answer the research questions.
The real criteria for usable online privacy were determined in Chapter 4 by querying
privacy experts in a Delphi study. The Delphi approach was chosen to allow experts
from various privacy research and practice areas to contribute their differing point of
views and to enable a discussion among them through iterative feedback. The Delphi
stages are detailed starting with the preparation phase followed by three rounds of
design and analysis.
The thesis then proceeded to evaluate existing online privacy mechanisms for the
requirements suggested by privacy experts and to identify HCI weaknesses in the
design of privacy that would affect the effectiveness of online privacy. Chapter 5
starts with a pilot study and is followed by an evaluation of the ease of use of
Facebook. Since weaknesses were identified in the approach, a more rigorous
approach of evaluating online designs for usability was conducted on internet
browsers’ privacy tabs and E-Commerce websites’ notice and choice function.
Following the exploratory part of understanding the criteria for usability of online
privacy and analysing existing systems for vulnerabilities in supporting privacy
interaction, a user experiment was conducted as described in Chapter 6. The aim of
the user study was to find out whether persuasive communication affects the
effectiveness and usability of online privacy mechanisms. Chapter 7 provides a
general discussion for the research including the significance and limitations of the
findings and Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.
1.6 The research contributions
An important contribution to the research space is the finding that contrary to
conclusions of previous research (such as Spiekermann et al., 2001; Acquisti and
Grossklags, 2005a), privacy fundamentalists do take more privacy behaviour than
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privacy unconcerned as expected from their privacy attitudes. Privacy behaviour is
affected by persuasive communication such that the framing of the messages within
the design can either distract end users and result in poor privacy behaviour or have
not much to do with privacy but still bias towards privacy behaviour or serve as the
argument that strengthens privacy behaviour. This contribution portrays a gap in
research – better understanding of the socio-psychological process of online privacy
management and the interaction of design components with this process and the
outcome of the interaction in future research would be beneficial for the research
space. It also means that existing design that has not taken the psychological impact
of their design components on privacy attitude and behaviour into account cannot
ensure that their privacy designs will be effective.
The thesis also reviews the theoretical criteria of the real world problem of ensuring
end user privacy online and comes up with a description of research gap and design of
methods that would contribute to research on more usable online privacy. Another
contribution of the thesis is a list of the requirements for usable online privacy designs
from a multidisciplinary standpoint produced by querying privacy experts. This
helped to pin down the main components of design that would contribute to usable
privacy mechanisms and to guide the rest of the research. The key requirements
included end user control, privacy to run in parallel to system services, privacy to
require minimum user effort and easy to use systems. Experts stressed on the
complexity and challenge of designing usable online privacy which supports and
explains the findings of the literature review that is online privacy designs suffer from
a large amount of usability issues. To address the challenge, the experts suggested a
list of ways that can help to provide for the conflicting requirements of end user
control and minimum effort in balance with system services and advised on carefully
considering the context of use during design.
The research also found that privacy mechanisms are not consistent in their
communication of privacy information that could help end users to manage their
privacy as effectively as they are used to offline. Privacy mechanisms are either not
accessible within the context of use or the disclosure link is missing. Privacy
mechanisms hence do not provide the processes to support end users’ privacy
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management. This contribution is important because it sheds some light on why
existing privacy designs are not effective for managing privacy. The lack of support
to the disclosure context or the availability of privacy mechanisms would make it
tricky for end users to cognitively evaluate their private-public boundary hence
rendering the availability of the privacy mechanisms not useful in enabling end users
to manage their boundaries. It would also be difficult for end users to associate their





The literature review begins by introducing a real world problem that arises from
conflicting requirements: the need for end users to disclose personal information so as
to benefit from online services and end users’ requirement for privacy protection. The
variety of privacy mechanisms that is available online and that caters for the tension is
then introduced. The second part of the literature review looks at the academic
foundation of this real world problem and reviews the research to date that addresses
the problem while focusing on privacy behaviour and privacy designs. The first pillar
is an exploration of privacy scholarship. The substantive contributions and
methodological contributions are also provided. Since a prerequisite of successful
information systems is effective human computer interactions, the second pillar is
usability. However, because of the need to ensure business models that depend on
disclosure are not disrupted and the need to accommodate different types of end users,
the third pillar of the academic and research to date review is persuasive technology.
The last section of the literature review elaborates on the research gap that can be
discerned, that is on the need to look at the human computer interactions design of
privacy from a social-psychological communications perspective and the benefit of
influence strategies such as persuasive technology.
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2.2 Real World Problem
The internet has revolutionised the way business is conducted. It has provided
powerful new ways to locate, learn about, and buy all types of products and services
(Norris et al., 2000). It has also dramatically changed the way people communicate
and has consequently enabled the creation of new virtual structures such as virtual
social communities (Bargh & McKenna, 2004).
During the process of using communication technology to interact and acquire
services online, content is often created and personal information is disclosed. This
makes end users vulnerable to risks such as the loss of personal information, privacy
intrusion, identity theft and fraud and becoming the target of behavioural marketing.
As a result there is a need to protect end users’ personal information when they
engage online.
The requirement of protecting end users’ privacy is however at a tension with the
business requirements of collecting and processing personal information that support
the provision of competitive services to end users. Online privacy protection
therefore has a social, organisational and technological dimension. In the next sub-
sections, these dimensions are reviewed and discussed.
2.2.1 Social
This section discusses the social implications of the lack of privacy protections.
These include exposure to identity theft and fraud, misrepresentation of information
and loss of control over personal information.
Individuals disclose a large amount of personal information online to enable the
creation and management of online identities that support online transactions and
online social life. While the maintenance of an online identity provides a lot of
benefits to end users such as complementing and facilitating traditional social
communication (Birnie and Horvath, 2002), a major problem for end users is not
being able to judge the extent of activity and accessibility of their online identities
(Strater and Richter, 2007). This might be mainly because online disclosure differs
from offline disclosure. In the offline environment, individuals tend to share private
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information with a small number of individuals and generally tend to not broadcast it
to the wider public audiences, while online broadcasting is much easier to accomplish
and personal information is frequently broadcast to a large audience although the user
may be sharing with a specific audience in mind as found by Richter-Lipford et al.
(2008). The sharing of one’s personal information is also usually done by the
individual or others close to the individual and differs from the online scenario where
personal information is more easily accessible and can potentially be shared by
anyone with access to it. For this reason the properties of online data and its
transmission affect the very nature of private information and hence no longer cater
for the intimacy required for communication and interpersonal relationships (Rachels,
1975). The situation also makes it easy for third parties to create digital dossiers of
their end users’ behaviour exposing them to physical and cyber risks. The
consequence of cyber crimes to end users can be very costly. This is shown by the
cost of cyber crime to UK citizens, as stated by the Detica’s E-Crime report (2011),
which is thought to be £3.1 billion per annum. These cyber crimes include identity
theft, online scams, scareware and fake antivirus (Detica and Cabinet Office, 2011).
Another social implication that develops due to the characteristics of the online
environment is the retention time of personal information. In the offline social
environment, personal information may be considered to have a brief retention time
since it often relies on human memory and is bounded within the context and
associated human emotions. In the online environment, however, information is
persistent and is easily replicated due to the nature of the internet infrastructure. The
consequences are that the information online can be easily taken out of context at a
later time, flattened of its emotional value and to the unawareness of end users be
made available to systems or people for analysis and scrutiny. The information might
be given a different meaning and secondary information might be inferred. These
characteristics might also deny users of their rights to exercise control on their
personal information in terms of who has access to it, when and how.
The use of online social interactions can also lead to an acceptance to be socially
pressured to conform into relinquishing control of access over information about
oneself and the control of access to oneself as discussed in Gross and Acquisti (2005).
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This can result into a redefinition of personal space which might create conflict in
offline life relationships. The later have to continuously adapt with the online persona
or identity.
To summarise, providing for end users’ privacy protection would have social benefits.
It has the potential to relieve the risks of cyber crime, to ensure end users’ online
content are protected from distortion and to maintain end user control and avoid
conflicts with offline identity.
2.2.2 Organisational
This section discusses the organisational implications of collecting and processing
personal information. These include the threat of cyber attacks, loss of customer trust
in the organisations’ services and breach of legal requirements.
Some organisations need to collect, process, store and manage customer information
much of which involves personal information in order to provide quality services to
customers. These include customised and personalised services. The potential
privacy problems that can arise from the different stages of personal information
manipulation activities have been outlined by Solove’s (2006) taxonomy. For
instance, information collection can result in surveillance. Information processing can
cause aggregation of data by linking different personal information. This would make
it easy to identify individuals from their online interactions, with the potential to cause
insecurity and exclusion. Information dissemination harms could include breach of
confidentiality, disclosure, exposure and increased accessibility. Organisations that
manipulate customer information are consequently an attractive target for cyber
attacks. It has in fact been shown in Detica’s Cyber E-Crime report that the loss or
theft of customer data costs UK businesses up to £1 billion per year (Detica and
Cabinet Office, 2011).
In addition to the financial implications, data breaches including the loss or
mismanagement of customer data also contributes to end users’ uneasiness when
engaging in transactions that involve the release of personal information and reduces
their trust in the service provider (Velmurugan, 2009). With regards to trust, the lack
of understanding and control of the technology provided by service providers and
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used to share personal information also contributes to a loss of trust and a negative
emotional reaction to the use of the technology (Adams and Sasse, 1999). There is
consequently a need for organisations to counteract privacy issues before they arise, to
solve them before people lose their trust and reject technology and services from the
service provider. Furthermore, end users might not be able to differentiate between
organisations that ensure the protection of their privacy versus those that do not. They
instead base their selection on the presence of security or privacy cues (Jensen et al.,
2005) that do not actually have much bearing on the service providers’ management
of end users’ personal information (Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy, 2002).
Moreover, privacy is a human right in Europe and it is a legal requirement to ensure
end users’ privacy (Council of Europe, 1950). The UK Government’s Data Protection
Act (1998) which was intended to bring the UK in line with the European
Parliament’s Electronic Commerce Directive (1995) aims to define UK law for all
parties involved in the processing of data on identifiable living people and provides a
way for individuals to control information about themselves. The Act defines eight
principles to which service providers involved in collection, processing and usage of
personal information must comply. The Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) has also
been proposed by the Information Commissioner’s Office of the UK to assess
compliance to the Data Protection Act that is organisations’ privacy risks in the
collection, use and disclosure of personal information (Information Commissioner’s
Office, 2009). As a result, privacy protection of end users is tightly linked with the
needs of the organisation to comply with privacy regulations. To ensure compliance,
organisations strive towards obtaining end users’ consent. However, for consent to be
fair, it has to be informed consent that is achieved when fully informed end users
participate in decisions about their personal data. Informed consent
‘originates from the legal and ethical right the user has to direct what
happens to his information, and from the ethical duty of the
organisation using personal data to involve the user in the control, use
and maintenance of these data’ (Van der Geest et al., 2005).
To summarise, organisations that collect and process personal information are at risk
of cyber attacks. Cyber attacks and other data breaches can result in damaged
reputation and loss of customer trust. In addition, since organisations deal with
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personal information, they have to comply with privacy regulations. To do so, they
have to provide for informed consent. This leads to the next section that is the means
employed by organisations to inform end users of personal information processing
and of tools that are useful for ensuring their privacy.
2.2.3 Technological
While each of the activities that information systems perform with personal
information such as data transfer, data storage and data processing can raise privacy
concerns, their impact on privacy varies on how they are performed, what type of data
is involved and who uses the data. As discussed in the previous section, the
businesses that operate these information systems have to abide by legal requirements
to ensure protection of end users’ personal information. To do so they design privacy
mechanisms into the systems. This section discusses the ways of ensuring end users’
privacy protection through technological designs. It highlights how the designs are
used and their effectiveness.
Privacy mechanisms can be added to or embedded to online systems making those
systems privacy-friendly systems and the mechanisms privacy-enhancing
technologies (PETs) (Van Blarkom et al., 2003). PET is the umbrella term for
hardware and software mechanisms that not only ensure compliance with privacy
regulations but is also believed to provide more flexible ways for people to protect
their privacy (Enterprise Privacy Group, 2008). Privacy mechanisms can support end
users as part of their overall strategy to manage the risks involved in disclosing
personal information.
Privacy-friendly systems can be divided into two types of systems that depend on the
type of privacy engineering approach used. They are either privacy-by-policy
systems or privacy-by-architecture systems (Spiekermann and Cranor, 2009).
Privacy-by-policy systems focus on the implementation of notice and choice
principles of the European Directive on Electronic Commerce, the UK Data
Protection Act or the Fair Information Principles standard of the US. This means that
notice should be provided in the form of at least some information about the service
collecting personal information, how these will be used, potential recipients, ways by
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which the information is collected, whether disclosure by end users is voluntary or
required and the measures taken by the service provider to ensure protection of end
users’ personal information (Federal Trade Commission, 2000). In addition, they
have to provide end users with the choice of what and how to disclose (Federal Trade
Commission, 2000). On the other hand, privacy-by-architecture systems minimise
collection of identifiable personal information and emphasise on anonymity and
client-side data storage and processing. Therefore, by definition, systems that rely on
privacy-by-policy ought to integrate notice, choice and access mechanisms in order to
ensure end users are aware of privacy risks and offer choices that enable control over
their personal information whereas privacy-by architecture systems ought to ensure
profiles cannot be linked with a reasonable or automated effort.
The privacy-by-policy approach has been adopted by many businesses since it does
not interfere with their current business models that rely extensively on personal
information. They do so by providing terms of agreement and privacy policies to
which end users ought to agree in order to benefit from a provided service. Privacy
notices are used for compliance purposes and as a result are designed as exhaustive
legal texts and are not accessible or informative to consumers (Milne and Culnan,
2004). They have been said to be “inadequate tools” (Cate, 2010, pp 59) for
managing privacy online. As quoted in Cate (2010), the Federal Trade Commission,
explains that
“Notice and choice don’t provide intrinsic privacy protection, although
they might serve other purposes. Consequently, they’ve become at
worst a substitute for more meaningful privacy protections.” (Cate,
2010, pp.60-61)
Since it has been recognised that it is hard to ensure end users can exercise control
over their information solely through privacy policies of service providers,
development of software or hardware that enable this control has been encouraged.
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) is a standard developed by World Wide Web
Consortium designed to provide internet users with a clear understanding of how
personal information will be used by a particular website (W3C, 2007). It is based on
privacy preferences set on the website and how they compare with the end user’s own
privacy preferences. While P3P version 1.0 provided insufficient support to end
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users’ evaluation of a site’s policy, AT&T Corp. designed a tool, Privacy Bird (AT &
T Corp., 2006) that reads P3P policies and displays them in an understandable
language. The tool partly addressed the issue by allowing end users to specify their
own privacy preferences, compares them with a website’s P3P-encoded privacy
policy when end users visit the website and alerts them when the policy does not meet
their standards. A few browsers also allow end users to specify certain limited
privacy preferences and compare them with the P3P policies of visited websites. For
instance, Internet Explorer allows end users to initially state few privacy preferences
and blocks cookies from sites that do not adhere to these preferences. However, these
software systems require end users to make privacy decisions a-priori, without regard
to specific circumstances in a particular context.
Privacy-by-architecture mechanisms on the other hand do not involve policies but
instead take a technological approach to ensure privacy through anonymity and
pseudonymity tools (Spiekermann and Cranor, 2009). Anonymity of end users means
that they cannot be identified or tracked online. This approach has been used in
anonymous email remailers such as in Babel (Gulcu and Tsudik, 1996) and
anonymous web browsing tools such as Anonymizer (Anonymizer, 2012).
Anonymizer is a web proxy that strips off identifying headers and source addresses
from the web browser. Another approach is “onion routing” which is built upon the
notion of “mix network” (Chaum, 1982). A mix network is essentially a chain of
proxy servers (called mixes). In onion routing, a message or packet is encrypted to
each mix node using public key cryptography. The resulting encryption is similar to a
layered “onion” with the original message in the innermost layer. As the message
traverses over the network, each mix node strips off its own layer of encryption to
reveal where to send the message next. For example, Tor (Tor Inc., 2012), a concrete
onion routing system can provide anonymous communication such as web browsing,
remote login sessions, instant messaging and other applications that rely on the TCP
protocol. Another approach is centred on the concept of “k-anonymity” (Sweeney,
2002). It is concerned with a practical problem of releasing data about individuals
without revealing identifying information about them. In a k-anonymized release,
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each individual’s record is indistinguishable from at least k-1 other individuals’
records.
Since end users need to be authenticated to gain access to certain systems, identity
management solutions can help to ensure their privacy. Authentication seeks to
ensure that end users are actually the person they claim to be and this is usually
achieved by employing a username in combination with a password, where the
username is considered as the digital identity of end users and the password as their
authentication. A more sophisticated, and thus more secure, scheme is two-factor
authentication, which involves two independent ways for verifying identity. It may
include a user having something (e.g., a bank ATM card or a time dependent token
card) and the user knowing something (e.g., a PIN). One of the goals of emerging
identity management systems is to allow end users to have more than one digital
identity and be able to freely choose which identity to use. An industry example is
Microsoft’s CardSpace (Chappell, 2006), an "identity metasystem" that allows end
users to create multiple virtual identity cards. Each virtual card created by end users
contains the minimum amount of information (retrieved from an identity provider)
that they need to divulge to carry out the transaction to which the card applies.
CardSpace thereby uses the metaphor of the various cards that are used to identify
individuals in the physical world, such as business cards, driver’s licenses and credit
cards. With these virtual cards, end users no longer have to worry about daunting
passwords. The problem with these mechanisms is that end users need to manage a
number of identities and their authentication factors.
OpenID is an open specification of a truly distributed identity system (Cross, 2008).
OpenID providers are essentially authentication brokers between end users and
OpenID enabled websites. They allow end users to log into an OpenID supported
website without registration. End users’ passwords and other credentials are safely
stored by OpenID. Because of its open and distributed nature, ease of use, and easy
adoption for websites, OpenID is gaining more and more momentum. However
because of the use of a single login, it suffers from single point of failure.
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Anonymizers and identity management attend to concerns such as improper
monitoring and improper use by observing identity principles (e.g., pseudonymity) but
not data principles such as notice/access and choice/consent. They also take control
away from end users. However, although some privacy designs, such as those
designed in social network services, enable end user control, they remain remotely
used.
This section showed that although privacy mechanisms are designed online, they
might not be accessible to end users and consequently not usable in ensuring end
users can manage their privacy. In the following sections, the literature review first
explores the two main themes of the real world problem: privacy and usability and
then reviews the research’s proposed enhancement approach: persuasive technology.
2.3 Privacy
As elaborated in the real world section above, it can be seen that the main focus of
this literature review is about privacy. In this section of the literature review, the
academic context of privacy is presented followed by an exploration of research to
date that aimed to ensure end users’ privacy.
2.3.1 Privacy in an academic context
This section explores the historic, philosophical, political, social and legal roots of
privacy. It shows that the use of the term privacy is not uniform and there remains to
date confusion over the meaning, value and scope of the concept of privacy.
Although there are several sceptical and critical accounts of privacy (Thomson, 1975;
Posner, 1981; MacKinnon, 1989; Bork, 1990) mostly taking a reductionist approach
to the concept of privacy claiming that privacy is not a concept on its own but rather
part of other conceptual systems, most theorists such as Schoeman (1984) take the
‘coherentist’ view that privacy is a meaningful and valuable concept whose
characteristics have emanated through a variety of cases. The systematic written
discussion of the concept of privacy is said to have begun in 1890 with Warren and
Brandeis’ (1890) famous essay “The right to privacy” which cited political, social and
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economic changes that led to a recognition for the right to be let alone. They argued
that existing law afforded a way to protect the privacy of the individual. They
believed the privacy principle was already part of the common law but that new
technology, for instance photography and newspapers, made it important to explicitly
and separately recognise this protection under the name of privacy (Warren and
Brandeis, 1890; Schoeman, 1984). They thus laid the foundation for a concept of
privacy that has come to be known as the control over information about oneself.
However it was only in the second half of the twentieth century that philosophical
debates concerning definitions of privacy became prominent due to the development
of privacy protection in the Privacy Act of 1974 (Buckley, 1974).
Westin endorsed the value of privacy as the control over information by describing
privacy as the ability to determine for oneself when, how and to what extent
information about one is communicated to others (Westin, 1967). Bloustein (1964)
also supported Warren et al.’s position on the need for a general theory of individual
privacy that reconciles its divergent strands. It defines one’s essence as a human
being and it includes individual dignity and integrity, personal autonomy and
independence. A more common view however has been to argue that privacy and
intimacy are related. Fried (1970) argued that privacy has intrinsic value and is
necessarily related to, and fundamental to, one’s development as an individual with a
moral and social personality to be able to form intimate relationships involving
respect, love, friendship and trust. Privacy is valuable he argued because it allows one
to maintain varying degrees of intimacy (Fried, 1970). Gerstein (1978) also supported
the necessity of privacy for intimacy which is required in communication and
interpersonal relationships for one to fully experience his life. Schoeman (1984)
endorsed these views and stressed that privacy provides a way to control intimate
information about oneself that has many other benefits, not only for relationships with
others, but also for the development of one’s personality and inner self. Other
researchers such as Rachels (1975) expanded the value of privacy to intimacy by
emphasising the importance of developing diverse interpersonal relationships with
others.
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Rachels (1975) further criticised the reductionists’ view of privacy by urging that
privacy is a distinctive right. He defended the view that privacy is essential to
maintain a variety of social relationships, not just intimate ones, privacy accord the
ability to control who knows what about oneself and who has access to one, and
thereby allows one to vary behaviour with different people in order to maintain and
control a variety of social relationships, many of which might not be intimate.
Rachels’ (1975) analysis emphasised that privacy is not only limited to control over
information but also access to oneself, both of which allows control over relationships
with others, thus connecting privacy to one’s behaviour and activities.
In more recent literature highly related to the advances in technology, privacy has
been defined as the freedom from judgement (Itrona and Pouloudi, 1999), the ability
to exercise privacy tradeoffs (Adams and Sasse, 1999), the control over who has
access to information (Belloti and Sellen, 1993; Dourish, 1993), the purpose and
sensitivity of the information in a particular context (Westin, 1967; Adams and Sasse,
1999). Although the explicit impact of technology on privacy came to the fore since
the arguments of Warren et al., there have been reasons for overriding the privacy
intrusions. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been
increasing views of the need to trade privacy for security and surveillance for public
safety (Chandler, 2009). However, it might be argued that such approach of trading
privacy for security strikes the wrong balance. Indeed, rather than security and
privacy being zero-sum approaches to society’s safety, a win-win approach is more
complementary to good system designs. In the past few years research has examined
ways in which respect for privacy might be balanced with justifiable uses of emerging
technology (Agre and Rotenberg, 1997; Brin, 1998; Austin, 2003).
Westin et al. (1991) described individuals according to their privacy concerns. He
defined ‘privacy fundamentalists’ as individuals who are extremely concerned with
how their personal information is used and therefore are generally unwilling to share
it with anyone; the ‘privacy pragmatists’, who share some of these concerns but prefer
to make decisions on a case by case basis; and the ‘privacy unconcerned’ who are
willing to give away information without much thought whenever it is requested of
them (Westin et al., 1991). However, end users often appear unconcerned about
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privacy until it is actually breached (Regan, 1995). This is because privacy is
deterministic and tacit in nature that is, although users value their privacy, they cannot
easily explain what it means to them and how they engage in private interactions until
there is an effect to which they might relate. Privacy is also a volatile concept in the
sense that end users’ privacy perceptions may alter according to contexts and value
tradeoffs that change over time and space for the same information.
The lack of clear and consistent definitions, different theoretical viewpoints and the
fact that end users have varying views of the importance of privacy might infer the
idea of a communication problem between the technology developers and end users.
The next section reviews online privacy research to date.
2.3.2 Privacy research to date
Previous research in the area of online privacy has aimed at achieving a better
understanding of privacy behaviour online and has studied end users’ privacy decision
making processes. They have done so using different perspectives and under different
conditions. This section discusses their substantive and methodological contributions.
Substantive results
As reviewed in the previous section, privacy concerns are situated and dependent on
the individual. End users can be categorised according to their online privacy
concerns as privacy unconcerned, pragmatists and fundamentalists as shown through
Westin’s Privacy Segmentation Index (Kumaraguru and Cranor, 2005). However,
privacy concern does not seem to corroborate with privacy behaviour. This was
found by Spiekermann et al. (2001) and later confirmed by Acquisti and Grossklags
(2005a). They found a privacy dichotomy in that although customers claim to be
concerned about their online privacy; they do not behave according to these concerns
both in terms of observed behaviour (Spiekermann et al., 2001) and reported
behaviour (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005a). Spiekermann et al. (2001) observed
voluntary disclosure of address to a ‘bot’ and the types and number of questions
answered. They found that rich and soft online communication with the automated
software induced even privacy fundamentalists and profile averse participants to
disclose (Spiekermann et al., 2001) personal information. These findings triggered
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further research into understanding privacy decision making and factors that influence
privacy behaviour.
The occurrence of the privacy dichotomy might be due to the fact that individuals are
not rational decision makers. In a study to understand end users’ decision making
process with respect to privacy, Acquisti (2004) found that individuals do not act as
rational economic agents as expected by privacy designs. Instead they exhibit
bounded rationality and behavioural bias. While models of rational behaviour were
seen to be unrealistic in E-Commerce, models of psychological distortions that reflect
end users’ self-control problems and the need for immediate gratification can be
deduced (Acquisti, 2004). End users give higher value to the immediate benefits they
can obtain from revealing personal information rather than the long-term desire to
maintain privacy and under-estimate the cumulative risks associated with the cost of
privacy loss (Acquisti, 2004). This happens even if end users perceive the risks of not
protecting their privacy as significant. In another study Acquisti and Grossklags
(2005b) found that limited information, ambiguity and uncertainty affect privacy
decision making by reducing the valuation of personal information when compared
with a certain benefit such as a discount (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005b).
Strandburg (2005) adds to the psychological perspective by further explaining the
need to disclose immediately by arguing that people have a willpower problem and
cannot resist the temptation to reveal (Strandburg, 2005).
Moreover, trust has also been found to impact end users’ privacy behaviour. Jensen et
al. (2005) show the effect of eleven variables on participants’ choice of E-Commerce
website. They investigated whether there was a relationship between the variables
and purchase decisions and found that participants did not consult the policy as much
as they reported they would and the likelihood that they would consult the privacy
policy was unrelated to Westin’s privacy concern categories (described in the
previous section) and to gender. However the presence of the privacy policy did
affect website choices. It was found that participants selected sites that had a privacy
policy although they did not open and read the policy (Jensen et al., 2005). Trust is
also induced through the reputation of the business and the presence of privacy cues,
such as privacy seals including TRUSTe and Policy-User-Good (Jensen et al., 2005).
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In their research on perceived privacy and trust, Joinson et al. (2010) found that trust
moderates the impact of privacy concerns on behaviour by interacting with perceived
privacy, such that high trust compensates for low privacy and vice versa. This finding
has implications for research that looks into privacy designs such that studies that
manipulate privacy and keep trust at a relatively high level might not find a significant
association between privacy and behaviour (Joinson et al., 2010). In another study
involving the P3P privacy enhanced search engine, Privacy Finder, it was found that
participants trusted the privacy policy information, annotated to search results by the
Privacy Finder. The Privacy Finder displayed a green, yellow or red bird icon
revealing the status of the privacy policy. It was found that the information provided
by the Privacy Finder had significant influence on the choice of websites for privacy
sensitive purchases. Participants also assumed that a red bird icon was worse than no
icon which was actually an indication that the privacy policy was unknown and could
not be read by the privacy tool (Gideon et al., 2006). These studies show how users
can be misled by the presence of privacy information that induces trust in the business
and can explain behaviour that contradicts privacy concern.
Privacy policies can be successful in promoting end user choice only if the policy is
read and the information contained in the notices are used. In a study to understand
the motivations of end users to read privacy policies across a variety of situations,
Milne and Culnan (2004) found that individuals tend not to read privacy polices when
they have prior experience with the company. However for respondents who read the
policy, they did so due to concerns when financial details were involved, to see how
their personal details will be used and shared with others, to avoid receiving junk
mail. Although concern motivated end users to read the policy, their perceived
comprehensibility of the policy affected whether they actually read the policy.
The review of research to date of this section showed that end users do not behave
according to their privacy concerns for several reasons. These include the following:
 End users are not rational economic agents and cannot be expected to interact
online as rational beings. Instead people exhibit psychological distortions and
behavioural bias.
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 HCI provides limited and ambiguous information that causes uncertainty
during privacy decision making and reduced valuation of personal information
and privacy.
 Privacy HCI designs might not be usable due to end users’ own assumptions
(Privacy Finder’s green, yellow and red icon) causing them to be misled.
 Privacy cues do not connect with end users’ privacy attitudes to the extent of
resulting in interactions with privacy mechanisms but instead link with trust
attitudes to influence choice of service provider.
 Rather than the HCI interactively motivating end users and contributing to
their engagement with privacy mechanisms, end users’ own individual
concerns (such as for financial details) was found to be the reason for privacy
actions.
Therefore there is a need to better understand online privacy management as an
interactive process and the role of HCI in contributing to this process and supporting
end users’ management of their privacy. There is also a need to better comprehend
end users’ response to different types of design elements.
Methodological approach
The methodological approach taken by previous research to understand privacy user
behaviour and privacy decision making consists of a variety of methods. These
include model mapping and the use of questionnaires, surveys and user experiments.
In his study of online privacy decision making, Acquisti (2004) used behavioural
economics to map a model of rational privacy decision making and showed why end
users could not be expected to behave according to the rational model (Acquisti,
2004). An online survey of adult internet users was conducted by Milne and Culnan
(2004). They collected reported accounts of the frequency with which respondents
read the privacy policy. They also asked the respondents to elaborate on the reasons
for the number of times they read the policy. This approach helps to understand the
motivations for reading the privacy policy. However, respondents’ own reports of
their behaviour or expected behaviour might not be an ideal reflection of their privacy
behaviour. This is because the respondents might be answering the survey with how
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they should behave rather than how they usually behave. Such surveys also require
respondents to imagine themselves in the situation. This process might not be
accurate given that, as discussed in the previous section, privacy is a tacit concept
which is grounded in a particular situation.
Acquisti and Grossklags (2005b) also used a survey method but opted for an
experimental survey design methodology to enable evaluation of the effect of
uncertainty and ambiguity on privacy behaviour. The experimental manipulation of
conditions was also used to explore the interaction effect of trust with privacy
behaviour. Joinson et al. (2010) first used questionnaires to measure privacy concern,
self-disclosure, situational perceived privacy and trust and devised a model of their
interactions. This was followed by an experimental manipulation of privacy and trust
using a web-based survey. The experimental manipulations for privacy were strong
versus weak privacy policy whereas trust was manipulated by hosting the survey on
an educational domain versus on a domain designed to reduce trust that included
advertisements and spelling and coding mistakes. Although this approach included
pre-questionnaires that supported the experimental survey and controlled and
manipulated the experimental conditions, it however took respondents from their
natural setting. This might cause the participants to respond with what is expected of
them rather than provide an indication of their usual behaviour.
User studies and laboratory experiments were also used. Jensen et al. (2005) used an
experimental approach to complement their demographic survey in order to better
understand user behaviour. They presented participants with eight pairs of simulated
E-Commerce web pages with controlled variation of twelve factors and asked
participants which sites they would prefer to buy from. The variables were price of
item, indication of SSL encryption, use of third party cookies and P3P, TRUSTe
privacy seal, credit-card symbols, the company e-mail address, telephone number,
postal address and four distinct privacy policies. On the other hand, Gideon et al.’s
study involved a laboratory user experiment where participants were presented with a
privacy enhanced search engine to select websites from which to make a privacy
sensitive and a non privacy sensitive purchase. However participants may not be as
likely to act naturally in laboratory setting than in their natural setting. In addition
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this might generate a strong feeling of being under observation that consequently
inhibits natural behaviour.
This section described the different methods used within privacy research to date. To
summarise:
 the methodological approach might suffer from ecological validity since they
either relied on self reporting of behaviour or was conducted within a
laboratory which differs from end users’ real life setting.
 The section also showed the difficulty of designing the most suitable study
involving measurement of privacy behaviour that avoids all possible
weaknesses. The very nature of privacy management can weaken the research
methods used.
 Therefore the research methods within this thesis and measurement methods
for privacy behaviour have to be carefully designed such that the
characteristics of privacy are taken into account.
2.4 Usability
Privacy as the focus of the literature review was explored in the previous section.
However as discussed in section 2.2.3 above, privacy mechanisms are available for
online use but end users might not be able to use them for the purpose for which they
were designed. Hence the second sphere of the literature review is the usability of
privacy online. In this section, the academic context of usability is presented followed
by an exploration of research to date that addresses the usability aspect of online
privacy mechanisms.
2.4.1 Usability in an academic context
This section explores the foundations of usability. It starts with the origin of usability
followed by measurement approaches.
Human-computer interaction (HCI) is the study of the interaction between people and
computers and is concerned with the physical, psychological and theoretical aspects
of this process (Dix et al., 2004). In the 60’s and 70’s the goal of developers was to
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provide increasingly sophisticated software with more and more functionality that
catered for a small number of trained end users only (Preece, 2001). However, over
the following decade, there was a raised interest in the HCI research area by
psychologists and human factors researchers (Dumas, 2007). The term usability was
then adopted to replace the vague and subjective connotations acquired by the term
‘user-friendly’ (Bevan et al., 1991) and researchers were exploring both the use of
scientific research experimental methods and checklist reviews as usability evaluation
methods (Preece, 2001).
However, usability was still a poorly defined concept (Preece, 2001) with no accepted
definition mainly due to the different requirements believed to make a product usable
(Bevan et al., 1992). The definitions developed from different views of what usability
is, three of which relate to usability measurement as analysed by Bevan et al. (1992).
They were the product-oriented view, user-oriented view and the user-performance
view. In the product-oriented view, usability can be measured in terms of the
ergonomic attributes of the product whereas for the user-oriented view, usability can
be measured in terms of the mental effort and attitude of the user. In the user-
performance view, usability can be measured by how the user interacts with the
product in terms of ease-of-use and acceptability (Bevan et al., 1992).
Furthermore, a survey of the literature performed by Rengger (1991) has identified
four classes of performance measure. These are goal achievement which means
accuracy and effectiveness; work rate which refers to productivity and efficiency,
knowledge acquisition which relates to learnability and learning rate, and operability
which involves error rate and function usage. Macleod et al. (1998) on the other hand
defined usability to be ease of use and acceptability and claimed that the latter affects
whether the product will be used. However, while measurement of the internal state,
that is the user's physical state such as muscular or ocular fatigue, affective state such
as preference and confidence, and mental state such as mental effort and fatigue,
measured through psycho-metric (Kirakowski and Corbett, 1988) or psycho-
physiological measures (Wiethoff et al., 1991) have been claimed to provide evidence
of ease of use and acceptability, these are also factors that a-priori affect the
effectiveness, efficiency of the product and the satisfaction experienced in usage
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(Jordan, 1998). Thus we can argue that their measurement does not completely reflect
the usability of the product but rather the state of the user which might be independent
of the product usability.
ISO’s definition of usability is however a more widely accepted definition of
usability, that is, that the usability of a product is a function of the particular user or
class of users being studied and the environment in which they work (Brooke et al.,
1990; ISO, 1998). This view was also accepted by Shackel (1991) who devised a
usability framework based upon earlier similar approaches. Shackel (1991) states that
usability “depends upon the dynamic interplay” of the “four principal components of
any user-system situation: user, task, tool and environment”. ISO 9241-11 provides a
framework whose purpose is to describe the components of usability and the
relationship between them. ISO 9241-11 not only defines usability but also explains
how to identify the information which is necessary to take into account when
specifying or evaluating usability of a visual display terminal in terms of measures of
user performance and satisfaction similar to Shackel’s framework (Shackel, 1991).
This section provided a review of the different viewpoints of usability. It suggests
that selection of a measurement factor of usability, such as effectiveness, efficiency,
learnability, error rate, ease of use and acceptability, depends on the aspect of HCI
under investigation. The next section elaborates on usability research conducted
within the privacy domain to date.
2.4.2 Usability in research to date
This section reviews previous privacy research that has addressed the usability aspect
of online privacy mechanisms. Un-usability of privacy mechanisms, in particular lack
of readability and accessibility, is often provided as explanation to end users not using
online privacy mechanisms.
Substantive results
In section 2.2.3, in this chapter, it was highlighted that the privacy policy might not be
effective in ensuring end users’ privacy online. The studies described in this section
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support the in-effectiveness stance since they found privacy policies to be too
legalistic, un-readable and un-usable.
In a review of the observations from three US Federal Trade Commission workshops,
Cate (2010) stressed that policies have been considered as contracts which supports
Milne and Culnan’s (2004) survey findings that policies were too legalistic and hence
not readable. Anton at al. (2004) found that 40 online privacy statements from 9
financial institutions lacked clarity and demonstrated in their study that most policies
require a reading skill higher than the adult US internet population’s average literacy
level. They further proposed a standardised method of expressing privacy policies and
for policies to be clearly articulated in a meaningful way. From their accessibility and
readability analysis of 64 privacy policies, Jensen and Potts (2004) found problems
with the structure and content of privacy policies. They concluded that the form,
location and legal context of privacy policies make them un-usable as decision
making aids for privacy concerned end users. Although the websites analysed had
accessible privacy policies, they failed to provide adequate notification of changes or
to present policies in a language end users can understand.
Proponents of improved privacy protection through the policies called for a simplified
and unified format that presents information in a condensed and accessible form
(Bettman et al., 1986; Derby and Levy, 2001). It has been argued that systems need
to provide feedback and allow end users to perform an assessment of tradeoffs
(Belloti and Sellen, 1993). Other studies have recommended more reader friendly
alternatives to conventional privacy policies (Pollach, 2007), ways of presenting
privacy information more clearly (Gideon et al., 2006) the need for privacy software
to be designed in such a way that they allow even moderately computer-literate online
users to protect themselves from the degree of self-disclosure they are afraid of
(Spiekermann et al., 2001), and the requirement that an individual has a means to
exercise control of access to the self and is aware of the potential consequences of
exercising that control (Dourish, 1993).
Privacy researchers and industry groups have designed enhancements to the privacy
policy formats with the aim of helping end users read and compare policies. One
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enhancement is layered policies which present a short form of the policy in addition to
a full policy (McDonald et al., 2009). Another enhancement is the Privacy Finder
which is in a brief bulleted format (McDonald et al., 2009). In a comparative study
McDonald et al. (2009) evaluated layered policies, the Privacy Finder report and
conventional human-readable policies and found that participants of the study were
not able to reliably understand the privacy policies in any of the formats. Compared
to conventional policies, participants read the layered and bulleted formats faster but
at the expense of accuracy for the layered format. Although the bulleted format
resulted in higher accuracy than the conventional format, all the formats and policies
were similarly disliked. Policies were also found to be not user-friendly for the
moderately computer-literate users (McDonald et al., 2009).
There has also been research into specific privacy enhancing technologies, for
instance P3P. Recommendations have been followed by attempts to devise better user
interfaces for P3P. For instance, Cranor et al. (2006) described their design approach
for user interfaces for P3P user agents. They also discussed design challenges for user
interfaces for specifying privacy preferences and concluded that user interface
designers need to find ways to manage the complexity, educate users about privacy, or
express privacy concepts using language they already understand, guide users through
the process of expressing their privacy preferences, and offer various options that
meet the needs of a diverse set of users (Cranor et al., 2006).
Cranor et al. (2006) evaluated user interfaces for privacy agents that can fetch P3P
privacy policies automatically, compare them with end users’ privacy preferences and
alert and advise end users. They developed one such user agent called Privacy Bird
and found that although participants in their survey thought the bird sound was
annoying, participants reported a change in their behaviour caused by the Privacy Bird
(Cranor et al., 2006). Behaviour was reported to change with regards to filling forms
online, taking advantage of opt out opportunities, ceasing to visit some websites,
comparing policies at similar sites and trying to frequent sites with better privacy
policies. Moreover, although not statistically significant, participants of the
laboratory study had a quicker rate of finding privacy information with Privacy Bird
than with Internet Explorer 6.0 or reading policies. They found the Privacy Bird to be
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both useful and usable and appreciated short summaries of information as long as they
did not hide important information.
Reasons given in the literature for under-utilisation of privacy in social network
include poor interface design, permissive default settings, social conformance, and
inherent trust in the online community (boyd, 2004; Acquisti and Gross, 2006; Govani
and Pashley, 2007; Gross and Acquisti, 2005). Richter-Lipford et al. (2008) designed
a prototype to improve privacy management in Facebook. Whilst they demonstrated
that Facebook users had difficulty understanding the existing settings, they found that
their audience view prototype enabled end users to have a better mental model and
improved visual feedback (Richter-Lipford et al., 2008). In a subsequent study,
Richter-Lipford et al. (2010) compared two different privacy policy representations:
AudienceView that represents a policy as the different views of information as seen
by various audiences or groups of user and ExpandableGrids which is a general,
matrix-based visualisation of a policy showing effective combination of policy rules.
They found that both interfaces were highly usable but there was no performance
difference between the two interfaces (Richter-Lipford et al., 2010). However, users
had clear and different preferences. Some preferred AudienceView for the visual
feedback but disliked the number of page visits while others liked the compact
overview available for ExpandableGrids with all settings in one location. They
concluded from their results that either interface would be usable for similar privacy
policies and that different representations of the policies may appeal to different users
(Richter-Lipford et al., 2010).
This section explored the design of privacy mechanisms from a usability perspective.
However, as discussed by Ackerman and Cranor (1999) privacy poses a difficult HCI
problem since the privacy mechanisms must not only provide information and enable
decision making (such as through enhancements to readability, performance or
enabling better understanding of privacy policies as described above) but also has to
enable this to happen seamlessly and without interference to social engagements.
This view was also re-iterated by Cranor et al. (2006) in their discussion of the design
challenges that need to be addressed to enable end users to specify privacy
preferences. This is because
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 the proposed separate enhancements to readability and performance or
enabling better understanding of privacy policies might not ensure that end
users are able to manage their privacy effectively as per their privacy goals.
 Moreover, as concluded in the review of usability within an academic context
above (section 2.4.1), there are different usability viewpoints and selection of
a measurement factor of usability depends on the aspect of HCI under
investigation.
 Therefore before evaluating usability of online privacy, there is first a need to
better understand the requirements of usable online privacy mechanisms
through a multidisciplinary perspective (not only legal or technological).
 Such an approach might enable the design of a better means of evaluating
usability of online privacy and help to suggest proposals for usability
enhancements.
Methodological approach
The methodological approach adopted by the research that investigated usability
aspects of privacy included both evaluations of specific designs and comparisons of
different designs based on end user choice. The methods comprised analytical
evaluations of design, user surveys and comparisons to better understand how end
users interacted with the designs and laboratory user studies to measure effectiveness
aspects such as performance.
Anton et al. (2004) performed goal-driven requirements engineering and readability
analysis of 40 privacy policy statements from 9 financial institutions. The analysis
enabled the identification of vulnerabilities, ambiguities and conflicts. They were
concerned that they, experienced analysts, encountered difficulties in understanding
policy statements. Jensen and Potts (2004) analysed 64 privacy policies belonging to
a set of high-traffic websites and a set of health care websites. Their analysis differs
from Anton et al. (2004) in that they assessed policy accessibility first in terms of ease
for users to find the policy and second in terms of the ease for users to get a complete
picture of the policy. Ease of finding the policy was measured through placement of
policy link and visibility whereas ease of getting a complete picture was measured
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through the length and number of pages the policy is spread across. They also
determined policy readability using the Flesch Reading Ease Score (Flesch, 1848).
These two analyses provided valuable insight into whether end users can be expected
to access and read privacy policies but did not suggest how the design could be
improved to enhance accessibility and readability. Although the evaluations were
structured, analytical evaluations have the disadvantage of not involving end users
and of being an interpretation from a given perspective.
Experimental survey designs and laboratory experiments were also conducted.
McDonald et al. (2009) conducted an online between subject survey where 749
participants were presented to one of 15 privacy policy representations. They
contrasted 6 companies’ conventional natural language policies and their
corresponding Privacy Finder report privacy policy format plus three layered policies.
The study questions assessed comprehensibility, psychological acceptability and
demographics and assessed whether participants had higher accuracy scores, shorter
times to answer and greater psychological ability with both of the standardised
formats than with their natural language counterparts. Cranor et al. (2006) also
conducted a user survey to find out how the P3P user agent, Privacy Bird was used in
practice and collected self-reported data from individuals who have been using
Privacy Bird for several months in their own homes and offices. The participants
reported a change in behaviour following use of Privacy Bird. In a subsequent
laboratory study, they compared effectiveness of Privacy Bird with Internet Explorer
and reading privacy policies. 12 experienced Internet Explorer users were given a
brief tutorial of the browser agent and Privacy Bird and were then asked to answer
questions with regards to a web site’s privacy policy. The control was to read the
policy at a different web site without the help of privacy bird. The time taken to find
information was collected. The researchers also evaluated the capabilities of Privacy
Bird with respect to Bellotti and Sellen’s (1993) framework for design for privacy
related computer supported co-operative work, computer mediated communication
and ubiquitous computing environment and discussed how Privacy Bird provided
these. Self-reported accounts might be to some degree biased with participants
reporting what they thought researchers wanted to hear whereas laboratory
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experiments take participants away from their natural setting such that they cannot be
completely expected to behave as they naturally would.
Richter-Lipford et al. (2008, 2010) used iterative prototyping and testing. In 2008,
Richter-Lipford at al. conducted a within subject comparison user study where
participants were asked to perform a set of five tasks on two interface asking them to
determine the effects of the privacy settings in terms of determining who had access
to what information. Their comfort or confidence about who would get access to their
information was also queried for the two versions. In a follow up study, Richter-
Lipford et al. (2010) conducted another within subject study to compare the tradeoffs
between the AudienceView and ExpandableGrids. Users were asked to complete 17
individual tasks for each interface, after each they were asked to rate their confidence
in their actions or responses. In the first four tasks they read and understood a policy
and to gauge their understanding of the settings, they were asked which friend groups
could access some information from their profile. The other tasks involved simple
and complex configurations followed by an exploration and self configuration of
privacy settings while thinking aloud. The within subject study might suffer from
carry-over effects such that when participants reach the second interface, they might
detect and process information quicker and be more confident. 17 individual tasks for
each interface could also cause fatigue to affect the findings.
This section described the variety of approaches used to assess the usability of online
privacy. Although each of the different approaches contributes valuable insight into
the research area, it is practically unfeasible to design a usability study that perfectly
matches a real world situation and at the same time generates rich data. A fitting
approach could however be to conduct at least two studies with different approaches
that support and complement each other. This is because as shown by the above
review:
 analytical evaluations suffer from the disadvantage of not involving end users
and largely depend on evaluators’ interpretations.
 Participants’ self-reports might not be reliable due to a possible tendency to
please researchers or due to participants’ reports of assumed ideal behaviour.
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 Participants in within subject user studies involving comparisons might be
affected by carry-over effects and fatigue.
2.5 Persuasive technology
Although privacy mechanisms are available online, due to the nature of privacy and
the diversity of end users, usability alone might not ensure that privacy designs can
connect with end users’ attitudes. Influence methods might provide this support to
privacy designs. The third sphere of the literature review is persuasive technology. In
this section, the academic context of persuasive technology is presented followed by
an exploration of research to date that addresses the influence of website components
or designs on end user privacy behaviour.
2.5.1 Persuasive technology in an academic context
This section of the review highlights the origin of persuasion in communication. It
then portrays the use of persuasive communication within technology.
Persuasion, as defined by the philosopher Aristotle over 2300 years ago, is “the art of
getting people to do something they wouldn’t ordinarily do if you didn’t ask” (Borg,
2007). Borg argues that basic human values have not changed much over the
centuries and the groundwork laid by Aristotle for successful communication
provided the most influential theory regarding persuasion. Aristotle observed that as
social animals, all humans were called upon to persuade fellow human beings almost
on a daily basis since all persuasive situations comprise of taking the audience from a
certain starting point A and moving them to point B which is the objective. That
shifting of attitude is what is called persuasion. Since at the initial point A, the person
is uninterested or resistant to one’s ideas or proposals, the person needs to have or be
provided with an understanding of the views one is putting forward and more
importantly believe the message. For instance a persuasive speech might employ
entertaining, thought-provoking, and eloquent methods but those techniques might not
be the purpose of the speech but rather to move the audience to the point B.
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At the core of Aristotle’s Rhetoric theory, where rhetoric is defined as “the ability to
see what is possibly persuasive in every given case”, are non-argumentative tools of
persuasion (Rapp, 2010). These are the three systematic ‘technical’ means of
persuasion where technical refers to the fact that it rests on a method and one must
understand the method used and know why some things are persuasive while others
are not. Those three technical means according to Borg (2007) are the ethics, the
emotional appeal and the logic of the persuasive means. Ethics refers to the ethical
character and reputation of the persuader that is credibility whereas the emotional
appeal is the emotional disposition of the one being persuaded. Thus the persuader
must have an ability to identify and to understand the other person’s feelings, ideas
and situations. The third technical means is the logic of the persuasive means which
can be either inductive or deductive.
Persuasion has been studied in recent decades by psychologists, such as Cialdini
(1998), as a means of social influence. They have hoped to define methods of guiding
people towards the adoption of an idea, attitude or action. Perloff (2010b, pp12)
defines persuasion as a communication process:
“a symbolic process in which communicators try to convince other
people to change their attitudes or behaviours regarding an issue
through the transmission of a message in an atmosphere of free
choice”.
Perloff’s (2010b) definition shows that persuasion involves the use of symbols and
language rich with meaning that is aimed towards an attempt to influence others. The
message transmitted can be verbal or non verbal, reasonable or unreasonable, factual
or emotional and can consist of arguments or simple cues. The other important
component of the persuasion definition is free choice that is individuals must be free
to take the actions desired such as altering their behaviour or not in a communication
setting. On the other hand, Cialdini (1998) defined six ‘weapons of influence’ which
are reciprocity, commitment and consistency, social proof, authority, liking and
scarcity. These ‘weapons’ have been widely used in marketing, advertising and
politics (Cialdini, 2000).
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In addition, probably due to the pervasiveness of technology, persuasion as a
technique to enhance end user experience and boost consumption, has emerged within
the computing area (Fogg, 2003). The psychologist, B.J. Fogg, who has studied the
use of technology as an aid to persuasion, has coined the word ‘captology’ to capture
the area of research, applications and design of the use of computers as persuasive
technologies (Fogg, 2003). Captology is an acronym for “computers as persuasive
technologies’ (Fogg, 2003, pp5) and persuasion in this context has been defined as an
attempt to change attitudes or behaviours or both. In their discussions of persuasion
in software and information systems, Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa (2008b)
however defined a persuasive system as one “designed to reinforce, change or shape
attitudes and behaviours or both without using coercion or deception”. This definition
is based on Miller (1980) who asserted that persuasive communication can be in the
form of any message that is intended to shape, reinforce or change the responses of
another or others. This definition restricts persuasive communication to the intention
of persuading others but corresponds with the intentional use of computers to
persuade end users. Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa (2008a) moreover add in their
systematic framework for designing and evaluating persuasive systems that of these
three outcomes, a persuasive interaction aimed at a shaping outcome may have a
higher likelihood of success than one aimed at changing behaviour. Moreover, while
Fogg (2003) considered persuasive systems as those that used human-computer
persuasion, Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa (2008a) considered persuasive systems as
those using both human-computer and computer mediated persuasion. The reasons
being that computers and systems do not have intentions on their own but rather those
who create, develop and distribute the technology do and although computers cannot
communicate the same way humans do, human-computer interactions have been
shown to exhibit patterns similar to social interactions (Nass et al., 1994; Fogg, 1998).
Persuasive technologies can be categorised according to their functional roles (Fogg,
2003). When used as a tool, persuasive technologies make target behaviour easier to
do, lead people through a process and perform calculations or measurements that
motivate whereas when used as a social actor, they are persuasive by rewarding
people with positive feedback, model a target behaviour or attitude or provide social
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support. On the other hand when used as a medium they provide an experience by
allowing people to explore cause-and-effect relationships, providing people with
vicarious experiences that can motivate or help people to rehearse behaviour.
This section showed that although persuasion has been practised since Aristotle’s era,
it is only in the early twenty-first century, due to Fogg’s (2003) work, that technology
has formally been recognised as a support to persuasion. Since persuasive technology
can make target behaviour easier to achieve, motivate and provide positive
reinforcement and allow simulation and rehearsal of experiences, it can be a valuable
asset in enhancing the effectiveness of complex systems such as privacy management
mechanisms.
2.5.2 Persuasive technology in research to date
In this section, research that looked at the influence of website components or of
designs on end user privacy and disclosure behaviour are reviewed. The section
shows how these components can be considered as persuasive before reviewing other
research that have suggested or implemented design approaches that can be
considered under persuasive technology.
Substantive results
In a study to explore the effect of internet seals of approval, such as TRUSTe and
BBBonline, Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy (2002) found that the presence of the
internet seals of approval logo raises favourable perceptions of the business’ privacy-
related practices. This finding is particularly interesting since it follows another study
by the same researchers (Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy, 2002) where they found that
the presence of the seals of approval did not reflect the businesses’ online privacy
practices (as seen from their privacy policy). This study is supported by Jensen et
al.’s (2005) discussed in section 2.3.2 of this chapter where it was found that the
presence of privacy policy or other trust marks caused end users to trust the websites
that consequently influenced their choice to do business with them. In terms of
persuasive technology, the internet seals of approval, noticeable presence of policy or
other trust marks act as cues that reassure end users of the credibility of the businesses
and influence end users’ disclosure and privacy decisions. A similar conclusion was
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reached in Gideon et al.’s (2006) study as elaborated in section 2.3.2 above. The
privacy icon and the privacy report that are annotated to search results help to provide
accessible privacy information that reduces the information asymmetry between end
users and service providers. They also make it easy for end users to distinguish
between service providers by enabling end users to select service providers who seem
better able to protect their privacy. It was also shown that when privacy information
was made accessible, some end users were more willing to pay a premium for services
from more privacy protective service providers (Gideon et al., 2006).
Researchers have proposed and designed privacy mechanism prototypes that contain
persuasive technology elements that take a functional role of suggesting or warning
end users. Ackerman and Cranor (1999) reported on two sample privacy critics that
are semi-autonomous systems that help people protect their online privacy by offering
suggestions and warnings. The first one checks a consumer complaints database
before warning end users whilst the second one watches the type of information
entered by end users and warns them when the P3P proposal requests data that can be
used in combination to identify end users.
Privacy designs also provided visual feedback that can be considered as a persuasive
element. Watson et al. (2009) assessed the performance of their prototype, designed
to provide improved visual feedback in the form of information sharing to different
audiences, against that of Facebook. The prototype can be categorised as an example
of Fogg’s (2003) cause and effect simulation persuasive design and can provide a
better mental model than Facebook. Although the participants to their study were
able to modify the privacy policy of the prototype version quicker and with more
confidence than that of Facebook, they did not exhibit higher configuration accuracy.
Watson et al. (2009) suggested that their prototype would be more effective than
Facebook by requiring less cognitive effort to complete tasks. Kelley et al. (2009)
designed a ‘Nutrition Label’ type privacy policy and found that participants were
better able to understand the differences between privacy policies, the control over
their information and the time-based cost of reading privacy policies. Participants
were better or similarly able to accurately find information and compare policy in the
label to that of the usual privacy policy. The visual feedback of the label allowed
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participants to easily find privacy information at the same place every time. They also
found that participants more consistently selected the company with the stronger
policy.
Another study involving persuasive element proposed contextual integrity (Richter-
Lipford et al., 2009), that is a framework that can be used to enhance the visibility and
ease of understanding of flows of information across a social network site.
Contextual integrity would be persuasive by providing visible information flows that
could appeal to end users to manage their privacy, by making context more concrete
and enhancing control over information flows.
This section reviewed research on online privacy that has some persuasive elements.
The review showed that
 design elements can engender trust, suggest actions, warn end users or provide
visual feedback that can connect with end users’ privacy attitudes.
 It is clear however that there is a lack of research about how and why
persuasive technology would affect privacy behaviour and support privacy
management as an interactive process.
 These studies stressed on end user understanding of the policy or privacy
settings, made the policy more likeable and stressed on choice of company
website.
 They however did not explore the effect of persuasive communication on the
effectiveness of privacy mechanisms in terms of the privacy attitude-behaviour
relation.
Methodological approach
The approach used by previous research to determine the influence of design elements
on privacy perceptions and behaviour were not targeted at finding the influence of
persuasive methods. Instead they formed part of user studies designed for other
purposes. For examples, Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy (2002) used a between subject
user experiment design that presented participants with printed information for the
different websites containing three different seal of approval logos. Participants’
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perceived favourableness of the business’ privacy practices was then assessed
together with the reported likelihood that the participants would disclose personal
information. Approaches that can be considered under persuasive technology were
also proposed and implemented as enhancements to designs without being referred to
as persuasive methods such as in Ackerman and Cranor’s (1999) study in the previous
section.
This section reiterated the findings of the previous section, in that there is a lack of
research designed to specifically explore how persuasive elements of system design
affect end user privacy decision and behaviour. It would be valuable to find out how
and why different persuasive elements affect end user behaviour and the implications
in different disclosure-privacy contexts.
2.6 Research gap and research problem
The real world problem as stated in the first section of this literature review arises due
to the conflict between end users’ requirements and business requirements. The
characteristics of the online environment and un-usability of the available privacy
mechanisms contribute to the problem of ensuring privacy of end users online. The
difficulty in ensuring usability of privacy mechanisms is also related to the tacit and
contextual nature of privacy such that although end users claim to be concerned about
their privacy, they find it hard to take privacy actions when interacting online.
Following the review in the previous sections of this chapter, this section brings
together review findings and discusses the research gap. It then formulates the
research problem and articulates the research question.
2.6.1 Substantive
Individuals instinctively manage their privacy offline but as seen in the previous
sections of the literature review, this is hardly achievable online. Previous research
found a dichotomy between privacy concerns and behaviour that is although end users
have privacy attitudes, their behaviour failed to reflect their attitudes (Spiekermann et
al., 2001; Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005a). Research that looked into privacy
decision making found that end users are not rational economic agents and cannot be
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expected to interact online as rational beings (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005a).
Instead people exhibit psychological distortions and behavioural bias. As reviewed in
section 2.3.2, privacy HCI designs do not help since they
 provide limited and ambiguous information that causes uncertainty during
privacy decision making and reduced valuation of personal information and
privacy,
 cause a link with other attitudes such as trust that influences disclosure instead
of connecting with end users’ privacy attitudes,
 do not take end users’ assumptions into account such that designs can be
misleading,
 do not interactively motivate end users and contribute to their engagement
with privacy mechanisms.
Following section 2.4.2, an HCI approach that solely focuses on improving
understanding of disclosure information (such as through better readability) or at
easing task completion (such as through enhanced performance) might not be
sufficient in ensuring privacy attitudes are activated or accessed and that privacy
mechanisms are effective. Similar to usable security (Whitten and Tygar, 1999),
usability of online privacy has to be better understood to enable better means of
evaluating online privacy and of proposing enhancements. Previous research has not
explored how effective and usable privacy should be designed from a
multidisciplinary (non-predefined) perspective and a general focus that is not specific
to a context of use (the Privacy Incorporated Software Agents consortium has defined
HCI requirements - HCI-P from legal requirements (Patrick and Kenny, 2003) and
Privacy and Identity Management in Europe for Life has added a socio-cultural aspect
to it (PRIME WP06.1, 2008); others have derived usability from end users’ behaviour
in surveys and the question of usability of online privacy from an experts’ view has
not been addressed). Therefore to determine the characteristics of privacy designs
that would contribute to their effectiveness and usability that is would allow end users
to use the privacy mechanisms according to their needs or privacy attitudes, the
research within this thesis first explored and defined the requirements of usable online
privacy mechanisms irrespective of contexts.
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As highlighted above, previous research has noted a variety of usability issues and in-
effectiveness of privacy mechanisms. Privacy being a behavioural concept, this
research evaluated the usability through a social-psychological assessment of existing
privacy designs by demonstrating whether they actually provided for the
requirements. These usability requirements are expected to enable end users to
seamlessly achieve their privacy goals. Seamless and intuitive privacy management
also means that the social psychological processes that would ensure the privacy
designs are effective in supporting end users’ privacy attitude-behaviour relation is
provided. Therefore the second research question aimed to find out whether and how
existing designs actually provided these processes.
From section 2.5.2, although enhancements to online privacy has been proposed,
previous research
 has not considered the impact of these proposed improvements on the
effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms in terms of aligning end users’
privacy behaviour with their attitude.
 They have not categorised these enhancements as influence methods or as
persuasive technology and consequently not explored how the different types
of enhancements connect with privacy attitudes to affect the attitude-behaviour
relation.
 They have also neither compared the effects of different influence methods nor
explored how and why these could affect end users’ privacy management
behaviour.
An investigation of how persuasive technology influences privacy behaviour would
allow research to offer improvements to the human-computer interactions design of
privacy by focusing on how the system communicates with end users and the impact
of this communication in activating privacy attitudes. This approach will also
contribute to ensuring effectiveness and hence usability of privacy mechanisms. This
is because although end users possess privacy attitudes, these exist within end users’
cognitive structure and are not necessarily invoked during online interactions. For
end users’ privacy attitudes to be associated with online interactions, the attitudes
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might need to be activated that is end users have to categorise the online interaction
experience as an instance requiring control of access to their personal information.
The privacy attitudes might also have been associated with a similar interaction before
but needs to be made accessible that is retrieved from memory. Persuasive
communication can present privacy information and help paint a mental model that
would activate privacy attitudes or make privacy attitudes accessible such that end
users can undertake privacy behaviour that matches their privacy attitudes and in
doing so ensure effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms.
Therefore the research investigated whether persuasive communication can provide
the social-psychological link within privacy designs that ensures end users’ privacy
attitude and behaviour consistency. End users with stronger attitudes such as highly
privacy concerned individuals (where strength refers to a consistent and well-
rehearsed link between an attitude object and its evaluation) can be expected to have
high attitude accessibility to engage into privacy behaviour more easily than those
with lesser activated attitudes. The thesis’ research selects a context and evaluates the
impact of different persuasive communication approaches on privacy behaviour.
 The first research question was: what are the requirements of usable online
privacy mechanisms?
 The second research question was: how usable are online privacy
mechanisms? This research question also helped to explicate how and why, as
claimed by previous research, privacy designs are in-effective in ensuring end
users’ privacy.
 The third research question was consequently: how does persuasive
communication affect the effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms?
2.6.2 Methodological
The previous sections highlighted the issues in designing evaluation of privacy design
and privacy behaviour and showed that designing the most suitable approach is




 researcher bias or focus on a specific perspective,
 carry over effects and participant fatigue.
Moreover, although previous research has tried to map economic models of behaviour
(Acquisti 2004), has conducted user surveys and experiments to understand behaviour
and has evaluated the usability of some privacy mechanisms (Milne and Culnan,
2004; Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005a; Jensen et al., 2005), it has not mapped or
investigated a communication approach to evaluating or enhancing online privacy
designs. Previous research has not looked at affecting the attitude-behaviour relation
as a means of improving effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms. It has not
considered privacy designs through a socio-psychological lens although it has
previously been said that end users respond to technology by exhibiting social
behaviours and by making social attributions within human-computer interactions that
are similar to human-human interactions (Nass and Moon, 2000). A socio-
psychological lens would not only enable understanding of offline individuals’
privacy management methods that could inform online designs, but also help evaluate
and propose designs that communicate privacy online to end users more effectively.
A socio-psychological approach would also help to better understand privacy attitudes
and help cater for critical differences in perceptions of disclosure and technological
possibilities for different levels of privacy concern individuals. It would consequently
also help to formulate persuasive methods that would help privacy attitudes to be
reflected within behaviour.
To answer the above research questions and contribute to filling the methodological
gap, the research within this thesis queried privacy experts on improving usability of
online privacy mechanisms through iterative questionnaires. This was followed by
analytical evaluation of existing privacy designs for socio-psychological processes of
privacy management through a systematic evaluation method. Persuasive
communication was then designed within a disclosure-privacy context and its impact
on privacy behaviour was assessed within an experimental user study that did not take
place within a laboratory setting. The methodology design consequently consists of a
selection of methods that support and complement each other so as to minimise their
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individual weaknesses. The next chapter elaborates on the research strategy and





In the previous chapter the research gap was identified within the research space.
This includes:
 a lack of exploration of the criteria for effective and usable privacy from a
multidisciplinary (non-predefined) perspective and a general focus that is not
specific to a context of use. Such an exploration would help to design privacy
evaluation methods and support proposals for usability enhancements.
 No investigation for the socio-psychological processes of privacy management
within privacy HCI designs that would be an indication of what is missing in
current designs to support privacy interactions as a behavioural concept.
 Previous research has not viewed its proposed enhancements to privacy
designs as influence methods that affect activation and accessibility of privacy
attitudes such that the later is reflected in privacy behaviour. It has also not
explored how and why these could affect end users’ privacy management
behaviour.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodological approach that
underpinned the research and contributed to closing the above gaps. The research
questions are first stated followed by an articulation of the research strategy and the
philosophical foundations. The chapter then elaborates on the research design
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framework and includes a reflection on the validity of the design. It follows with a
list of the data collection and analysis techniques that were used to answer the
research questions.
3.2 Research Questions
The research first aimed to define the requirements of usable privacy mechanisms that
is mechanisms that provide for the processes of privacy management. The research
then assessed existing privacy mechanisms for social-psychological processes of
privacy management that would enable effective privacy mechanisms, and explored
the influence of persuasive communication in influencing privacy behaviour and in
aiding the privacy attitude construct to be reflected in behaviour. The research
questions that were derived following the literature review of the last chapter are:
 RQ1: What are the requirements for usable online privacy mechanisms?
 RQ2: How usable are existing online privacy mechanisms?
 RQ3: How does persuasive communication impact the effectiveness of online
privacy mechanisms?
3.3 Research Strategy
In this section of the methodology chapter, the research strategy is depicted. The
perspective taken to answer the research questions is first detailed. Second, the
section follows with a social-psychological exposé of the relationship between
attitude and behaviour that discusses the strategy to address the privacy dichotomy
introduced in the literature review.
3.3.1 Social science approach
As detailed in the Literature Review Chapter in section 2.3.1, privacy is a
multidimensional concept. It has a physical, social, psychological and legal
dimension. The socio-psychological dimension of privacy is particularly essential to
the maintenance of relationships because privacy is implicit within the
communication that forms part of interpersonal interactions (Fried, 1970; Gerstein,
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1978). In the online environment, end users interact with service providers or other
end users. The online human-computer interactions (HCI) could hence be thought to
be as important to online privacy management as the interpersonal interactions are to
real world privacy management. In the same way as exploration of the interpersonal
interactions would benefit from a social science approach, it follows that deliberation
of the usability of HCI design of online privacy would also benefit from such an
exploration that exposes rich interpretations about the expected effectiveness of
current designs. This philosophical approach could then also facilitate the
formulation of alternate designs. However, since controlled user studies are core to
assessing HCI, a positivist approach is essential to evaluating the effect of a particular
condition – in this case the effect of persuasive communication on usability. Thus the
research applies a pragmatic viewpoint that combines qualitative and quantitative
research techniques and seeks to offer a logical and practical alternative to using a
viewpoint at the extreme end of the positivist-interpretivist spectrum. The pragmatic
viewpoint makes use of pluralistic approaches to understand and derive knowledge
about a problem which requires both the need to explore and explain (Creswell,
2009a). This research hence moves past the paradigm wars that advocate an either-or
approach by tapping into the advantages of both philosophies.
Figure 2 below depicts the research strategy which is bounded within a socio-
psychological theoretical lens. It is a mixed method design that employs a sequential
exploratory strategy. The sequential exploratory strategy starts with qualitative data
collection and analysis followed by quantitative data collection and analysis. Weight
is placed on the first phase that is the qualitative phase. The findings of this phase
then guide the evaluation of the quantitative phase.
Figure 2: Sequential exploratory research flow using the notations in Creswell (2009a)
3.3.2 Social-psychological exposé of attitudes and
behaviour
This section looks at the socio
and discusses the reasons previous research have found discrepancies between privacy
attitude and behaviour. It then shows how persuasive communication can be used to
fill the gap between privacy attitude and behaviour.
Attitudes and behaviour
Attitudes have been given numerous definitions over the past century. According to
scholars, an attitude is
 “an association between a given object and a given evaluation” (Fazio, 1989),
 “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity
with some degree of favour or disfavour” (Eagly
 “a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favourable or
unfavourable manner with respect to a giv
1976),
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-psychological foundations of attitude and behaviour
and Chaiken, 1993),
en object” (Fishbein and Ajzen,
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 “a more or less permanently enduring state of readiness of mental organisation
which predisposes an individual to react in a characteristic way to an object or
situation with which it is related” (Cantril, quoted in Allport, 1935, p.804)
While the first two definitions stress the association with an object/entity and
evaluation of the latter, the last two definitions highlight the behavioural view of
attitude. Perloff (2010a) discusses these and puts together a more stable definition
that encompasses the key aspects of the above definitions. He follows McGuire
(1985) in defining attitude as an object of thought and a dimension of judgement:
“An attitude is defined as a learned, global evaluation of an object
(person, place or issue) that influences thought and action.” (Perloff
2010a, pp 43)
Perloff’s definition helps towards better understanding the concept of attitude: first
people are not born with attitudes; rather attitudes are learnt over the course of life
through socialisation (Perloff, 2010a). Attitudes are developed through encounters
with social objects leading to the second part of the definition - evaluation which
includes both cognition and affect. Evaluation of encounters can then be expressed
through thoughts, feelings, intentions to behave and behaviour. Third, attitudes help
people to organise their social world and hence influence behaviour (Perloff, 2010a).
Together with cognitive and affective responses to evaluations, behavioural responses
form the three main classes of responses (Rosenberg and Hovland, 1960). Behaviour
is what people do and involves people’s actions. It has more than one dimension that
can be measured such as frequency, intensity and duration. Since it is an action, the
occurrence of behaviour can be observed, described and recorded both by the person
doing the behaviour and by others (Miltenberger, 2011). Behaviours impact the
physical or social environment. People interact with their environment by either
responding to stimuli or intentionally performing an act with consequences.
Behaviour can thus be of two types: respondent behaviour or operant behaviour
(Miltenberger, 2011). Respondent behaviours are brought about by stimuli and occur
automatically in the presence of the stimuli. They are elicited by antecedent stimuli
and are relatively insensitive to their consequences. They help the organism adapt by
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regulating organisms’ physiology and contribute to their safety. Operant behaviour
on the other hand is “behaviour that acts on the environment to produce an immediate
consequence and in turn is strengthened by that consequence” (Miltenberger, 2011, pp
63). Operant behaviour ‘operates’ on the environment and has been described as
behaviour that is voluntary and purposeful (Leslie, 1996) as opposed to behaviour that
is reflexive or outside of the subject’s control. Operant responses are not elicited by
antecedent stimuli but rather rely on the reinforcing or punishing effects of a
consequence to strengthen or weaken operant behaviour (Sturmey et al., 2007).
Reasons for why privacy behaviour may not match privacy
attitudes
The privacy dichotomy depicts the discrepancy observed by previous research
between attitude and behaviour (Spiekermann et al., 2001; Acquisti and Grossklags,
2005a). Such a discrepancy is however not a new occurrence since sociologists have
studied the problem of attitude-behaviour inconsistency from more than three decades
ago following LaPierre (1934)’s questioning of the assumption that attitudes cause,
reflect or correlate substantially with behaviour. He found that the anti-oriental
attitudes of tourist accommodation owners’ did not reflect in their behaviour towards
allowing the stay of a Chinese couple in their establishment. This section discusses
why privacy attitudes does not necessarily lead to privacy behaviour by first looking
at the structure of attitudes and then discussing the measurement of privacy attitudes
and behaviour in previous research.
Structure of attitudes
The structure of attitudes can be described in two ways: either through the relationship
between the cognitive, affective and behavioural components of the particular attitude
or through the associations across attitudes and the links between attitudes and
different attitude objects (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). However, three characteristics
of attitudes have been deemed to be important. These are the accessibility of
attitudes, the activation of attitudes and the possibility of ambivalent attitudes
(Augoustinos et al., 2006). These aspects of attitudes could explain the privacy
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dichotomy observed by previous research, that is, that privacy behaviour does not
always match attitudes. They are discussed in the paragraphs below.
Social psychology distinguishes between the availability of an attitude and its
accessibility (Higgins, 1996). While availability of an attitude refers to whether it is
present within a person’s cognition, accessibility of attitude refers to the ease with
which the attitude may be retrieved from memory (Fazio, 1989). Augoutinos at al.
(2006) explained that the accessibility of an attitude is dependent on the properties of
the attitude such as strength of the attitude and aspects of the context that highlight
particular attitudes as being relevant. This is important because accessible attitudes
lead to corresponding behaviour more closely than less accessible attitudes (Fazio and
Williams, 1986). Therefore, whilst individuals have privacy attitudes, these may not
be accessible when they interact online. The low accessibility of privacy attitudes
during interactions may be first due to the lack of relevance of the online disclosure
context to privacy attitudes and second due to the weak strength of the privacy
attitude. It is important to note here that rather than extremity in terms of positive or
negative value of the attitude, the strength of a particular attitude refers to a
consistent, well-rehearsed link between an attitude object and its evaluation
(Augoustinos et al., 2006).
Although attitudes may be available, they may not be active; that is they may not be
associated with an object or issue to cause its evaluation (Fazio, 1989). This
characteristic of attitudes can also explain the privacy dichotomy, that is although
individuals hold privacy attitudes, they may not be able to associate these attitudes
with their online activities. Another explanation can be that the privacy attitudes are
not strongly associated with the disclosure context. It was shown by Fazio et al.
(1986) that when the association between an object and its evaluation is strong
enough, simply noticing the object would cause the evaluation to become activated.
Attitudes can have multiple cognitive and affective components thus leading to
different evaluations of an object. These ambivalent attitudes are unstable since the
evaluation expressed at a particular moment depends on the elements of the attitude
that is most accessible at that time (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Privacy attitudes for
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the online environment can be said to be ambivalent since a variety of different
personal information disclosure contexts exists online that makes it hard for
individuals to maintain stable and strong evaluations. This property of online privacy
attitudes may also explain why individuals’ do not behave according to their privacy
attitudes.
Measurement of attitude and behaviour
Measurements of privacy attitudes in previous research have used general measures of
privacy attitudes and compared these to disclosure actions (Spiekerman et al., 2001;
Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005a). The discrepancy in their observed privacy
behaviour and attitude may be either due to inconsistency in terms of the specificity of
attitude and behaviour or due to taking disclosure actions to be a direct measure of
privacy behaviour.
Since LaPierre questioned the relationship between attitude and behaviour in 1934,
there have been a lot of discussions, among which calls for better measurement of
attitude and behaviour. Schuman and Johnson (1976) for instance discussed the need
to consider conceptual congruence, that is, the expectation that a particular attitude
and behaviour should go together versus the empirical finding that they do or do not
go together. Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) reviewed the findings from the past decades
about the influence of attitudes on behaviour and concluded that previous studies that
have observed the attitude-behaviour inconsistency suffered from measurement issues
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977). They found that these studies did not distinguish
between two types of attitudes: general attitudes towards an object versus attitudes
towards performing behaviours with respect to an object or targets, that is behavioural
intentions and they suffered from two types of inconsistencies: evaluative
inconsistencies and literal inconsistencies. These are explained in the following
paragraphs and were taken into account when designing the user study for the
research.
Evaluative inconsistency occurs when broad attitudes are compared with single
behaviours. This is a problem because it is only under certain conditions and/or for
certain individuals that general attitudes have strong impact on behaviour. The
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principle of aggregation has been said to improve attitude-behaviour consistency and
can be applied to the case of evaluative inconsistency (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005).
According to the principle of aggregation, general attitudes fail to predict specific
behaviour because of a lack of compatibility in the action, context and time elements.
This is because general attitudes identify only the target element whereas specific
behaviours involve a particular action directed at the target in a given context and
point in time. Therefore, Westin’s Privacy Segmentation Index (Kumaraguru and
Cranor, 2005) would not be compatible with specific online privacy behaviour. It was
seen that while general attitudes are typically poor predictors of individual behaviour,
they showed strong correlations with an aggregate measure of behaviour (Fishbein
and Ajzen, 1974). Thus identifying a set of behaviours that have evaluative
implications in the research and are broadly representative of the domain under
investigation would not only increase positive correlations with attitudes and increase
measures of reliability but would also ensure that the behavioural criterion has
construct validity.
Literal inconsistency is the inconsistency between behavioural intentions and actions.
Such inconsistency can be caused if behaviour is not easy to perform as argued by
Campbell (1963) or if there is a time interval between measurement of intention and
assessment of behaviour, and if intentions change during that time, the intentions will
tend to be poor predictors of behaviour. The principle of compatibility that requires
that the measures of attitude and behaviour involve exactly the same action, target,
context and time elements whether defined at a very specific or at a more general
level, can help to improve literal inconsistency (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977). Just as
behavioural aggregation makes it possible to demonstrate strong attitude-behaviour
correlations, at the global level, the shift from general attitudes towards behaviour
intentions enables the use of the attitude construct to predict single behaviours.
Therefore, although end users have privacy attitudes, a lack of behaviour intention
would result in low expected behaviour. However relatively low intention-behaviour
correlations can also be obtained if intentions are not stable, for instance. In this case,
prompting people to form an implementation intention can help to close the attitude-
behaviour gap.
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Moderators of the attitude-behaviour relationship
From the above it can be said that together with consistent measurements, the
structure of attitudes plays an important role in the link between attitude and
behaviour. Elements of designs that affect the accessibility, activation and
ambivalence of attitudes would consequently affect the attitude-behaviour
relationship. Moreover, Stiff and Mongeau (2003) and Ajzen and Fishbein (2005)
agree that the attitude-behaviour relationship depends on whether the general attitudes
were formed as a result of central or peripheral processing, whether the attitudes were
formed as a result of direct experience or second-hand information, whether there is
vested interest or involvement with the attitude object and whether the attitude is
stable. Designs especially aimed at doing so employ persuasive communication. The
paragraphs below discuss how persuasive communication can moderate the attitude-
behaviour relationship by interacting with the structure of attitudes.
When attitudes are formed, accessed or activated, cognitive evaluation of an object or
situation can occur via central processing or peripheral processing (Augoustinos et al.,
2006). Central processing can be triggered by arguments with ample information
whereas peripheral processing relies on simplistic associations or cognitive shortcuts
of negative and positive attributes to some object, action or situation (Petty and
Wegener, 1998). Therefore, by including elements that favour one of these two types
of processing, privacy designs might cause individuals with the same attitude to
behave differently and vice versa. Another key variable is involvement, that is the
extent to which an individual is willing and able to think or elaborate about the
position advocated and its supporting materials. When individuals are motivated by
the design and able to think about the content of the message, elaboration is high.
Elaboration involves cognitive processes such as evaluation, recall, critical judgement
and inferential judgement. The degree of elaboration can be taken to be a function of
factors such as personal relevance of the topic to the receiver and the presence of
distraction.
Direct experience with the object of the attitude influences the attitude-behaviour
relationship (Fazio and Zanna, 1981). Therefore privacy attitudes formed through
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personal experience with an object or situation will be stronger and more related to
subsequent behaviours than privacy attitudes formed through indirect experiences of
others. This is because privacy attitudes formed through direct experience are more
accessible and hence more able to predict and guide behaviour than those formed
through indirect experience. Regan and Fazio’s (1977) study of college students’
attitudes about a campus housing shortage provided support for this proposition by
showing that direct experience moderates the size of the attitude-behaviour correlation
(Regan and Fazio, 1977). In Regan and Fazio’s experiment, vested interest and ego
involvement may also have confounded the effect of direct experience. Sivacek and
Crano (1982) found that students in the vested-interest group (those who would not be
able to drink for two years or more till they are 21 years old) exhibited a stronger
attitude-behaviour correlation than students in the moderate and low vested interest
group (Sivacek and Crano, 1982).
Construct differentiation that is the number of different dimensions along which
people judge objects and situations, also moderates attitude-behaviour relationship
(O'Keefe and Delia, 1981). Limiting construct differentiation of privacy attitude in a
given context would limit privacy attitude ambivalence and ensure privacy attitudes
are stable. Stable privacy attitudes would be expected to be more frequently reflected
in behaviour than unstable ones. Although privacy pragmatist that is individuals who
make privacy decisions on a case by case basis can be expected to have more
ambivalent attitudes, they might exhibit less ambivalence if similar online contexts
have the same privacy designs.
This section provided a discussion on the relationship between attitudes and
behaviour. It stressed the importance of measurement and the structure of attitude on
the relationship. It follows that elements of online design that impact the structure of
attitudes such as persuasive communication and consistent attitude and behaviour
measurements could enable positive association between attitudes and behaviour.
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3.4 Research Design
In this section a human-computer interaction (HCI) research approach is presented
since the human-computer interaction design is a major precursor of usability. Also,
having formulated the research strategy in the previous section, a framework is
required to not only ensure that the studies conducted to help answer the research
questions are valid and reliable, but also to ensure that the studies link and support
each other. The section portrays the framework for data collection and analysis. The
exploratory part of the research employed a Delphi study and two case studies,
whereas the quantitative part involved a user experiment. The section also elaborates
on the validity of the research designs.
3.4.1 HCI
HCI is a multidisciplinary subject that has historically branched out of computer
science and psychology but the need to cater for the full complexity of people’s use of
computers means that it also encompasses social science, organisational theories,
cognitive ergonomics and philosophy (Caroll, 1997). The following paragraphs
discuss the role HCI played at the different stages of the research.
Design of usable online privacy is a difficult task since end users should be able to
manage their privacy while using the system for other purposes such as online
shopping and social networking (Ackerman and Cranor, 1999). Interactions with
online privacy are complex and apart from typical usability requirements such as ease
of use, the criteria that would allow end users to manage their privacy seamlessly and
make online privacy usable are not known. Privacy needs are subjective and privacy
behaviour can be driven by social values, trust, identity and motivation among others.
Grounded theory has been found to provide insights that address such complex issues
(such as in Pace, 2004; Adams et al., 2005; Razavim and Iverson, 2006). Grounded
theory is a method of qualitative research, originally identified within social science
as the product of close inspection and analysis of qualitative data (Glaser and Strauss,
1967). It aims to produce new theories that are grounded in the qualitative data
gathered during the research. Grounded theory methodology combines systematic
levels of abstraction into a framework of interpretation of a phenomenon which can be
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iteratively verified and expanded throughout the study (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). It
was hence suitable to identify the requirements of usable online privacy mechanisms
for the first research question, RQ1.
The research then further tapped into HCI to understand whether existing online
privacy mechanisms can be considered to be usable and how the privacy interactions
would be perceived by end users. The emphasis was on understanding the
communicative attributes of the privacy mechanisms that would enable end users to
manage their privacy effectively. Since the aim was to understand and explore rather
than measure and manipulate, a qualitative approach to HCI was designed. While the
interpretations of the researcher are vital, it was necessary to reduce the influence of
the researcher to avoid bias. This was achieved by making use of the rigorous
procedures of an inspection method and theoretical principles of privacy management.
Having identified requirements for usable online privacy through grounded theory and
explored existing designs, a controlled experiment approach was adopted to examine
the privacy behaviour in the context of interactions with persuasive messages.
Controlled experiment is an HCI approach that has been adopted from research
methods in psychology (Caroll, 1997). It is widely used to evaluate interfaces, styles
of interactions and to understand cognition in the context of interactions with systems
(Blanford et al., 2008). The question most commonly answered is whether a change
in conditions or value of a given variable is linked to a change in another variable.
Controlled experiments are hence fitting as the HCI research approach to determine
the influence of persuasive communication conditions on privacy behaviour.
3.4.2 Delphi
The Delphi method has been developed as a technique to obtain reliable consensus
among a group of experts when judgemental information is required (Okoli and
Pawlowski, 2004). It is applied within research as a method of data gathering that
collects data from respondents within their domain of expertise. The objectives of the
Delphi study employed within this research were to seek out information which may
generate consensus and to correlate informed judgements spanning across a wide
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range of privacy disciplines in the quest to explore requirements for usable online
privacy.
Delphi design
The privacy experts queried came from a variety of privacy disciplines. The Delphi
approach hence helped to provide for a multidisciplinary rather than solely a
technological or legal perspective. It helped to identify usability enhancement factors
emerging from particular privacy focus followed by revision and assessment by a
multidisciplinary group. This happened through the iterations of the Delphi with later
iterations validating and refining the opinions of the first iterations. The iterative
nature of the Delphi is hence an approach to grounded theory through which, as
explained in section 3.4.1 above, qualitative findings in the first iteration of
investigation are used to design subsequent iterations of a study and in doing so help
to thoroughly assess an issue (Adams et al., 2008). Hence experts’ opinions identified
in the first round of the Delphi were used to design the second questionnaire whose
aim was to detect consistency and identify conflicts. As a consequence, the Delphi
approach not only produces richer data than surveys and questionnaires but it is also a
more rigorous and reliable approach than studies designed with single iteration that do
not follow up on initial findings.
The analysis of the Delphi data from the first and second round was performed
through grounded theory coding techniques. Coding is an analysis method through
which data is broken down, conceptualised and put back together in new ways
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008). It involved the initial identification of codes (usability
factors) that were then compared to find consistencies and differences. Consistencies
between factors revealed a theme and eventually each theme saturated when no new
factors related to it could be formed. The coding process contains two analytic
procedures: the making of comparisons and the asking of questions which are also a
major part of grounded theory. These two procedures help to give concepts precision
and specificity (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The two types of coding schemes that
were used within this research were open and axial coding. Although open and axial
coding are distinct analytic procedures, during analysis, one usually alternates
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between the two modes (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Open coding allows initial
categorisation of information about a phenomenon by segmenting the information.
The first step of the analysis was to conceptualise the data; that is break down an
observation, a sentence, a paragraph, and give each discrete incident, idea or event a
name that stood for or represented a usability factor. Each factor was then compared
so that similar factors were given the same name. Once those factors were identified,
themes developed by grouping the factors into concepts. The themes could be said to
have conceptual power since they pulled together around them other groups of
concepts or sub-categories around them. In axial coding, the data from open coding
was assembled in new ways. Axial coding puts data back together by making
connections between a theme and sub-categories (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The
focus was on specifying a theme in terms of the conditions that gave rise to it, the
context in which it was embedded, the action/interactional strategies by which it was
handled, managed, carried out and the consequences of those strategies.
Depending on the aims of the research, Delphi studies can be designed as a factor
identification Delphi or a ranking Delphi (Skulmoski et al., 2007). In the factor
identification Delphi, themes are identified and reviewed without being ranked in
terms of importance whereas in the ranking Delphi, participants rank the factors
identified. Since the aim was only to identify requirements and not to find out which
is more important, a factor identification Delphi was used.
The Delphi approach was however time consuming including waiting times for
several rounds of data gathering followed by in-depth analysis. This disadvantage
was nonetheless outweighed by the rich qualitative data obtained. The other issue
was identifying a group of experts who were willing to participate and motivated to
continue participation through all the rounds of the study. Identification of experts
was however made easier since the study was launched following a gathering of
privacy experts at the IFIP Summer School in 2010.
Validity of Delphi
As discussed in the previous section, the findings of the Delphi study are reliable and
valid due to the different rounds that fed into each other to validate the previous
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findings. It helped to determine the accuracy of the qualitative findings by taking the
specific description and themes back to participants to determine the accuracy of the
translated data.
Any bias that the researcher brought to the study was catered by the Delphi study
structure which queried participants’ opinion and performed systematic coding
(several times and inter coder validity) on the initial data collected and took the
consolidated opinions collected back to the participants for discussion. The analysis
was also explained in a very clear and detailed manner. Moreover, internal validity
was achieved within the Delphi by confirming the themes through a second researcher
who was provided with the list of codes and participants’ responses to perform a run
through. The results were cross checked among the two researchers through
comparison of the independently derived codes.
Throughout the Delphi study, a diary was maintained with the aim to leave an audit
and decision trail. This helped to ensure the rigorousness of the study. To ensure that
there was no drift in the definition of codes in the Delphi study, constant comparison
was employed. These processes provided an audit trail (consisting of raw data, data
reduction, analysis outcomes, data reconstruction and synthesis results such as
categories, findings, process notes) and provided for neutrality of findings which
helped to ensure the data was free from the biases of the inquirer (Lincoln and Guba,
1985).
3.4.3 Case study
Having gathered experts’ opinions about the requirements of designs that would cater
for usable online privacy, the research proceeded to find out whether existing designs
provided for the main themes of those requirements by answering the second research
question (RQ2), that is, ‘How usable are online privacy mechanisms?’ (How are
privacy options communicated to end users? Would end users be able to use the
privacy mechanisms to achieve their privacy goals?). A case study approach was
designed using the principles of a real world privacy management framework. The
following sections reflect on these choices and explain how they were used.
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Case study design
Case study research method is an empirical inquiry research method that investigates
an existing phenomenon within its current settings and context using multiple sources
of evidence (Yin, 2009). Hence the case study method enabled the investigation of
the usability of different online privacy mechanisms as close as possible to their
context of use. A case can be an event, an entity, an individual or a unit of analysis
(Yin, 2009); in this research, a case is an example of privacy mechanism provided
online.
Since case studies are concerned with the how and why phenomena happen they
supported the investigation of how usable the privacy mechanisms designed online
are. Moreover, case-study research is not concerned with the entire aspects of a
phenomenon and thus does not aim to generalise a sample to the entire population.
Instead, case-studies are intended to focus on a particular issue, feature or unit of
analysis (Noor, 2008). This feature of case studies was useful since there was a need
to understand different design approaches of designing privacy in depth. Case studies
can also cater for embedded-design, that is, multiple units of analysis within a study
(Yin, 2009). Within this research two case studies were conducted to investigate two
different approaches of designing privacy within online services and each case study
had three units of analysis. The case study design can be described as a multiple-case
design with multiple units of analysis. This provides for an embedded design
approach that includes multiple units of analysis where the aim is to look for
consistent patterns of evidence across the units within a case. Embedded designs, by
requiring extensive analysis provide more robust results and compelling arguments
(Yin, 2009). The downside is however the raised focus on sub-units and loss of
higher level (holistic) aspects. This was however resolved through cross-case analysis
that was performed in order to identify a trend if any among the different cases. The
process generally followed by case studies is shown in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3
Since the case-study data collection involved multiple cases, a protocol that helps
towards the asking of good questions was required. The protocol helped to avoid
interpretation bias by providing the procedures and general
case study protocol design that is the way the questions were asked followed the
procedures of semiotic inspection. Semiotic inspection is an analytical evaluation
technique that provides a rigorous approach to inspecting commun
designs. It is further explained in the next section of this chapter. At the heart of the
protocol was a set of questions; which were considered as the instrument. The
questions acted as reminders of the data to be collected. The questio
those to ask of individual cases, of the pattern of findings across multiple cases, and of
the entire study. The questions asked during the inspection relate to the requirements
of usable online privacy mechanisms. These requirements are
environment and the individual offline and are depicted by the
principles of the Communication Privacy Management theory. The principles
describe the seamless ability of individuals to manage their privacy offline that i
lacking online. The principles are presented as a theoretical framework that can be
used to assess whether online privacy designs are as effective as within offline
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: The case study method in general (Yin, 2009)








interpersonal interactions as discussed in Coopamootoo and Ashenden (2011). It
helped to identify communication issues and where changes to communicability of the
design of privacy mechanism might enhance usability.
CPM was devised to understand the way people manage private information from a
communication perspective, targeting the privacy regulation that takes place through
inter personal communication interactions (Petronio, 2002). It is useful in untangling
the dialectical tension of being both connected and autonomous. The interplay of
needing both privacy and openness allows individuals to make decisions about the
way they manage their privacy. To allow for this tension between disclosing and
concealing also leads to the need to consider the role of others, for instance the
recipient of the information, in privacy management. The theory was applied to two
privacy designs to help understand and evaluate the usability of existing designs and
to enable the design of privacy solutions that are beyond solely securing protection for
the self and restricting access to others. CPM theory is based on five principles of
private information management that represent the organising principles interlinking
both individuals and collectives (Petronio, 2010).
CPM Principles and evaluation questions
The CPM principles were translated into a list of questions that were used in the
qualitative analysis stage. The CPM principles are explained below and the privacy
evaluation questions using the CPM lens are provided.
Principle 1 of CPM stipulates that disclosure and privacy form a dialectical tension
(Petronio, 2010); that is, if there is no disclosure, privacy management would not be
required. When individuals disclose and they know they are disclosing, they usually
communicate via some privacy rules. Since disclosure and privacy form a dialectical
tension, if end users know or can understand that they are disclosing, they might
require and look for privacy mechanisms. This principle corresponds to the notice
principle of the EU Electronic Commerce Directive (European Union, 2003) and of
the FIPs (Federal Trade Commission, 2000) which say that end users should be given
notice of the service provider’s information practices before any information is
collected from the end users. Notice should be provided in the form of at least some
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information about the service collecting personal information, how these will be used,
potential recipients, ways by which the information is collected, whether disclosure by
end users is voluntary or required and the measures taken by the service provider to
ensure protection of end users’ personal information. As explained in the paragraphs
explaining case study protocol design, a set of questions are useful to guide the case
study. From Principle 1 of CPM, the questions that the researcher asked when
evaluating the design were: (1) would end users know what they are disclosing, (2)
would end users know to whom they are disclosing, and (3) would end users know
how they are disclosing (that is what actions cause disclosure)?
Within Principle 2 of CPM, individuals believe they own their personal information
and hence have a perception of rightful ownership and a right to control it (Petronio,
2010). They further believe that they are entitled to disclose information or keep it
private depending on what seems the best choice for them. Hence for end users to
require or use privacy mechanisms they must realise that the design is causing a
release of control and ownership. From the design, it would be difficult for the
researcher to assess whether end users would realise a release of control and
ownership. This principle was hence not used within the analysis.
Principle 3 of CPM stipulates that since individuals own their information and have a
right to control it, they should have the means to regulate the flow of information that
they define as private through the formation of privacy rules. The need for end users
to have the means to exercise control of access to the self and the awareness of the
potential consequences of exercising that control had also been highlighted by
Dourish (1993). Thus, the questions asked by the researcher as part of the case study
protocol when evaluating the design were: (1) would end users have the means to
regulate the flow of their disclosures online (that is are privacy mechanisms, tools or
features provided to form privacy rules?) and (2) would end users know that these
means are available?
Principle 3 however suggests that five criteria: gender, age, motivation, context and
risk-benefit are important during privacy rule formation (Petronio, 2010). Since age
and gender are characteristics of end users and cannot be controlled by the system
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design where as motivation, context of use and awareness of risks and benefits can be
influenced by the system design, the next three questions referred to within the case
studies were: (3) would end users be motivated to form privacy rules by the
interaction design, (4) is there a context for disclosure and (5) are the risks and
benefits presented to end users?
According to Principle 4 of CPM, once private information has been disclosed, parties
become responsible for co-owning and co-managing the information. This means that
for a viable relationship to exist, and to allow smooth interaction between the parties
involved in the disclosure, privacy rules must be coordinated through linkages
between those disclosing information and the recipients of the information. Linkages
can be of different types depending on the balance of information shared between the
parties and the balance of power that results. For instance, if end users were to
knowingly disclose some personal information to the service provider for the purpose
of benefitting from services, the type of linkages formed would be of role type.
However if end users did not know that linkages would be formed (personal
information disclosed to service provider), the linkages would be of coercive type.
Also, during rules coordination, the parties involved negotiate ownership of the
information shared and permeability, that is whether others can be linked within the
boundary of personal information shared between the two parties and the extent to
which they can be linked. For Principle Four, the questions asked by the researcher
when evaluating the design were: (1) who is linked within the boundary, (2) what type
of links joins them, are they coercive or role linkages, (3) is there ownership
negotiation and (4) is there any permeability negotiation?
Principle 5 of CPM stipulates that dissimilar expectations and misunderstandings of
privacy parameters can cause conflict in the handling of private information (Petronio,
2010). This turbulence has to be dealt with by re-coordinating personal information
boundary rules. Therefore, if end users receive feedback after disclosure they could
be aware of turbulence to their desired privacy and proceed to re-coordinate their
privacy boundary rules. The translation of this principle into questions used within
the case studies is supported by Belloti and Sellen’s (1993) recommendations that
online privacy mechanisms need to provide feedback and enable end users to perform
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assessment of trade-off. The questions asked by the researcher when evaluating the
design were: (1) how would the end users know when there is turbulence, how can
turbulence be noticed, (2) is there any feedback after disclosure, such as a report of
access, and (3) are there methods to deal with turbulence such as re-coordination and
re-negotiation of rules?
Validity of case studies
An important aspect of ensuring the robustness of the case study is to use different
sources of evidence. Each case study had three units of analysis that is three
examples of the technology. Semiotic inspection also consists of the evaluation of
help sections, static interfaces and dynamic interactions. In the case-studies, semiotic
inspection steps were rigorously followed by looking for the principles of the CPM.
This justifies the inferences made since the development of these is at the centre of
potential problems in mixed research (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). Heuristic
evaluation using the list of requirements derived from the Delphi study was not
conducted since heuristic evaluation is highly dependent on the researcher and it
would have been hard to evaluate the design for some elements of the list.
Reliability on the other hand refers to the consistency across different researchers and
different projects (Creswell, 2009b). For instance, for consistency, it was suggested
by Yin (2009) that procedures of case studies should be fully documented. This was
ensured in the research by maintaining a detailed case-study protocol and database
and checking transcripts to identify obvious transcription mistakes in the case-studies.
The protocol was important to increase the reliability across the multiple cases of case
study research and to provide guidance in carrying out the data collection.
3.4.4 User experiment
User experiments involve participants performing a task and are usually conducted to
verify a theory and provide evidence to support or reject hypotheses derived from the
theory. The theoretical foundations of section 3.3.2 helped to advance that persuasive
communication employed within online systems can affect privacy behaviour by
causing end users to elaborate about privacy, by acting as a cue that affects privacy
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behaviour or by motivating end users towards privacy behaviour. The question most
commonly answered by controlled experiments is whether there is a significant
impact of a change to the value of a certain variable on the value of another variable
(Blandford et al., 2008). A user experiment was hence conducted to help answer the
third research question that is ‘How does persuasive communication impact the
effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms?’. By nudging towards privacy
behaviour, usability of privacy mechanisms, in terms of effectiveness and user
satisfaction, can also be improved.
User experiment design
Apart from observing user actions, user experiments can also involve a qualitative
part that queries user information and opinion before and/or after the experimental
task. The qualitative part substantiates and supports the quantitative findings. During
the research a demographic questionnaire was first set followed by the experimental
task. The task was followed by qualitative questions that gathered participants’
opinion. A between subject experiment was designed such that each participant took
part in only one condition. This was done to avoid practice effects and fatigue from
affecting participants’ actions.
Validity of user experiment
Validity in quantitative methods represents how well a variable measures what it is
supposed to, whether the independent variable is really independent, whether there is
a relationship between the independent and dependent variables and whether the
findings can be generalized across population, settings and time. These quantitative
validity concerns were catered for by the experiment design for instance it was
ensured that an aggregate measure of privacy behaviour was compared with general
privacy attitude and not disclosure behaviour with attitude. The aggregate measure of
behaviour ensured evaluative consistency and construct validity. The effect of the
experimental condition and independent variables on user behaviour was statistically
analysed to identify significance and the requirements of those statistical tests such as
sample size were assured. A discussion of the validity of the user experiment is
further undertaken in Chapter 6.
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3.5 Research Methods
In this section, the studies undertaken to answer the research questions are introduced.
Although further details about the design of each study are included in the chapters
that follow, the rationale for the choice of research method involved in data collection
and analysis of each study is provided. The table below summarises the research
questions, the research approach taken and the studies conducted to answer each
research question.
Table 1: Research questions and the studies undertaken to answer them







































Studies 6 & 7
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3.5.1 Usability requirements: Study 1
As detailed in the research design section, a Delphi study was conducted to answer
research question RQ1; that is ‘What are the requirements of usable online privacy
mechanisms?’. The aim of this study was to explore the key requirements of privacy
designs that would ensure that they are effective and usable. The Delphi study is a
structure consisting of several iterations that used questionnaires as data collection
method and coding and constant comparison as data analysis methods.
Questionnaires were used as they enable both the query of opinions through open
ended questionnaires and multiple choice questions. Compared to other methods of
querying participants for opinions such as focus groups, the questionnaire provided a
structured way of asking the same questions to different experts and enabled the
researcher to collate and analyse the data fairly easily. Since the questionnaires were
sent via email, they supported the property of the Delphi in ensuring participants are
anonymous to each other such that the discussion that occurred in the second and third
iterations of the Delphi was free from peer influence.
3.5.2 Social network service survey: Study 2
Surveys are widely used data gathering methods that allow investigation of problems
in a realistic setting and can be done at a relatively low cost. Surveys also provide
easy means of collecting data from a variety of people. During the initial stage of the
research a descriptive survey was performed since the aim was to attempt to picture
whether and how privacy mechanisms were currently used and how satisfied end
users were rather than explaining why they are used in a particular way. A pilot study
contributed to answering research question RQ2, that is ‘How usable are existing
online privacy mechanisms?’. The perspective taken was whether end users were
aware of the availability of privacy mechanisms in the most used social network
service, Facebook. It was consequently possible to determine whether participants
understood the privacy implications within Facebook. This preliminary study helped
to guide the direction of research, in particular whether end users could interact with
online privacy. This hinted towards whether the social-psychological processes of
privacy management were present.
75
Data was collected through an online questionnaire and analysed through simple
addition and percentages. This was appropriate since it was only a pilot study with a
small number of participants to gauge whether end users were aware of and used
privacy mechanisms that were included in designs.
Previous research has suggested that students’ poor awareness of privacy implications
while using Facebook would explain the low use of its privacy mechanisms (Govani
and Pashley, 2007). This pilot survey however differed from Govani and Pashley
(2007) in that it did not aim to find out about awareness of means due to possible
privacy consequences but rather awareness of privacy controls due to the design of the
privacy interactions. The survey study however was not sufficient on its own to
enable evaluation of the usability of online privacy mechanisms.
3.5.3 Social network service cognitive walkthrough:
Study 3
Following the survey, a cognitive walkthrough was performed in order to determine
whether the design would actually enable end users to understand their privacy
implications during disclosure. Cognitive walkthrough takes a relatively structured
approach and is designed to uncover usability issues by following a sequence of
actions a user would take to perform a set of tasks (Polson, 1992). It is a task-oriented
approach in that it considers the goal structure and the ways goals are addressed in
completing a task. Cognitive walkthrough is based on the theory of exploratory
learning, that is, end users are believed to learn to use a system through exploration,
or first time use without formal training (Wharton et al. 1994; Rieman et al. 1995). A
cognitive walkthrough evaluates the ease with which a typical user can successfully
perform a task using a given design interface (Polson, 1992).
Using the cognitive walkthrough each step necessary to perform a task was evaluated
in an attempt to uncover design errors that might interfere with learning by
exploration. The cognitive walkthrough had two phases which were the preparatory
phase and the analysis phase. In the preparatory phase, the tasks, action sequences for
each task, user population and the interface were defined whereas in the second phase,
the researcher worked through each action of every task being analysed.
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The cognitive walkthrough was used as a follow up to the first pilot study in order to
find out whether there was a link between the survey responses and the design of
privacy. However, although it has the advantage of being an analytical usability
evaluation method that does not require user involvement, it can suffer from evaluator
bias (Hertzum and Jacobsen, 2001). It also focused on whether end users would learn
to use the system and complete a set of privacy-related tasks. It did not show whether
the design would support the social-psychological processes specific to privacy
management.
3.5.4 Case study of internet browsers and E-
Commerce websites: Studies 4 & 5
Following Study 3, a more rigorous approach to evaluating usability of online privacy
mechanisms was designed through the case study framework. The case studies aimed
to find out whether the interaction design provided for the requirements of online
privacy through the socio-psychological processes of privacy interaction and whether
end users could be expected to manage their privacy using the existing interaction
designs. In the real world, the environment and individuals cater for the requirements
that enable individuals to seamlessly manage their privacy. The requirements that
enable seamless privacy management are described by the principles of CPM. The
principles of CPM were used to help the research in determining whether online
designs would be effective in enabling privacy management and why this is the case.
The protocol followed by the case studies were defined by the principles of
Communication Privacy Management (explained in research design section above).
Data was collected by evaluating interaction designs through the Semiotic Inspection
Method (SIM). SIM is an analytical usability evaluation method involving expert
analysis of the quality of the human-computer interactions provided by an interface
(de Souza et al., 2006). SIM was chosen over cognitive walkthrough because the
latter is not rigorous enough to obtain valid results on why current privacy designs are
not usable and are too general for application to privacy human-computer interactions.
SIM on the other hand is a semiotic engineering evaluation method that is theory-
based and that also does not involve actual users during evaluation (de Souza et al.,
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2006). The purpose of theory-based evaluation methods in human-computer
interactions is to assess the quality of interfaces and interaction in the light of a given
perspective of human-computer interactions. SIM also enables a comparison between
different ways of communicating privacy mechanisms that is through the static
interface, the dynamic interactions and the supporting help sections which is not
provided by cognitive walkthrough. The primary purpose of SIM is to evaluate the
communicability of interactive computer artefacts by focusing on user interface
meanings expressed by design (de Souza et al., 2010). SIM helps to examine the
diversity of signs that users are exposed to while interacting with computing artefacts.
The signs present in computer interfaces are words, colours, dialog structures and
graphic layouts.
SIM is hence suitable for the research on human-computer interaction evaluation of
privacy that allows a communication perspective to be taken. Semiotic engineering
views HCI as a “set of unique and contingent instances of meta-communication from
designer-to-user” (de Souza et al., 2006, pp.148). While being qualitative and
interpretive, semiotic engineering evaluation methods provide the means to facilitate
the evaluator’s interpretation and assessment of the quality of the meta-
communication across the wide scope of human-computer interaction instances. It
has been argued that the interpretive results of SIM are objective, can be validated,
and are comparable to other accepted methods because of the preparation and
validation steps of the inspection method (de Souza et al., 2010).
3.5.5 User Study: Study 6 & 7
After evaluating the communicability of privacy mechanisms and theorising on how
persuasive communication would improve usability by aligning privacy behaviour
with attitudes, a user experiment was conducted to investigate the influence of
different persuasive communication messages. The usability experiment enabled the
comparison of user behaviour under different conditions and the framework enabled
pre-task and post-task questionnaires to support the quantitative measurements.
Moreover, the quantitative findings benefit from reliability offered by statistical
analysis. The user experiment is further described in Chapter 6.
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3.6 Summary
This chapter illustrated the research strategy consisting of a social science research
approach. It was followed by the framework supporting the use of different HCI
based design methods at different stages of the research. It described a pragmatic
viewpoint as suitable and necessary to both exploring existing privacy designs and
assessing the influence of persuasive communication. The chapter is followed by a





In Chapter 2, the research gap was identified and research questions shaped. The
criteria (requirements) for usable online privacy (from a non-legal and non-
technological perspective) are not known and it follows that not knowing the criteria
for usable online privacy would mean that evaluation of online privacy mechanisms
would not be guided by these criteria. Subsequently proposals for enhancements that
follow the evaluations would not ensure that online privacy is usable and effective as
a behavioural and interactional process.
Previous research has not determined the requirements of usable privacy from a
multidisciplinary perspective and a general context. Therefore the purpose of Study 1
as stated in the Methodology Chapter is to identify and explore the key requirements
of usable online privacy from a multidisciplinary perspective. Such a perspective
would include requirements that support the socio-psychological nature of privacy
management and would provide a template against which online privacy can be
evaluated as an interactional process. Study 1 is hence designed to answer the first
research question (RQ1): ‘What are the requirements for usable online privacy
mechanisms?’.
This chapter describes a Delphi study conducted in 2010. The Delphi approach was
chosen to allow experts from various privacy research and practice areas to contribute
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their differing point of views and to enable a discussion among them through iterative
feedback. In the sections below, the Delphi stages are detailed starting with the
preparation phase followed by three rounds of design and analysis. The chapter then
provides the recommendations before concluding.
4.2 Method
Sections 3.4.2 and 3.5.1 in Chapter 3 provided the rationale for the choice of the
Delphi method to answer research question RQ1. In this section, the Delphi
participants, procedure design and apparatus used are detailed.
4.2.1 Participants
Delphi studies can consist of either a homogeneous or heterogeneous group of
participants depending on the outcome targeted by the research study (Skulmoski et
al., 2007). The group chosen is homogeneous since the participants belong to the area
of privacy but with specialisations in a variety of privacy disciplines. In 2010, the
participants, including academics and practitioners from the UK, Germany,
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and Italy, were working on European privacy
projects and their work was either of a technological, legal, social, design or ethical
nature or a combination of these. Having participated in the ‘2010 Privacy and
Identity Management in Europe for Life’ Summer School, where the usability issue
posed by current online privacy approaches was prominently highlighted, they were at
least generally aware of the problem. Moreover, they were chosen since it was
believed that usable privacy mechanisms design would benefit more from a holistic
approach, that included views from various privacy research and practice disciplines,
than a solely technological or legal viewpoint that has been shown to be ineffective
(in Chapter 2 Literature Review).
50 participants were targeted and 22 responses were received in the first round. This
amount dropped to 17 in the later rounds. The number of received responses was
sufficient for a study with homogeneous sample as shown by Skulmoski et al. (2007)
in their review of research using the Delphi Method.
4.2.2 Procedure
In this section, the design approach of the three iterations of the Delphi is elaborated.
It explains how the three rounds supported and linked to each other.
Round I
The aim of the first round was to identify themes from the responses to an open ended
question. The themes were thought to provide common and/or diverging
recommendations or requirements for what could make online privacy more usable.
The participants were contacted by email (and provided with two weeks to respond
with a reminder sent after the first week). The first task for participants consisted of
answering an open-ended question followed by their privacy area of focus as shown in
figure 4 below:What, in your opinion, will make online privacy more usable?
How would you describe your area of research, background or practice?






Figure 4: Delphi Round I questions
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Round II
The outcome of Round I was analysed and the list of factors identified that had the
potential to enhance the usability of privacy online was sent back to participants. A
questionnaire was sent to participants and they were asked to denote the importance of
each factor on a scale of 1 to 7; 1 being least important and 7 being most important.
They were also asked to comment on the categories and factors identified so as to
verify whether the identified factors were what they meant in their responses to the
previous round of the study and to identify different viewpoints. This process was
aimed at identifying agreement, conflicts and overlaps and at reducing the list of
factors to a more concise one. The questionnaire of Round II is available in Appendix
A.
Round III
A questionnaire was designed for the third round with the aim to explore the
conflicting factors and identify solutions or possible agreements on how to resolve the
conflicts identified in Round II. The questionnaire was designed with questions
requiring Yes/No answers and comments. The third questionnaire is provided in
Appendix B.
4.3 Analysis
This section explains how the data collected from the three rounds of the Delphi was
analysed. The analysis included coding and comparison of participants’ comments.
4.3.1 Round I
From the 22 responses received, one was discarded since the open-ended question
section was empty. The 21 responses were then read to identify themes and sub-
categories of those themes. The sequence of tasks for the analysis followed the flow
in the figure below. Figure 5 below is an adaptation from Creswell’s data analysis
sequence for qualitative research (Creswell, 2009b).
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Figure 5: Flow of activities in Round I, adapted from Creswell (2009b)
As shown in the above figure, the responses were first organised and prepared for
analysis by sequentially listing the responses according to when they were received.
They were then read thoroughly to build a general understanding of the responses and
to enable reflection of their meaning. A detailed analysis was then started with the
coding process. An inductive coding method was used that is the data was organised
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and broken down into an observation, a sentence, a paragraph, and each discrete idea
that stood for or represented a usability factor was given a name. Each factor was
then compared so that similar factors were grouped according to their conceptual
dimension into themes. The coding method used for the first round responses was
hence open coding. Coding was performed manually several times to generate the
codes afresh followed by a comparison with the last coding session. This approach
helped to enhance the reliability of the coding process. Moreover, to make sure that
there was no shift in the meaning of codes during the coding process, the data
associated with the codes were constantly compared and memos were written about
the codes and their definitions. A second researcher was also invited to cross-check
the codes, that is to code the responses using the produced set of codes. Practically
the same pieces of text were coded with the given codes. This process thus helped to
achieve inter-coder agreement. The MAXQDA computer software was also used for
another trial at coding so as to identify any mismatch, overlaps or redundancy among
the identified codes and to reinforce the reliability of the codes.
4.3.2 Round II
The analysis of this round consisted of reviewing responses to identify the conflicts,
agreements and issues raised concerning the need for new factors, the removal of
specific factors or the need to merge factors or categories. A comparison was then
performed with the responses of Round I so as to understand how the themes would
change. Axial coding was used that is the data was assembled in new ways and put
back together by making connections between theme and factors.
4.3.3 Round III
The number of ‘Yes’ answers received for each possible response was computed and
the comments were consolidated. A summary of the favourite choices that clear the
conflicts and the associated comments are provided below.
4.4 Result
In this section, the results of the Delphi are presented. The outcome following each
round and the data that feeds into the next round is discussed.
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4.4.1 Round I
First, the participants believed that end users need to be in control of their privacy and
be able to exercise that control according to the level they desire. They must be able
to do so with minimum effort and privacy is usually a secondary goal in online
interactions. There was also mention of end users assuming they have a level of
privacy. These factors seemed to be associated with end users’ characteristics or
requirements and were hence grouped under the User theme. The User theme
developed from the first round and consisted of the following factors: control,
disclosure level, minimum effort, secondary goal and assumption.
This led to the second theme that was about human-computer interaction. The
interface must enable end users to understand that while disclosing they are releasing
control of their privacy, that is, they need to be aware to whom they are disclosing,
and the consequence to privacy. They must also be able to grasp the different
possibilities available to maintain their privacy and be able to assess the benefits
versus the future risks of disclosing. The interface must also be transparent in
informing users about data handling and this information must be made explicit
within human-computer interactions. The interface must also cater for different types
of end users and the service provider must be responsible and liable to ensure their
systems cater for these. The factors forming the Interaction theme are consequently:
recipient of disclosure, consequences, privacy possibilities, risks, different user
groups, transparent, explicit, service provider liability.
Third, some system usability properties were also identified. They included the need
to provide privacy means that are easy to use and standardised privacy interfaces that
make it easy for end users to identify privacy options and manage their privacy across
systems. Participants also added that privacy should be embedded or implicit within
online systems rather than added on. These were grouped under Technology
Properties with factors: ease of use, standard methods and embedded privacy.
In addition to usability properties of the system, privacy tool functions that could
enhance their usability were also identified. These were default maximum privacy
and explicit opt-in to disclose rather than opt-out of disclosure for privacy protection.
86
The privacy features should also allow minimum data collection, use pseudonyms and
be designed in a way such that the business is liable for any misuse. These factors
were grouped under Technology Functions: default privacy, explicit opt-in, feedback,
pseudonyms, revert back and minimum data collection.
Another key point from the responses was that an attempt to enhance the usability of
privacy must include a combination of measures from the user, interaction,
technology and legal themes rather than isolated perspectives. The responses of this
round highlight that no one single factor could enhance usability of privacy online on
their own but should rather be used together.
4.4.2 Round II
In this section, the participants’ review of each of the identified themes is discussed.
A summary of the outcome of this round is then provided.
User Theme
The list of factors that made up the User theme from Round I included: control,
disclosure level, minimum effort, secondary goal and assumption. In Round II,
participants believed that end users’ requirement for different levels of disclosure
should not be considered as a factor for usability enhancement of privacy per se.
They also claimed that end users’ assumption of a level of privacy online is an issue
rather than a factor that is requirement of design for usability enhancement. They
added that the issue might be resolved by ensuring end users are aware of what they
are sharing, to whom, what happens to their disclosures, and what the future potential
risks are. They thought that this solution could be supplemented by forcing service
providers to explicitly provide this information.
The fact that end users do not interact online with the primary goal of being private
makes privacy a secondary goal for human-computer interactions. Participants stated
that privacy should not obstruct or burden the main aim of those interactions and the
secondary goal factor might be considered an issue with managing privacy online
rather than a design requirement that would impact the usability of online privacy.
The factors making up user theme was consequently modified from control,
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disclosure level, minimum effort, secondary goal and assumption from Round I to
control and minimum effort in Round II.
Interaction Theme
The list of factors that made up the Interaction theme from Round I included:
recipient of disclosure, consequences, privacy possibilities, risks, different user
groups, transparent, explicit and service provider liability. In Round II, participants
gave the control factor very high importance in their ratings. They suggested that
control is to be provided in the form of allowing end users to understand and agree
who they are sharing their data with, what they are sharing, what the immediate
consequences are in terms of how the disclosure is handled and processed and what
the potential future risks are. The control factor is hence moved from the user theme
to the interaction theme to incorporate recipient of disclosure, consequences and risks.
However, some issues were identified in the responses. For instance, there is a danger
that control in design would overburden end users or be obtrusive. It was also
highlighted that control could be an unnecessary overhead that would cause end users
to resort to default privacy settings. Different end users might also have different
control needs such that some may favour convenience over control. However
participants provided suggestions for the design of control such as guiding end users
so that they can understand the choices that they make and while designs should allow
end users to learn about the consequences of disclosure, they should help them make
an informed decision rather than frighten them.
The need for interaction design to cater for different user groups received a low
importance rating and participants added that it might be too abstract and not make
sense in all systems. It was however suggested that the issue might be resolved by
having predefined custom levels.
Participants believed that transparency of information processing, explicit awareness
of data collection and risk factors are interrelated and the explicit factor is catered by
the properties of control. Moreover, explicit disclosure practices refer to transparency
also.
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Following the review of the Interaction theme, the User theme was modified to
include only minimum effort. The Interaction theme developed to include control,
privacy possibilities and service provider liability.
Technology Properties Theme
The list of factors that made up the Technology Properties theme from Round I
included: ease of use, standard methods and embedded privacy. In Round II,
participants suggested that the ease of use factor must be defined with respect to
privacy mechanisms to avoid reading as a tautology and not helping design
endeavours.
The need for standard interfaces as identified in the first round raised some discussion
in the second round. Participants thought that since privacy is context dependent,
different interfaces might be needed for different types of systems and services and
standard interfaces might also not be convenient for different users. Participants
showed concerns that standardisation might lead to high level of vulnerability. The
Technology Properties theme thus remains the same following Round II but with
some reservations on the implementation approach of these factors.
Technology Functions Theme
The list of factors that made up the Technology Functions theme from Round I
included: default privacy, explicit opt-in, feedback, pseudonyms, revert back and
minimum data collection. In Round II, the respondents claimed that revert back,
minimum data collection and expiration factors were not feasible with the currently
available methods of handling personal information. Moreover, it was also suggested
that the Technology Functions theme might have emerged due to misunderstanding of
the open-ended question of Round I and that these would enhance privacy online
rather than usability of privacy. Although usability of privacy is related to enhancing
privacy online, ‘pseudonymity’ for instance, is more a mechanism that provides for
privacy than usability. Following participants’ review in Round II, the Technology




Participants proposed new factors in Round II. They suggested that a possible
solution to the issue that privacy is a secondary goal is to design privacy mechanisms
to run in the background so as not to burden end users. The new factor ‘background’
however posed some dilemmas. Participants claimed that privacy solutions should be
visible because if they are not, people will not think about them and hence not use
them. Running privacy in the background also poses a problem with the amount of
control to provide to end users and the privacy explicitness of designs. Moreover,
they added that the decision of how explicit privacy designs should be depends on the
types of end users targeted such as whether they value convenience or more control
referring to casual versus expert users. Running privacy in the background might
however help the minimum effort factor by requiring only a small amount of effort
from the user.
A solution for supporting end users’ requirements for different disclosure levels and
to provide for default privacy without forcing end users to always choose defaults is
to design predefined privacy levels that can to some extent be customised. As a
result, the two new factors identified in the second round are: background and custom
level.
Summary
An important aspect of privacy that came out of this round is that since privacy is
dependent on the individual, human computer interactions need to allow users to
manage their privacy according to their specific needs. The three elements considered
as issues rather than usability factors in Round II (disclosure level, assumption and
secondary goal) suggest the need to enable end users to choose and set different levels
of privacy and disclosure at different times, to be clear about the privacy provided by
the system and the need for a method that integrates privacy interactions within design
of online services such that privacy does not burden the main purpose of the system.
From the interaction theme, the control afforded to end users was at the centre of the
debate. Control is important but should not be obtrusive. A balance is required such
that end users are guided to exercise control while learning about the consequences of
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different actions and taking into account different user needs. Regarding technology
properties, the outcome was that since privacy is context dependent, it would not
make sense to have a standardised privacy model or approach that fits all systems.
Instead, there is a need to look at the privacy human-computer interactions of
different service types. The discussion that occurred due to new factors ‘background’
and ‘custom level’, point to the need for privacy to run in parallel to system services
and require minimum end user effort. ‘Custom level’ is hinted as support and
guidance to manage control and to provide for different disclosure needs.
4.4.3 Round III
In this section, participants’ responses to the conflicts identified in Round II are
provided and discussed. The conflicts were presented in the form of questions having
a choice of possible answers.
The first conflict and question posed to participants was ‘Should privacy run in the
background?’. Their preferred outcome from the list of options was that ‘privacy
solutions should offer predefined privacy options that users can be aware of and
control to some extent’. They added that despite running in the background, privacy
mechanisms should be flexible enough to allow end users to control their disclosure if
they need to, including non-expert end users. Hence while running in the background,
it was suggested that privacy designs should provide understanding of how personal
data is processed for end users to be aware of their privacy. Also, end users should be
able to decide on being informed or not, on what kind of privacy strategy to use and
of consequences and impacts. They concluded that there is a need to reduce the
learning curve and to provide a better communication method than obtrusion and
suggested nudging end users in the ‘right’ direction by for instance offering a privacy
preserving default while allowing users to deviate.
The second question posed to participants in Round III was ‘Should privacy designs
opt for minimum effort?’. Their preferred outcome was that “predefined privacy
levels could provide for minimum effort without too much simplification”. The
comments for minimum effort referred to its interaction with control as in the
previous conflict for the background factor above. Participants were wary that an
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interface that requires minimum effort from end users might not allow them to control
their privacy and added that the effort required of end users should be balanced with
control. Furthermore, they thought that having predefined privacy levels could be a
good idea that would help to avoid over simplification of privacy management and
also help non tech-savvy end users. However, it was added that predefined settings
cannot be generalised to all systems but the design depends on the functions and
objectives of systems. It was also mentioned that communication strategies might be
required rather than minimum effort.
The third question assessed participants’ preference in terms of how control should be
provided. Participants selected the four options equally. They thought end users
should be guided to understand their choices by making control visible and helping
end users to learn about their privacy choices. About the un-obtrusiveness of control,
they thought that a smart interface can ensure that control does not interfere with
minimum effort. Also, ensuring privacy choices are integrated in the work flow
would reduce effort and burden and at the same time make privacy choices clear and
understandable.
The fourth question was about the usefulness of standard interfaces that is whether
participants thought that standard interfaces could help end users to easily recognise
and interpret privacy features. They thought that standards could be adapted to
different applications and different groups of people and that vulnerabilities and
security problems might arise if standards were not used. Moreover, standards would
provide similarities in the form of patterns and choices that can make it easier for end
users to comprehend. Also standards would not pose vulnerability threats only if
properly done and as standards evolve, the design approach becomes very important
and difficult to get right.
In question five, participants were queried for their opinions regarding the use of
default privacy settings set to maximum privacy. They thought that security could be
bypassed if it was too difficult to achieve a specific goal, hence defaults should be
restrictive at first but easy to change to avoid turning off of privacy. Also to avoid
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having defaults that obstruct the functionality of systems, there is a need to analyse
implementation of default privacy according to context of use.
The discussion that emerged from this round re-iterated the need for privacy to run in
the background that is in parallel to the system’s services balanced with the need for
user control. While the control should be un-obtrusive, it should however provide the
possibility for users to decide on being informed and on the mechanisms to choose to
manage their privacy. It was further suggested that the learning curve should be
reduced with the application of a better communication method than obtrusion. For
instance, users could be nudged by privacy preserving defaults that can be changed.
By having a smartly designed user interaction, control should be provided that does
not interfere with minimum effort.
4.5 Summary
Table 2 shows the list of factors derived from the three rounds of the Delphi study
recommended by privacy experts to enhance the usability of privacy online. The table
presents a list of key essential factors that should be provided together within privacy
design. The themes that categorised the factors during the analysis do not provide
benefits to the list at this stage and are consequently taken out.
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Table 2: Final list of factors derived from Delphi study
Factor Description
End user control Includes awareness of disclosure and knowledge of
privacy choice
Background Privacy to run in parallel to system services
Minimum effort Minimum user effort required to manage privacy
Predefined custom levels Predefined privacy levels that end users can customise to
their needs
Easy Privacy mechanisms that are easy to use in the context of
use
Standard Standard privacy methods that enable easy recognition of
privacy
Default privacy Maximum default privacy that is easy to alter
Explicit opt-in Clear about disclosure
Feedback Feedback of end users’ privacy and disclosure
From the table, this study highlighted the need for end user control, the main
requirement of online privacy management, to be enabled in designs. Privacy
mechanisms should however not interfere with the system services and require only
minimum end user effort. It was suggested that such design approach should be
carefully thought for each context of use and include elements of helping or nudging
end users towards privacy behaviour such as predefined custom privacy levels,
standard privacy methods across systems, default privacy, explicit opt-in and
feedback.
The requirement for end user control of privacy relates to user involvement and
participation in managing their privacy. The direct interaction in managing privacy
that is end user privacy behaviour in the context of their online interactions highlights
the importance of social psychology for privacy HCI. The latter would enable
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exploration of how end users operate in their online environment with regards to
privacy and whether designs support control (protection) of privacy and management
of disclosures. However firsthand involvement in managing privacy might be tedious
and the understanding of how end users behave in response to design elements can
also help to propose an approach that alleviates cognitive effort. The following
chapter of the thesis explores existing designs for HCI that are supposed to enable
privacy behaviour.
4.5 Contributions
This section summarises the contributions of Study 1 to the rest of the research and to
the research space. It starts with the substantive contributions and explains innovative
aspect of the methodological approach.
4.5.1 Substantive
Study 1 is innovative in enabling identification of usability requirements that is not
restricted to a legal or technological perspective. The list can help to guide usability
evaluations of privacy designs and help to propose enhancements. However the
distinct HCI functions of components of the list can cause conflict in implementation
and should be carefully designed. The study also confirmed the direction taken in this
research because designs that provide for the suggested requirements would benefit
from endeavours aimed at understanding end users’ response to privacy designs and
their behaviour in the context of their interactions online with regards to their privacy
attitudes.
Another contribution of the Delphi study was the discussion of the complexity and
challenge of designing usable privacy which was previously identified in the literature
review. In addition, the privacy experts suggested a list of ways to cater for the
complexity. These suggestions can be viewed to have persuasive characteristics for
instance predefined custom privacy levels can provide granular privacy options that
would ease end users’ privacy by suggesting privacy levels, standard privacy methods
across systems would make it easier to detect privacy options, default privacy can act
as a persuasive cue or ensure end users have some level of privacy since they might
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not alter defaults settings, explicit opt-in can act as a reminder and feedback can serve
to reassure or inform end users of their privacy level.
4.5.2 Methodological
The methodological contribution comes from the use of the Delphi approach in HCI
research. The iterative survey within the Delphi framework allowed a group of
multidisciplinary privacy experts to engage in a small debate about improving
usability of privacy online. Not only were privacy experts not queried before but
although the Delphi approach has been used in information systems research to
untangle complex problems, it has not been used within the online privacy or security
research space. As shown in Study 1, the Delphi method provides a valuable






The literature review found that end users cannot use privacy mechanisms effectively
online. For usable online privacy, Study 1 proposed the need for end user control
coupled with minimum effort among other requirements. These requirements relate
to end users’ interactions with the privacy design and lead to the second research
question which is whether online designs support these requirements (such as end user
control). Since these requirements are about end users’ interactions with their online
environment and their consequent behaviour to manage their privacy, the outcome of
Study 1 guides and supports the approach proposed to answer the second research
question that is an assessment of whether online designs provide for the social
psychological processes of privacy management. The experts who participated in
Study 1 also suggested ways of designing privacy that would nudge end users into
using privacy mechanisms. However, the list provided by the Delphi is not exhaustive
since it was not generated for specific online contexts. While the specific ways of
nudging end users could be assessed from online designs, it would be difficult to
evaluate privacy designs for end user control and minimum effort requirement without
involving end users. This means that the exploratory part of the research aimed at
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better understanding whether privacy designs support end users’ privacy management
processes has to be creatively designed.
The chapter is divided into four main sections that present the four studies designed to
answer the second research question (RQ2): ‘How usable are existing online privacy
mechanisms?’. The research uses analytical evaluations to explore existing privacy
design approaches. The first section describes two studies (Studies 2 and 3) aimed at
evaluating the most popular social network service, Facebook. Due to weaknesses in
the methodology with regards to the context of the study, the second and third
sections of the chapter employ a more rigorous approach to answering research
question RQ2. Studies 4 and 5 evaluate internet browsers’ privacy and E-Commerce
websites privacy design respectively. The chapter concludes with the contributions of
the analytical evaluation part of the research and the link to the next section of the
thesis.
5.2 Evaluation of social network services
(Studies 2 & 3)
One of the key processes of enabling end user interaction with privacy design and
management of their privacy is awareness of the presence of privacy mechanisms.
The first pilot study was a survey, conducted from December 2009 to assess end
users’ awareness of the privacy mechanisms of Facebook, and to find out whether and
how often privacy mechanisms have been used. Another study was designed
following the pilot study. It involved a cognitive walkthrough evaluation aimed to
find out whether users would be able to use the mechanisms. The survey and
analytical usability evaluation enabled exploration of the HCI design of privacy in the
social network service for the initial step of managing one’s privacy – having the
means or privacy mechanisms. This is because for end users to use privacy
mechanisms the latter first have to be visible, end users have to know that privacy
mechanisms are available and how these can be used to manage their privacy. This
section describes the design and findings of Facebook’s evaluation.
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5.2.1 Study 2 - Survey
The pilot survey study attempted to investigate end users’ awareness of the
opportunity to use privacy mechanisms to control access to their information and the
satisfaction in using the mechanisms. The sections below describe the method
including the survey design, the survey analysis and the results.
Method
In this section the method is elaborated. It describes the participants and the survey
design.
Participants
The participants of the survey consisted of 9 staff and students of the Department of
Informatics and Systems Engineering of Cranfield University. The survey was
designed online through Survey Monkey and participants were invited to take part via
email. This made the survey easily accessible to participants.
Design
In the first three questions, Westin’s Privacy Segmentation Index (Kumaraguru and
Cranor 2005) was used to determine the general privacy attitudes of the participants.
To find out whether participants were aware of the control they had on their different
contents, participants were asked whether they were sure or assumed only them, only
their friends, the friends of their friends, their networks or anyone had access to view
their profile, to write on their wall, to comment on their pictures and posted contents,
to view their albums and photos and to view pictures others posted of them. The
survey then investigated whether participants were aware that they could manage the
privacy of their profile contents. They were asked to elaborate on how they would
protect access or editing of their profile contents on Facebook. Participants were then
queried on their frequency of using the privacy features and what they used them for.
The last question asked whether they were certain of the controls they applied. The
survey is provided in the Appendix C.
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Analysis and results
All the participants were found to be privacy pragmatists. A privacy pragmatist, as
defined by Westin’s Privacy Segmentation Index, is an individual who weighs the
benefits of various consumer opportunities and services, protections of public safety
or enforcement of personal morality against the degree of intrusiveness of personal
information sought or released (Kumaraguru and Cranor, 2005). Although 6
participants claimed to have performed some access control actions, only 2
participants were strongly sure of the outcome of their use of Facebook’s privacy
whereas 4 were somewhat sure and 2 somewhat not sure. However, of the 6 who
were either strongly sure or somewhat sure, only 1 provided a precise response to how
they used the privacy features. This allows suggestion that although pragmatists
claimed to be sure of the outcome of their actions, they might not clearly understand
how the mechanisms could be used.
Moreover, for question 4: ‘How sure are you about who can perform each of the
following activities on your Facebook profile?’, 3 to 6 participants believed that the
activities could be performed by only their friends and none of them thought activities
could be performed by their networks. This assurance that only one’s friends could
perform activities on one’s profile can be explained by the fact that end users
participate in social networks with an audience view in mind as showed by Richter-
Lipford et al. (2008) in their study of end users’ understanding of privacy settings. In
addition, the responses to question 5, ‘How would you protect who can access or add
to your contents on Facebook?’, show that all respondents who answered the question
had at least a general knowledge of the availability of security mechanisms in online
systems and very few showed specific knowledge for the privacy settings of
Facebook.
5.2.2 Study 3 - Cognitive Walkthrough
Following the findings of the pilot survey, a second study was conducted to find out
whether end users can be expected to successfully achieve the desired goal that is
ensuring the privacy of their personal information while disclosing and interacting in
Facebook. A cognitive walkthrough was designed to identify usability issues in the
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design of privacy in Facebook. The cognitive walkthrough is a precisely specified
procedure for stimulating end users’ cognitive processes as they interact with the
interface in an effort to accomplish a specific task (Polson, 1992). The sections below
describe the design of the cognitive walkthrough followed by its analysis and results.
Design
A cognitive walkthrough evaluates the ease with which a typical user can successfully
perform a task using a given design interface (Polson, 1992). A list of specific
questions guided the walkthrough such that these reflected a cognitive model that
allowed the researcher without extensive training in cognitive psychology to
implicitly use the model to analyse the interface. The typical end users and the tasks
they would perform, the interface and its responses were described and successful use
of privacy mechanisms was defined for the purpose of the walkthrough.
1. Who were the users of the system?
The selected end users for whom this study was conducted were Facebook users who
are fluent in using the internet for electronic commerce and social network services.
This group of end users was chosen since Facebook was in 2009 and as of now the
largest and mostly used social network service globally. Fluency with electronic
commerce and social network services use was also assumed since this type of users
can be thought to have at least a general prior knowledge of browsing the internet and
performing transactions that involve agreeing or consenting to terms of agreements
and privacy policies.
2. What tasks were analysed?
Task selection was based on representative tasks (Wharton et al., 1994). Since the
aim was to identify issues with usability of the privacy design, that is, issues that
might cause ineffective use of the privacy mechanisms included, the criteria used to
select representative tasks for the study included:
- Activities most commonly performed on social network services
- Activities resulting in the release of personal information
- Activities claimed to result in privacy issues
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- Activities that are beyond the control of end users
- Activities involving the use of privacy mechanisms
Using the above list of criteria, the three selected tasks for analytical evaluation were:
i. Status update
The status update was a social network activity that had resulted in a variety of
privacy impacts including jobs lost due to employer access to employees’ Facebook
profiles (Ostrow, 2009). Also, early in 2010 Facebook added privacy mechanisms to
this activity.
ii. Photo-sharing through upload and tag
Bonneau and Preibusch (2009) suggested that photo-sharing on social network
services may have been the force driving social network growth, that is an activity
much favoured by social network users that increased the amount of interactions and
thus the use of the social network services. Photo sharing was also shown through
different cases to result in privacy issues such as in the Gilani (2009) case. The
problem of sharing and tagging photos of others is exacerbated by the fact that end
users who do not benefit from the data protection household exemption, that is, those
who do not use the social network only for personal use, can be considered as data
controllers.
iii. Comment on others’ post
Commenting to other’s post though not releasing personal information on one’s
profile does so on other’s profile and the privacy of the information released is highly
dependent upon the level of privacy of the profile to which one is commenting.
‘Like’ of other’s post might also release information about one’s preferences to
people not within one’s Facebook ‘friends’ list, the existence of one’s profile and use
of social network from which other details can be inferred.
The context for performing the selected tasks was that the end users had more than
150 friends and a default Facebook privacy profile with access to their information as
shown in Table 3 below. The number 150 was chosen for the least number of friends
for the cognitive walkthrough process since as explained through the Dunbar number
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(Dunbar, 2010), it is the cognitive limit to the number of friends one can handle, that
is, one can maintain relationships with 150 others and know who each person is and
how they relate to each other. It is important in social networks since it relates to
‘audience view’ sharing as explained by Richter-Lipford et al. (2008) who suggested
that end users have a specific and limited audience in mind while sharing personal
information.
Table 3: Default Facebook Privacy Settings
Profile information Permission Description of profile information
About me Everyone About me refers to the description in
one’s profile description in one’s profile
Personal info Everyone Interests, activities, favourites
Birthday Friends of friends Date and year of birth
Religious and political
views
Friends of friends Religious and political perspectives
Family and
relationship
Everyone Family members, relationship status,
interested in and looking for
Education and Work Everyone Schools, universities and workplaces
Photos and videos of
me
Friends of friends Photos and videos you've been tagged in
Photo Albums Edit settings Albums of uploaded photos
Posts by me Everyone Default setting for status updates, links,
notes, photos and videos you post
Allow friends to post
on my Wall
Opt-out check Friends can write on user’s profile page
Posts by friends Friends of friends Control who can see posts by your friends
on your profile
Comment on posts Only friends Control who can comment on posts you
create
3. What is the correct action sequence for each task?
The action sequence for each of the selected task is described in the next section and
involves breaking down the main goal into subordinate goals that flow into actions.
The action sequence provides a description of how the end users are expected to view
103
the task before learning the interface and a description of the sequence of actions that
should accomplish the task with the current interface definition. Specific parts of the
sequence involving the use of privacy mechanism were chosen for the analysis phase
to determine the ease with which end users were expected to use the privacy
mechanism in an explorative way.
Analysis and results
During the walkthrough, analysis proceeded by applying the theory of learning by
exploration (Wharton et al., 1994) as a story was told and evaluated about whether
and why end users would choose the correct action at each step that is by asking the
following four questions:
i. Will the user try to achieve the right effect?
ii. Will the user notice that the right action is available?
iii. Will the user associate the correct action with the effect they are trying to
achieve?
iv. If the correct action is performed, will the user see that progress is being
made toward solution of their task?
For each of the four questions, the common features of success are provided in Table
4 below (Wharton et al., 1994). The three chosen tasks were analysed by answering
the four above questions with reference to the control requirement of managing one’s
privacy.
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Table 4: Success features
Questions Success Criteria
Users may know what effect to
achieve
Because it is part of their original task
Because they have experience using a system
Because the system tells them to do it
Users may know an action is
available
By experience
By seeing some device (e.g. a button)
By representation of an action (e.g. a menu
entry)
Users may know an action is
appropriate for the effect they are
trying to achieve
By experience
Because the interface provides a prompt or
label that connects the action to what they are
trying to do
Because all other actions look wrong
Users may know things are going
ok
By experience
By recognising a connection between a system
response and what they are trying to do
Task 1: status update with the aim of sharing update with friends
only
The description for task one was that end users logged into their profile and were
taken to their home page. At the top of this page was a text box displaying “What’s
on your mind?”. End users had to click in the text box and to start typing. They then
had to customise access to the typed information. The initial goal was hence to
update their profile status with what was on their mind with a group of friends. The
action sequence for task 1 is shown in figure 6 below.
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Figure 6: Cognitive walkthrough task 1 action sequence
From task 1, sub-goal c was chosen for the analysis since it involved the use of
privacy mechanisms to control access of information. The analysis of action c.i is
provided below whilst the analysis for the other actions of c is provided in Task 2’s
analysis since they are similar. The interface display for action c.i is as shown in the
figure below.
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Figure 7: Facebook - Click on Padlock to customise access
For the first question of the analysis, ‘Will the user try to achieve the right effect?’,
end users might not know that clicking the padlock is part of their sub-goal of
customising access. A padlock does not provide the label-following strategy to help
the user out. That is, there is no link between the end users’ task description
(customise access of status update) and clicking the padlock icon. Also the system
does not tell end users explicitly for instance, ‘to share with only these friends click
on the padlock to select who to share it with’.
Moreover, since the end users selected for the analysis were fluent in using the
internet for electronic commerce transactions and browsing they may think that the
padlock picture means the sharing of their update is secure. The padlock icon may
thus create a false sense of security by spreading a general and fuzzy secure feeling to
end users but it does not initiate any awareness of why it is there, how is can be used
and how it can be helpful for privacy. As a consequence, task 1 failed to provide for
question i.
For the second question of the analysis, ‘Will the user notice that the right action is
available?’, only end users who can associate a padlock with giving access to whom
they want to access their information will know that clicking the padlock is the right
action. Task 1 hence failed to provide for question ii.
For the third question of the analysis, ‘Will the user associate the correct action with
the effect they are trying to achieve?’, there is no prompt which tells them so. This
meant that Task 1 failed to provide for question iii.
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For the fourth question of the analysis, ‘If the correct action is performed, will the
user see that progress is being made toward solution of their task?’, the system shows
a list with the default privacy setting highlighted and the list of possible choices such
as Everyone, Friends and Networks, Friends of Friends, Only Friends and Customise.
When selection is clicked or entered, the user will see it as highlighted. Task 1
succeeded in providing for question iv because of the feedback that lets user know
that the preferred audience has been selected.
Task 2: Photo-sharing through upload and tag with the aim of
sharing photos with specific friends only through internet explorer
browser on a desktop or laptop
The description for task 2 is that end users logged into their profile and were taken to
their home page. They accessed their wall and clicked on photos tab and created an
album. They then customised the access control, uploaded the photos and tagged their
Facebook friends to whom the album has been made accessible and after receiving the
approval from those friends who would like to be notified before being tagged in a
photo. The action sequence for task 2 is shown in figure 5 below.
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Figure 8: Cognitive walkthrough task 2 action sequence
From task 2, sub-goals c, e, and f were chosen for the analysis since subgoal c
involved the use of privacy mechanisms, e involved the publishing of photos and f
involved the tagging of people who do not explicitly consent to uploading and tagging
photos of them or who may not even be a member of Facebook. The analysis
proceeded in the same fashion as for task 1 above. The interface contributing to the
analysis is provided in Appendix D.
Task 3: Comment on a friend’s post with aim of the comment being
viewable only by the friend
The description for task 3 is that end users logged into their profile and were taken to
their home page. In the news feed, they clicked on comment beneath a friend’s post;
left a comment and clicked on ‘Comment’. The action sequence for task 3 is shown
in figure 9 below.
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Figure 9: Cognitive walkthrough task 3 action sequence
From task 3, sub-goal b was chosen since it involved the sharing of information
beyond one’s control. The analysis proceeded in the same fashion as for task 1 above
and the interface contributing to the analysis is provided in Appendix D.
The results of the representative tasks’ analysis is summarised in the table below. The
privacy actions that failed at least one of the four questions are not usable and
consequently cause their high level task to be un-usable.
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Table 5: Summary of Cognitive Walkthrough results
(F=Failure; S=Success)
Questions
Actions Action Descriptions Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1.c.i Click on the padlock picture icon F F F S
2.c.i Click on 'Who can see this?' dropdown at the Privacy
section
S S S F
2.c.ii Select 'Customise…' F F S F
2.c.iii Under Friends select 'Some Friends' S S S S
2.c.iv Click on textbox to start typing name of friend S S S S
2.c.v Select the friend or friend list that comes up S S S S
2.c.vi Under networks select 'None of my networks' from
the dropdown
F F F F
2.c.vii Click OK to save selections and move to the next
action
S S S S
2.c.viii Click on 'Create Album' to create the album S S S S
2.e.i Click on 'Publish now' button S F F F
2.f.i Click 'Tag this photo' F S F F
2.f.ii Click on Photo S S S S
2.f.iii Select those people who provided prior approval to
be tagged and to whom the album is accessible
F F F F
2.f.iv Click 'Finished Tagging' S S S S
3.b.i Click on 'Comment' beneath the friend's post S S S S
3.b.ii Type the comment S S S F
3.b.iii Click on the 'Comment' button F F F F
5.2.3 Discussion
Although the participants of the survey were people from the Defence and Security
School of Cranfield University and might be expected to be familiar with managing
security and privacy, they could not explain how they used the privacy mechanisms of
Facebook. Also since social network services thrive on disclosure of personal
information, the lack of end user awareness of privacy may be the purpose of the
design (Bonneau and Preibusch, 2009). The survey study was however limited due to
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factors that could not be controlled. For instance, participants’ responses about their
awareness of privacy mechanisms could be determined by their use of the social
network service (and hence a contribution of the HCI design) or by whether
participants verified the settings during the survey. Another factor was that
participants could have answered what they thought was required of their position
through an exaggeration of their awareness. The awareness shown among Facebook
end users may also be due to the highly publicised privacy issues and privacy
management changes that occurred in the same period the survey was launched and
this level of awareness might slope down when privacy issues are not heard of again
for some time and with the lack of informed controls in the interface.
From Table 5 above, it was interesting to note that those actions that satisfy all four
questions of the cognitive walkthrough analysis have a similarity. They are all part of
a task that enable the control of access to information but are not the triggering actions
that make end users aware of their availability to decide to use the privacy
mechanism. To the contrary it could be suggested that these successful actions help
end users to get out of the process of using the privacy mechanisms and help to make
the sharing of information successful. Hence while the representative tasks do
possess some but not thorough means of ensuring privacy, they do not ensure usable
privacy but instead could have been designed as such so as not to encourage the use of
the mechanisms.
Moreover, there was a lack of awareness that could allow end users to recognise the
availability of privacy mechanisms. This was shown by the high number of failures in
questions 1, 2 and 3 for the actions that failed in being usable, that is, the system did
not help end users to perform the privacy action, provided a representation of the
action or some connection to the action the user was trying to do. Furthermore, most
of the actions that failed the evaluation also failed question 4 that is the feedback
element. This is because feedback is usually important in a security system to enable
verification of the controls applied. Without the feedback in the above actions, end
users would not be sure that what the system was allowing them to do is the level of
privacy they required. Also, in those actions, feedback would have been useful in
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reassuring end users that they are on the right path towards achieving their privacy
goal and also making them aware of the importance of these actions.
However the cognitive walkthrough method is limited by evaluator bias and although
awareness is a key component of end users’ use of privacy mechanisms, it cannot
ensure effective online privacy mechanisms on its own. A more systematic and
thorough approach of evaluating privacy designs for social-psychological processes of




Studies 2 and 3 provided an analysis of Facebook’s privacy mechanisms. The
contribution of Study 2 is the finding that it was not clear to end users how the privacy
mechanisms of Facebook could be used. This was supported by Study 3 that found
that the design of the interface did not help end users to identify and learn how to use
the privacy mechanisms of Facebook. By enabling a breakdown of the identified
tasks into their action sequence and assessing each of the actions, it has been possible
to point out which privacy action might require design modifications or be made more
persuasive.
Methodological
The methodological contribution to the research space is the cognitive walkthrough
analytical evaluation that divided privacy related tasks into their action sequence.
This approach helped to identify specific HCI issues in communicating privacy in
Facebook.
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5.3 Evaluation of internet browsers (Study 4)
In the Delphi study (Study1) experts proposed that end users must be able to control
their privacy with minimum effort. They also suggested ways of designing privacy
that would nudge end users into using privacy mechanisms. The two previous studies
(pilot Study 2 and Study 3) attempted to evaluate Facebook for social-psychological
processes of privacy management. They found that the privacy mechanisms of the
social network service were not clear to end users since the interface did not enable
end users to identify and learn to use privacy mechanisms. Not only was the study
prone to researcher bias but the cognitive walkthrough of Study 3 was also limited to
awareness and learning to use the privacy mechanisms of Facebook. It did not
thoroughly assess the design for elements that would specifically contribute to privacy
management.
This section describes a more rigorous method of evaluating online privacy designs
through a case-study method that answers research question RQ2, that is, “How
usable are online privacy mechanisms?”. Communication Privacy Management
(CPM) shows the impeccable ability of individuals to manage their privacy in real
life. It provides a framework that has been associated with online privacy before
(Metzger, 2007). Together with semiotic inspection, CPM provides a more
systematic way of evaluating privacy designs for usability requirements. Study 4
analysed the human-computer interaction (HCI) design of the privacy tabs of internet
browsers to understand whether end users could be expected to use them. More
specifically, semiotic inspection was used together with CPM theory to identify
communication breakdowns in the privacy interaction design. It was important to
study the usability of privacy mechanisms of internet browsers since apart from
providing privacy mechanisms that enable end users to manage their privacy; internet
browsers are also the media through which most internet interactions happen. This
section starts with the method design followed by the analysis and results before
discussing the findings and summarises the contributions of the study.
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5.3.1 Methods
Compared to the cognitive walkthrough, the case study design offered a more rigorous
analytical evaluation approach. This section portrays the design of the case study
procedure followed by a description of the materials used.
Procedure
Guided by the principles of CPM and the procedures of semiotic inspection, a case
study was designed to analyse usability through an evaluation of the communicability
of the privacy design of internet browsers. Communicability is vital for end users’
understanding which in turn contributes to the different components of usability
which are ease of use, learnability, memorability, efficiency, minimum errors,
acceptability and satisfaction. Semiotic inspection helps to examine the diversity of
signs that end users are exposed to while interacting with computing artefacts. The
signs present in computer interfaces that were analysed are words, dialog structures
and graphic layouts. The three most used internet browsers in 2010 (W3Schools,
2011), that is Internet Explorer 8.0, Firefox 3.6.12 and Google Chrome were
evaluated. The data obtained for each browser was then consolidated and analysed
before a cross-case analysis was performed.
A case study data collection protocol was designed which consisted of the procedures
to follow during data collection and analysis. The backbone of the procedures was the
semiotic inspection method consisting mainly of the analysis of privacy related help
pages, the static interface of the privacy tab and the dynamic interactions that can be
generated following actions from the static interface. Semiotic inspection was
systematically carried out in five steps. The first three steps consisted of the
inspection of help content, static interface signs and dynamic interaction signs which
are the means through which a system communicates to end users. Each of these
steps referred to the principles of the CPM to understand whether online privacy was
designed and communicated in a way that end users are used to offline as stipulated
by the CPM theory. In the fourth step a comparison of the designer-to-user meta-
communications identified in the first three steps was performed. In the fifth stage, a
substantiated judgement was made of communicative problems that may prevent end
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users from effectively using online privacy mechanisms. The flow of the semiotic
inspection stages within the case study is shown in figure 10 below. For each internet
browser (unit case), data about their communicability of privacy was collected by
evaluating each instance of privacy help pages, the static interfaces and the dynamic
interactions by analysing the texts and other signs and answering each subordinate
question of the CPM principles as detailed in the Methodology Chapter.
Figure 10: Within-case data collection and analysis and cross-case analysis
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of the principles of the CPM, as described in the
methodology chapter, and the privacy tabs of the three internet browsers Internet
Explorer 8.0, Firefox 3.6.12 and Google Chrome. The figures 11, 13 and 15 below
show the privacy tabs of each internet browser. These were also the static interface
instances. The actions that can be taken from the static interfaces generate the
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dynamic interactions. The different dynamic interactions that follow from the static
interfaces are shown in figures 12, 14 and 16 below.
Figure 11: Internet Explorer 8.0 privacy tab
The options that can be selected from the above privacy tab are shown in figure 12.
These represent the dynamic interactions of Internet Explorer 8.0’s privacy design.
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Figure 12: Internet Explorer 8.0 privacy tab’s static and dynamic interaction flow
Figure 13: Firefox 3.6.12 privacy tab
The options that can be selected from the above privacy tab are shown in figure 14.
These represent the dynamic interactions of Firefox 3.6.12’s privacy design.
Figure 14: Firefox 3.6.12 privacy tab’s static
Figure
The options that can be selected from the
These represent the dynamic interactions of
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and dynamic interaction flow
15: Google Chrome privacy tab
above privacy tab are shown in figure 1
Google Chrome’s privacy design.
6.
Figure 16: Google Chrome privacy tab’s static and dynamic interaction flow
5.3.2 Analysis & Results
This section elaborates on the case study analysis and the results of the study. It starts
with the analysis of each unit case
design of privacy.
Within case analysis
The data collected about the way privac
static interface and dynamic interactions
analysis of the consolidated data (that is comparison between help, static and dyna
communication of privacy) was
discrepancies with the principles of CPM which were likely to indicate usability
issues.
In the following sections, the analysis for each internet browser is elaborated. The
analysis was performed for principles 1, 3, 4 and 5 of CPM. As explained in the
Methodology Chapter, analysis for Principle 2 was omitted since it would be difficult
to assess help pages, interface and interaction designs for signs that enable end users’
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followed by a comparison of the three browsers’
y was communicated through the help
were consolidated separately.






understanding of release of ownership and control of their personal information. To
summarise from the Methodology Chapter, Principle 1 asserts that if individuals are
aware of disclosure of personal information, they are likely to engage in managing
their privacy. During the analysis, the internet browsers were assessed for signs that
would enable understanding of disclosure such as what would be disclosed to whom
and how. Principle 3 states that individuals have the means to manage their privacy
and form privacy rules that are dependent on five different criteria of rule formation.
These criteria are gender, age, context, motivation and risk and benefit of disclosure.
During the analysis, internet browsers were assessed for the availability of privacy
mechanisms, whether the context of disclosure was apparent, whether the system
motivated end users to form privacy rules and whether the risks and benefits of
disclosure were clear. Gender and age of end users do not depend on the system, they
were hence not taken into account in the analysis. Principle 4 states that during
privacy rules formation, end users negotiate and coordinate ownership and
permeability rights of their personal information. Links of role or coercive nature can
be formed with end users’ personal boundary. During the analysis, internet browsers
were assessed for signs that would enable end users to negotiate who will own their
data and how personal information can be shared with others. Principle 5 claims that
after disclosure, turbulence to personal boundaries can happen when recipients of
personal information do not abide to privacy rules. When turbulence happens,
individuals are aware of these and they have the means to deal with the turbulence.
During the analysis, internet browsers were evaluated for signs of feedback following
disclosure, ways of informing end users in case turbulence happened and ways for end
users to manage turbulence.
Internet Explorer
Principle 1: Awareness of disclosure through what is disclosed, to whom and
how.
Internet Explorer 8.0 did not communicate Principle 1 of the CPM that is awareness
of disclosure, effectively to the end users. This was shown by the contradiction
between help pages, the static interface and dynamic interactions, a lack of clarity and
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preciseness and the confusing information in the dynamic interactions. Table 6 below
gives a summary of how Internet Explorer 8.0 provides for the elements of Principle
1.
Table 6: Would end users be aware of disclosure through Internet Explorer 8.0?
Principle 1 Help Static Dynamic
What  x x
Who x x x
How x x x
The help pages were clear in what would be disclosed but limited to the examples
given. The help pages did not inform end users about how they would be disclosing
nor to whom whilst the static interface suggested disclosure would happen via cookies
without explaining how and what cookies are. The dynamic interactions did not
provide support for what would be disclosed while the recipients of disclosure
appeared to vary in different instances between websites, third-party cookies or no
information. Since the help pages were not directly linked to the static and dynamic
parts, the different communication templates would not support each other in helping
internet explorer end users in being aware of disclosure.
Principle 3: Means to regulate the flow of information online, awareness of these
means and criteria for privacy rules.
Internet Explorer 8.0 did not satisfy the third principle of CPM. This is shown in
table 7 below.
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Table 7: Does Internet Explorer 8.0 provide means to manage privacy, awareness of means and
criteria for rule formation?
Principle 3 Help Static Dynamic
Means   
Awareness of means  x x
Motivation cues x x x
Context information x x x
Risk/Benefit x x x
From the help pages, the means were available to manage one’s privacy. However,
elements that support rule formation as explained in Chapter 2 such as motivating
cues, context of disclosure and risk-benefit of disclosure were partly provided or were
not clearly present. End users would not understand why to use the privacy
mechanisms. Furthermore, for the static interface, means were available to regulate
the flow of disclosure but to understand that privacy mechanisms were available end
users would have to relate the interface to disclosure which might not be easy.
Although the actions possible from the static interface could motivate end users
towards privacy rule formation, these effects would be counteracted by a lack of
explanation in the interface. The static interface corroborated with the help section in
the lack of context and risks and benefits. A similar trend to the static interface was
observed in the dynamic interactions, that is means to manage privacy were available
but there was no information to relate these to disclosure, there were no cues that
could motivate end users to form privacy rules and the context and risk-benefits
information were missing. The three media of communication were consistent in
providing privacy means without explanation of use, in not motivating to form
privacy rules, in having no relation to the context of disclosure and in not enabling a
risk-benefit assessment.
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Principle 4: Disclosure causes linkages to be set up within boundaries, and
requires coordination of ownership and permeability rights.
For Principle 4, there was some consistency in what was communicated between the
three meta-communication templates (the help pages, static interface and dynamic
interactions), especially between the help section and dynamic interactions. Internet
Explorer 8.0 however did not provide for personal boundary negotiation as advocated
by Principle 4 of CPM. Table 8 below provides a summary of how Internet Explorer
8.0 provides for the elements of Principle 4.
Table 8: Does Internet Explorer 8.0 provide for awareness of links to end users boundary and
negotiation?
Principle 4 Help Static Dynamic
Who is linked   
Type of links Role links if end users understand they disclose to
service provider in order to benefit from services
Ownership negotiation x x x
Permeability negotiation x x x
From the help section, it could be understood that first and third party websites would
be linked to end users’ personal boundary. This was not mentioned in the static
interface but was present in the dynamic interactions. Dynamic interactions included
recipients of personal information, hence links to personal boundary such as first and
third party cookies, pop-ups and websites. If end users can understand what first and
third party websites, cookies and pop-ups meant and decided to allow access, the
disclosure would enable the service provider to perform its role of providing services.
However, if end users do not understand the implications of disclosing to these
recipients, the linkages would be of coercive nature. Moreover, the three meta-
communication templates provided no clues about who would own the data accessed
by cookies, pop-ups and permeability negotiation was completely absent as in the help
pages and static interface above.
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Principle 5: Awareness of Turbulence
Apart from not enabling end users to coordinate access to their personal boundary as
described in the analysis for the previous principle, Internet Explorer 8.0 also did not
provide for the possibility to be aware of turbulence to privacy rules as shown in table
9 below.
Table 9: Does internet explorer 8.0 provide for turbulence awareness, means and feedback
following disclosure?
Principle 5 Help Static Dynamic
Awareness of turbulence x x x
Feedback after disclosure x x x
Means to deal with
turbulence
x x x
End users would not know about turbulence to their boundaries except for the hint in
the help pages about the information bar when the computer is at risk. There was no
report of access since disclosure did not happen at any point within all the meta-
communication templates. Also, apart from one instance in the help pages, ‘How can
I keep websites from changing my default search provider?’, there was no method to
deal with turbulence.
Firefox
Principle 1: Awareness of disclosure through what is disclosed, to whom and
how.
Firefox 3.6.12 did not communicate Principle 1 of CPM clearly to end users. By
highlighting the management role of Firefox and not showing that disclosure
happened or could happen, Firefox contributed to the ineffective use of its privacy
mechanisms. Table 10 below offers a summary of how Firefox3.6.12 provides the
elements of Principle 1.
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Table 10: Would end users be aware of disclosure through Firefox 3.6.12?
Principle 1 Help Static Dynamic
What  x x
Who x x x
How  x x
Firefox’s help pages provided a limited list of what type of personal information
would be disclosed to it for management. The help pages indicated that disclosure
would be made to Firefox which would happen when visiting websites and when
downloading and entering information in forms. The static interface corroborated the
managing characteristics of Firefox. The dynamic interactions however provided a
list of what would be disclosed without explanation of what the list contents meant.
Moreover, since dynamic interactions referred to privacy actions separated from
disclosure, end users would not know to whom they would be disclosing and how
they would do so.
Principle 3: Means to regulate the flow of information online, awareness of these
means and criteria for privacy rules.
Although means were available to manage disclosure, the meta-communication
templates (the help pages, static interface and dynamic interactions) were not
consistent and Firefox 3.6.12 failed to cater for Principle 3 of the CPM by not making
the availability of means clear in its static interface and dynamic interactions.
Elements that could help privacy rule formation such as motivating cues, context and
risk-benefit information were not consistently present. This is shown in table 11
below.
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Table 11: Does Firefox 3.6.12 provide means to manage privacy, awareness of means and criteria
for rule formation?
Principle 3 Help Static Dynamic
Means   
Awareness of means  x x
Motivation cues  x x
Context information x  
Risk/Benefit x x x
The help pages provided the means to regulate the flow of information. The clearly
displayed text and pictures could help make end users aware of the presence of
privacy mechanisms and could also act as a motivating factor. These were however
missing from the static interface. As for the dynamic interactions, they might trigger
some end user awareness of the presence of privacy means, but the lack of details
about their aim could cause end users to fail to recognise their availability. The help
section did not point to the context of disclosure whereas the static and dynamic
templates only referred to browsing in general.
Principle 4: Disclosure causes linkages to be set up within boundaries, and
requires coordination of ownership and permeability rights.
Firefox 3.6.12 did not provide for Principle 4 of CPM. This is shown in table 12
below.
Table 12: Does Firefox 3.6.12 provide for awareness of links to end users boundary and
negotiation?
Principle 4 Help Static Dynamic
Who is linked x x x
Type of links Role is end users understand they disclose to
service provider in order to benefit from services
Ownership negotiation x x x
Permeability negotiation x x x
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The Help pages and the static interface communicated the same information that is
that links were formed with Firefox who managed information for end users. This
would be role linkages according to CPM. Firefox would manage information for end
users and would be an intermediary. This was not made clear to end users. Firefox
also did not provide for boundary coordination as per principle 4 of the CPM. There
were also no clues about who would own the disclosures and how they could be
shared with others. This could create the false assumption of fully owning one’s
information.
However one of the dynamic interactions: “exceptions” involved a privacy rule that
required coordination. The linkages that could be formed for “exceptions” would be a
voluntary link with websites whereas the others were actions that would strengthen
role linkages. But as in the help section and the static interface, there were no
ownership and permeability rights negotiation.
Principle 5: Awareness of Turbulence
In general Firefox did not provide feedback after disclosure, ways to be aware of
turbulence and means to deal with turbulence. This is shown in table 13 below.
Table 13: Does Firefox 3.6.12 provide for turbulence awareness, means and feedback following
disclosure?
Principle 5 Help Static Dynamic
Awareness of turbulence x x x
Feedback after disclosure x x x
Means to deal with
turbulence
x x x
There was only one exception among dynamic interactions. If end users selected ‘ask
me every time’, during browsing they would be prompted when websites required
more access hence providing awareness of boundary turbulence with the browsing
website. However, from analysis for Principle 4, boundary formation would be
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established with Firefox. It was hence ambiguous whether disclosure would be made
to Firefox or browsing website. Turbulence with Firefox would not be noticed by the
end users and that with websites might or might not be seen when browsing.
Google Chrome
Principle 1: Awareness of disclosure through what is disclosed, to whom and
how.
Google Chrome was not consistent in its design of principle 1 of CPM. This is shown
in table 14 below.
Table 14: Would end users be aware of disclosure through Google Chrome?
Principle 1 Help Static Dynamic
What  x x
Who   
How  Infer from block and allow
Google Chrome communicated Principle 1 of the CPM in its help section. The help
section was clear about what would be disclosed to whom and how disclosure would
happen. However in the static interface and dynamic interactions, there was a lack of
information and clues that could enable end users to understand when disclosure
could happen. The static interface only indicated that disclosure was made to Google
but not what was disclosed and how. The only information that could be found in
dynamic interactions about what would be disclosed was physical location. For some
of the interactions information was not provided about recipient of disclosure while
for others the recipients were websites and third party cookies. There were no clues
for how disclosure could happen.
Principle 3: Means to regulate the flow of information online, awareness of these means
and criteria for privacy rules.
Google Chrome was quite consistent in its static and dynamic instances in terms of
not providing information that privacy mechanisms were available, not relating to
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context of disclosure, and not providing risk-benefit understanding. This is shown in
the table below.
Table 15: Does Google Chrome provide means to manage privacy, awareness of means and
criteria for rule formation?
Principle 3 Help Static Dynamic
Means   
Awareness of means  x x
Motivation cues  x x
Context information   
Risk/Benefit x x x
The help page of Google Chrome provided privacy means and explanations of the
need for disclosures only rather than explaining the privacy means together with the
disclosures. Motivating cues to form privacy rules was not existent apart from the
contents of the video. The context of disclosure was browsing and while benefits of
disclosure were highlighted, risks were not. However, Google Chrome provided
information about privacy means, motivation factor, some contextual details and risk
and benefits information in the video embedded within the help page.
Principle 4: Disclosure causes linkages to be set up within boundaries, and
requires coordination of ownership and permeability rights.
The links that would be formed with the personal boundary involved different
recipients in the different communication media: browser sites and Google services in
the help section, Google Chrome in the static interface and sites and third party
cookies in dynamic interactions. The links formed were of role type and were
consistent throughout the three meta-communication templates. Moreover, all three
media did not allow negotiation of ownership and permeability rights as shown in
table 16 below.
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Table 16: Does Google Chrome provide for awareness of links to end users boundary and
negotiation?
Principle 4 Help Static Dynamic
Who is linked   
Type of links Role is end users understand they disclose to
service provider in order to benefit from services
Ownership negotiation x x x
Permeability negotiation x x x
Principle 5: Awareness of Turbulence
Google Chrome did not provide means that would let end users know of turbulence in
all three meta-communication templates. However, it can provide feedback when
disclosure happens in two dynamic instances if end users selected to be notified
whenever a website access their information.
Table 17: Does Google Chrome provide for turbulence awareness, means and feedback following
disclosure?
Principle 5 Help Static Dynamic
Awareness of turbulence x x x
Feedback after disclosure x x 




Cross-case analysis was performed in order to identify a trend if any among the
different cases (internet browsers) in terms of each principle. For instance, the cross
case analysis aimed to find out whether the principles were communicated in help




A cross-case analysis of the data collected for Principle 1 revealed that internet
browsers provided clearer information about what would be disclosed within their
help documentation compared to within their static interface and dynamic
interactions. In its static interfaces, Internet Explorer 8.0 indicated that cookies and
pop-ups would be disclosed. However the meaning of these and their implications
were lacking. Firefox on the other hand highlighted the management of history
details but not disclosure whereas Google Chrome gave no mention of what would be
disclosed. A lack of clear information about what would be disclosed in all the three
browsers would make it hard for end users to understand that disclosure would
happen. For instance, Internet Explorer ought to explain what cookies and pop-ups
are, Firefox ought to clear whether disclosure happens to Firefox or whether the latter
is an intermediary and what history details imply. Google Chrome ought to define the
type of information (with explanations) that will be disclosed. Dynamic interactions
in the three browsers are quite confusing in terms of what would disclosed to one
exception only in Google Chrome.
To Whom
Google Chrome provided more information about the recipient of disclosed
information compared to Internet Explorer 8.0. Internet Explorer did not explain what
cookies and third party cookies are. Moreover in Firefox 3.6.12 there was no
information on who would receive the disclosed information since the management
role of Firefox was highlighted without disclosure details. However, all three
browsers provided slightly more information in the help documentation compared to
within the static interfaces and dynamic interactions.
How
Whilst Internet Explorer 8.0 gave no information on how disclosure would happen,
Firefox and Chrome provided more information in the help documentation. Firefox
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did not provide any in the static and dynamic instances whereas Google Chrome
required end users to infer from the words “Block” and “Allow”.
Summary: In general, internet browsers provided limited information about what
would be disclosed in their help section but did not provide clear or un-confusing
information in their static interfaces and dynamic interactions that is there was no
clear information of what would be disclosed to whom in which situation in all of the
cases of help, static interface and dynamic interactions. Part of these were scattered
around in the different instances and were not consistent. More information was
provided in help which was not easily accessible from the static interface and the
dynamic interactions. Since privacy and disclosure are in a dialectical tension
according to Principle 1, the absence of disclosure information at the point where end
users are engaged with the system would make it difficult for end users to understand
that they are disclosing personal information and hence cause the use of privacy
mechanisms to be redundant.
Principle 3:
Availability and awareness of means
All three browsers provided the means to regulate information flow through their
meta-communication media but the problem was with awareness of the availability of
these means. The help section of Internet Explorer and Firefox provided awareness of
availability of the means but Google Chrome concentrated on explaining the aim of
disclosures except in its video. However all three browsers failed to show the
existence of these means in the static and dynamic interfaces. Hence if end users had
the means but failed to recognise that they were there, they cannot be expected to use
them let alone use them effectively.
Motivation to form privacy rules
In some instances of the help documentations only, clear sections and pictures were
used that can motivate end users. However, their static and dynamic counterparts did
not provide any motivating aspect and if there was any persuasive technique, its
effects would be counteracted by the lack of explanations and understanding of why
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those options were there. Hence browsers did not motivate end users in privacy rule
formation except from the standard explanations in the help section which was not
directly linked to the static and dynamic parts.
Context and risk-benefit ratio
Whilst Internet Explorer 8.0 highlighted the context of disclosure to be browsing in
general with no specificity in help, Firefox did so in static and dynamic only whereas
Google Chrome did so throughout all media. However for the risks versus benefits,
none of the media of the different browsers provided information about risk and
benefits to enable end users to make an informed decision. (Google Chrome detailed
the benefits of disclosure only in order to benefit from services.)
Summary:
Although privacy mechanisms were available, end users would not use them since
they would not know whether the means were available and for what purpose they
could be used because the static and dynamic interactions did not provide the
information that the help section did. Also, although functional persuasive techniques
were used in help, during interactions end users would not be motivated. Moreover,
since the actions on privacy mechanisms would be conducted out of the disclosure
context, the specific contextual element that could help manage privacy was absent.
Lack of information about the risks of disclosure compared to the benefits of using
privacy mechanisms would make it hard for end users to understand whether to form
privacy rules and which types of rules to form according to CPM.
Principle 4:
Who is linked within boundary
While Internet Explorer 8.0 and Google Chrome provided different information about
who would be linked within the personal information boundary if disclosure occurs,
Firefox suggested that links were formed between the end users and Firefox which hid
the reality in that Firefox was only an intermediary.
Type of links formed and awareness that these links are formed
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The type of links formed throughout the browsers was role linkages if end users
understood that the links were formed and the type of the links that were formed. If
end users were not provided information to understand that links are formed, linkages
were coercive according to CPM.
Ownership rights and permeability negotiations
There was no ownership and permeability negotiation in the privacy tabs of the
browsers. The only option in some media instance was to block completely or not
share which imply total ownership and control or nothing. There was no negotiation.
While this situation can be explained by the fact that these are a-priori settings,
coordination of these rights form part of boundary coordination which is an important
part of privacy rule formation according to the CPM.
Summary:
Internet browsers in general did not provide for Principle 4, that is awareness of the
type of links formed was quite tricky and there was no boundary coordination and
negotiation of ownership and permeability rights. Moreover the type of links formed
depended on whether end users can understand that a boundary different from their
personal boundary would be formed. The lack of Principle 4 can be explained by the
fact that privacy features of internet browsers are to be set a-priori to disclosure
interactions and coordination and negotiation with service providers cannot be done
until the service is requested.
Principle 5:
Awareness of turbulence
Apart from the exception of one instance of dynamic interactions in Firefox 3.6.12,




Only Google Chrome provided for means to be notified when disclosure happens in
two of its instances of dynamic interactions.
Means to deal with turbulence
There was no means to deal with turbulence if ever it happened.
5.3.3 Discussion
For Principle 1, since privacy and disclosure form a dialectical tension (that is, if there
was no disclosure, privacy management would not be required and if there was no
need for privacy, disclosure of personal information would not matter), for end users
to manage their privacy they need to understand that disclosure happens that is what
would be disclosed to whom and how. The above analysis showed where more
explanations or clues would be useful in ensuring end users can be aware that
disclosure would happen (can recognise disclosure). The information provided in
help, static and dynamic instances should be consistent and complete. This could be
done by making sure all the information is provided in one place or the help pages
should be easily accessible from the static and dynamic instances for instance by
clearly linking help to the static. This would assist end users to relate the use of
privacy mechanisms to disclosing their personal information that would consequently
highlight the personal relevance of using the privacy mechanisms. Highlighting
personal relevance could trigger the cognitive effort required to associate the
interaction with their available privacy attitudes or to enable evaluation in terms of
control of access to private information.
Principle 3 is about the means to form privacy rules when people are motivated,
understand the context and the risks and benefits of disclosure. For end users to use
the privacy mechanisms, they need to be made aware of their presence in static
interface and dynamic interactions. This is because if end users are able to link the
available privacy mechanisms and how the mechanisms can be used to their own
privacy attitudes, they could be more expected to use the mechanisms according to
their concerns/attitudes. According to Principle 3, end users also need to be motivated
to use the mechanisms, to be able to associate the context of disclosure with the
privacy management action and to understand the risks and benefits of disclosing
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versus maintaining their privacy. These criteria from Principle 3 can themselves serve
as persuasive communication within the design. Linking the mechanisms more to
context within interactions would also help to cater for the privacy and disclosure
dialectical tension which in itself would serve to highlight end users’ own attitudes.
For Principle 4 of the CPM, after private information has been revealed, parties
become responsible for co-owning and co-managing the information through
linkages, ownership and permeability rights. Hence interaction designs have to
provide the possibility to coordinate boundaries by allowing formation of links, and
coordination of ownership and permeability rights. The analysis showed that
Principle 4 was not catered for by internet browsers. Provision of the previous
principles that is making it clear what and to whom disclosure happens and ensuring
end users are aware of the usefulness of privacy mechanisms would also contribute
towards Principle 4. However high level coordination and negotiation could be
implemented that would require more precise tuning at specific service request.
As for Principle 5, providing end users with feedback of disclosure might help them to
detect turbulence to their privacy management rules. However, background
monitoring of personal information use would better help browser end users to detect
turbulence. As a form of persuasive communication, monitoring could consequently
enable end users to take actions to match their concerns/attitudes whenever turbulence
happens.
These discrepancies in providing the principles of CPM provide an explanation to the
findings of previous research that showed that end users’ privacy behaviour often do
not match their attitudes. Without support for the socio-psychological processes of
privacy management, internet browsers do not connect with end users’ attitudes and
do not enable the portrayal of a mental model that would help end users to express




The substantive contribution of the study is that internet browser privacy mechanisms
are not consistent in their communication of privacy information in a way that could
help end users to manage their privacy as described by the CPM theory. Clearer
information about the disclosure context was provided in the help pages that were
difficult to access from the static interface and dynamic interactions. Changes to the
communication of information in the design such as coherent information in all
instances together with visible and accessible privacy and disclosure cues would help
to link end users’ privacy attitudes to the use of the privacy mechanisms. The study
also showed that more support for the dialectical tension between disclosure and
privacy and for the socio-psychological processes of privacy management is required
if end users would be expected to manage their privacy effectively. Internet browsers
therefore do not provide the processes that would enable end user control of their
privacy and the other requirements proposed by the experts of Study 1.
Methodological
The methodological contribution is the use of a rigorous and systematic approach to
analyse privacy mechanisms using a communications perspective that assesses
communicability of privacy management processes within the HCI designs of internet
browsers privacy tabs. The study design enabled exploration of the social-
psychological processes of privacy within internet browsers without involving end
users that is it did not suffer from ecological validity that can arise from end users’
self reports of their privacy behaviour (as shown in section 2.3.2). The approach was
also valuable in helping to point out discrepancies in design with regards to the CPM
theory right away.
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5.4 Evaluation of E-Commerce websites (Study
5)
In the previous section internet browsers were analysed and the study found
discrepancies in communication and lack of support for the social-psychological
processes of privacy management. This section describes a second case study aimed
at evaluating another approach of designing privacy. The case study was also
conducted as part of answering research question RQ2, that is, “How usable are online
privacy mechanisms?” but by exploring the interaction design of the privacy
mechanisms of E-Commerce. E-Commerce websites provide the `notice and choice'
privacy approach, that is, end users are provided with a privacy policy which apart
from acting as a liability shield for service providers is also supposed to inform end
users about their privacy. End users then have a choice of whether to disclose or not.
Since it has been said that this approach of designing privacy is not usable or useful
(Anton et al., 2004; Jensen and Potts, 2004; Milne and Culnan, 2004; Jensen et al.,
2005), exploring `notice and choice' would be valuable to shed more light on why this
is the case.
This study analysed the human-computer interaction (HCI) design of the checkout
option of three E-Commerce websites to understand whether end users could be
expected to manage their privacy while shopping online. More specifically, semiotic
inspection was used together with communication privacy management (CPM) theory
to identify communication breakdowns in privacy designs.
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5.4.1 Methods
This section describes the case study design. It starts with the procedure and is
followed with the materials used during the case-study.
Procedure
The case study was designed in a similar fashion to the one in the previous section
through the five steps of semiotic inspection and the principles of the CPM. The three
most used E-Commerce websites in the UK during December 2010 to February 2011
that is Amazon.co.uk, Play.com and Argos.co.uk (IMRG, 2011) were evaluated. The
data obtained for each E-Commerce website was then consolidated and analysed
before a cross-case analysis was performed. The flow of the semiotic inspection
stages within the case study is shown in figure 17 below.
Figure 17: Within-case data collection and analysis and cross-case analysis
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Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of the principles of the CPM, as described in the
methodology chapter, and the E-Commerce websites. The help pages, static interface
and dynamic interactions selected for the evaluation are those that refer to privacy,
disclosure or both. For Amazon, the help pages consist of the privacy notice and the
privacy paragraph from security whereas for Play and Argos, the help pages refer to
their privacy policy. The static interface of Amazon refers to the first interface
leading to the ‘Checkout’ function. For Play and Argos, help pages refer to their
privacy policy, static interface refers to first screen of checkout leading to create new
account and account sign-in through ‘My trolley’ interface respectively. The dynamic
interactions of the three websites refer to the process of disclosing personal details for
checkout. Figure 18, 19 and 20 below show the checkout page for Amazon.co.uk,
Play.com and Argos.co.uk respectively.
Figure 18: Amazon first page to checkout
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Figure 19: Play.com first page to checkout
Figure 20: Argos first page to checkout
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5.4.2 Analysis & Results
This section elaborates on the case study analysis and the results of the study. It starts
with the analysis of each unit case followed by a comparison of the three E-
Commerce websites’ design of privacy.
Within case analysis
The data collected about the way privacy was communicated through help pages,
static interface and dynamic interactions were consolidated separately. A within-case
analysis of the consolidated data (that is comparison between help pages, static and
dynamic communication of privacy) was then performed. The aim was to highlight
discrepancies with the principles of CPM which were likely to indicate usability
issues. In the following sections, the analysis for each E-Commerce website is
elaborated. Similar to the method design described in section 5.3, the analysis of this
study was performed for principles 1, 3, 4 and 5 of CPM.
Amazon.co.uk
Principle 1: Awareness of disclosure through what is disclosed, to whom and
how.
Amazon.co.uk did not communicate Principle 1 of the CPM that is awareness of
disclosure to the end users effectively. This is because it did so in the help pages and
privacy policy but not in the static interface and the dynamic interactions. Table 18
below gives a summary of how Amazon.co.uk provided for the elements of Principle
1.
Table 18: Would end users be aware of disclosure in Amazon.co.uk?
Principle 1 Help Static Dynamic
What  x x
Who  x x
How  x x
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The help pages were clear in what would be disclosed to Amazon and its affiliates
when end users provide information in the different actions mentioned. For their
static interface, that is the static screen at checkout that leads to registration or
entering of one's details, end users would not understand that they might be about to
disclose private information. Also, in its dynamic interactions of checking out
(including entering of contact, billing and delivery details); Amazon did not hint
towards disclosure.
Principle 3: Means to regulate the flow of information online, awareness of these
means and criteria for privacy rules.
Amazon.co.uk did not satisfy the third principle of CPM. This is shown in table 19
below.
Table 19: Does Amazon.co.uk provide means to manage privacy, awareness of means and criteria
for rule formation?
Principle 3 Help Static Dynamic
Means x x x
Awareness of means x x x
Motivation cues x x x
Context information   
Risk/Benefit x x X
Amazon.co.uk only catered for the context of disclosure since it is within an E-
Commerce context.
Principle 4: Disclosure causes linkages to be set up within boundaries, and
requires coordination of ownership and permeability rights.
Amazon.co.uk hardly provided for Principle 4 of CPM. Following the findings of
Principle 1 in which end users would know who they are disclosing to within the help
pages, end users would also know who would be linked within their personal
boundary through the help pages as shown in table 20 below. This was however not
possible in the static interface and the dynamic interactions.
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Table 20: Does Amazon.co.uk provide for awareness of links to end users boundary and
negotiation?
Principle 4 Help Static Dynamic
Who is linked  x x
Type of links Role coercive coercive
Ownership negotiation x x x
Permeability negotiation x x x
Moreover according to the help pages, the type of links that would be formed with
Amazon and its affiliates would be of role type since end users would know who
would be linked within their boundary for the purpose of providing them with
services. But the links formed in the static interface and the dynamic interactions
would be of coercive type since end users would not know who would be linked
within their personal boundary.
Principle 5: Awareness of Turbulence
Apart from not enabling end users to coordinate access to their personal boundary as
described in the analysis for the previous principle, Amazon.co.uk also did not
provide for the possibility to be aware of turbulence to privacy rules as shown in table
21 below.
Table 21: Does Amazon.co.uk provide for turbulence awareness, means and feedback following
disclosure?
Principle 5 Help Static Dynamic
Awareness of turbulence x x x
Feedback after disclosure x x x





Principle 1: Awareness of disclosure through what is disclosed, to whom and
how.
Play.com was not consistent in communicating Principle 1 of CPM to end users.
Play.com would enable end users to be aware of disclosure in its help pages and
dynamic interactions but not in its static interface as shown by table 22.
Table 22: Would end users be aware of disclosure through Play.com?
Principle 1 Help Static Dynamic
What  x 
Who  x 
How  x 
Play hinted towards disclosure in dynamic interactions by using the following:
`provide a valid, active email address', `Enter your postcode', `Date of birth (required
for Debit/Credit card authorisation'.
Principle 3: Means to regulate the flow of information online, awareness of these
means and criteria for privacy rules.
Play.com was inconsistent in providing means to manage privacy and elements that
help towards privacy rule formation. Play provided for user-controlled means that
would allow end users to verify the recipient of disclosure in its dynamic interaction.
Play also provided for risk-benefit awareness in dynamic interactions as shown in
table 23 below. However the help pages and the static interface did not provide for
these elements of Principle 3 apart from the context which was obviously about online
shopping in the static interface.
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Table 23: Does Play.com provide means to manage privacy, awareness of means and criteria for
rule formation?
Principle 3 Help Static Dynamic
Means x x 
Awareness of means x x x
Motivation cues x x x
Context information x  
Risk/Benefit x x 
Principle 4: Disclosure causes linkages to be set up within boundaries, and
requires coordination of ownership and permeability rights.
Play.com did not provide for Principle 4 of CPM. This is shown in table 24 below.
Table 24: Does Play.com provide for awareness of links to end users boundary and negotiation?
Principle 4 Help Static Dynamic
Who is linked   
Type of links Role coercive role
Ownership negotiation x x x
Permeability negotiation x x x
End users of Play.com would know that Play.com and ‘reputable third parties’ would
be linked within their personal boundary throughout the help pages, static interface
and dynamic interactions. In the help pages and dynamic interactions, end users
would have enough information about disclosure to form role links whereas in the
static interface, it would be of coercive nature.
Principle 5: Awareness of Turbulence
In general Play.com did not provide feedback after disclosure, ways to be aware of
turbulence and means to deal with turbulence. This is shown in table 25 below.
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Table 25: Does Play.com provide for turbulence awareness, means and feedback following
disclosure?
Principle 5 Help Static Dynamic
Awareness of turbulence x x x
Feedback after disclosure x x x




Principle 1: Awareness of disclosure through what is disclosed, to whom and
how.
Argos.co.uk was not consistent in its design of Principle 1 of CPM. This is shown in
table 26 below.
Table 26: Would end users be aware of disclosure through Argos?
Principle 1 Help Static Dynamic
What  x 
Who  x 
How  x 
In the privacy policy, end users would know that they are disclosing to Argos,
companies and organisations that administer prize draws and competitions, agents,
staff, approved third parties, anyone with whom rights and duties are transferred and
cookie contents. This would happen by registering as a user of services provided by
Argos and by using Argos website generally. The static interface provided no such
information. In the dynamic interactions, end users would know they are disclosing
delivery details such as name, address, email address, payment details. They might
however not realize that they would also disclose purchase history. Recipient of
disclosure would be assumed to be only Argos. End users would know how they
would be disclosing due to the comment "By submitting your details, you consent to
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their use as set out in our Privacy policy. You'll also be signing up to receive
marketing information (such as email, telephone, text) as detailed in our Privacy
policy, unless you tick the boxes below."
Principle 3: Means to regulate the flow of information online, awareness of these means
and criteria for privacy rules.
Argos did not clearly provide for Principle 3 of CPM. In the help section, end users
might have the means to manage their privacy only for the disclosures that happen
through cookies but not for the information they would disclose to enable a purchase.
Table 27: Does Argos provide means to manage privacy, awareness of means and criteria for rule
formation?
Principle 3 Help Static Dynamic
Means x x x
Awareness of means x x x
Motivation cues x x x
Context information   
Risk/Benefit  x x
The context of disclosure was clearly online shopping. The risk and benefit could
only be discerned in the help pages in some ways since the risk could be seen as the
power Argos has in controlling and managing end users’ personal information and the
benefits would be benefitting from products and services.
Principle 4: Disclosure causes linkages to be set up within boundaries, and
requires coordination of ownership and permeability rights.
Only the first two elements of Principle 4 were provided by Argos as shown in table
28 below. The help pages indicated that end users’ personal boundary would be
linked to Argos, companies and organisations that administer prize draws and
competitions, agents, staff, approved third parties, anyone with whom rights and
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duties would be transferred and cookie contents. The static interface and the dynamic
interactions only hinted towards links formed with Argos and others.
Table 28: Does Argos provide for awareness of links to end users boundary and negotiation?
Principle 4 Help Static Dynamic
Who is linked   
Type of links Role coercive role
Ownership negotiation x x x
Permeability negotiation x x x
For the type of links formed, the help pages made it clear that end user information
has to be provided for Argos to provide better services. That could also be gathered in
the dynamic interactions, that is entering of contact and delivery details would enable
purchases to be processed and products to be delivered. However, the static interface
would leave end users clueless hence causing coercive links.
Principle 5: Awareness of Turbulence
Argos did not provide means that would let end users know of turbulence in all three
meta-communication templates. It also did not provide feedback when disclosure
happened.
Table 29: Does Argos provide for turbulence awareness, means and feedback following
disclosure?
Principle 5 Help Static Dynamic
Awareness of turbulence x x x
Feedback after disclosure x x x





Cross-case analysis was performed in order to identify a trend if any among the
different cases (E-Commerce websites) in terms of each principle. For instance, the
cross case analysis aimed to find out whether the principles were communicated
consistently throughout the help pages rather than static interface and dynamic
interactions.
Principle 1:
The cross-case analysis for Principle 1 suggests that end users would be aware of
disclosure in the privacy policy of the websites and through some hints during
checkout (dynamic) but not in the static screen leading to the dynamic interactions in
Play and Argos. Amazon gave no hints in dynamic too.
Principle 3:
For Principle 3, all three E-Commerce websites provided the context of disclosure
throughout their templates, but only Play provided for user-controlled means that
would allow end users to verify the recipient of disclosure in its dynamic interaction.
Play also provided for risk and benefit awareness in dynamic interactions whereas
Argos did so in its privacy policy only. Hence in general they provided for privacy
means in the form of a privacy policy which end users might not understand how to
benefit from. Also since the components of the privacy mechanisms (the policy) are
not directly linked to the dynamic interactions (where the disclosure happens), they
fail to be usable. They also did not consistently communicate risk and benefit that is
important for privacy rule formation throughout the templates.
Principle 4:
For Principle 4, the type of linkages that could be formed between end users and E-
Commerce websites were mainly role linkages, that is end users would knowingly
release personal information to the service providers with the aim to benefit from
services. However, in instances where information was not provided about
disclosure, the types of linkages were coercive. This was shown in the static interfaces
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of all the three websites. Hence, end users would know about their linkages in the
privacy policy and some instances of dynamic interactions, that is during the process
of disclosure but not before starting the disclosure process.
Principle 5:
None of the E-Commerce websites provided for ways to be aware of mishaps to end
users’ personal information and no ways to find out about how personal information is
processed after disclosure apart from what is available in the privacy policy.
5.4.3 Discussion
For Principle 1, since E-Commerce is a contextual scenario, end users might realise
that they are disclosing personal information in their dynamic interactions (although
not obvious in Amazon) but it might be difficult for end users to link the disclosure to
the use of the privacy mechanisms. This is because although E-Commerce websites
provided the privacy policy, it fails at its purpose of providing notice and choice since
it is not easily accessible within the static and dynamic interactions or linked within
the dynamic interactions. Furthermore the disclosure actions may not be de facto
linked to end users privacy attitudes given that the design does not highlight the
relevance of initiating privacy actions such as opening the policy. As seen in
Principle 3, E-Commerce websites do not provide for user-controlled privacy
mechanisms (with the exception of the dynamic interactions of Play). In addition,
from Principle 4, end users would assume disclosure is required to benefit from the
online service. This means that even if end users know very clearly how disclosure
happens, they would not be motivated by the design to use privacy mechanisms such
as to open and read the privacy policy to find out about their choices.
5.4.4 Contributions
Substantive
The substantive contribution was the finding that E-Commerce websites did not
consistently provide information to help effective use of its privacy mechanisms.
They hardly communicated privacy information that could help end users relate
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disclosure interactions to privacy choices provided by the websites. The design did
not give end users any reason to read the privacy policy. Changes to the
communication of information in the design such as coherent information in all
instances together with visibility and easy access to privacy features would enhance
effectiveness and hence usability of E-Commerce’s privacy mechanisms.
Methodological
The methodological contribution was similar as for internet browsers’ evaluation.
The approach was rigorous and provided valuable insight into the shortcomings of E-
Commerce websites’ privacy design.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, three methods of designing privacy online were analysed. In the first
section, Studies 2 and 3 assessed Facebook’s approach of providing privacy
management mechanisms. The second section analysed internet browsers privacy
tabs within Study 4 and the third section evaluated E-Commerce websites’ ‘notice and
choice’ approach within Study 5. Although the three methods of providing privacy
online differ in their approach, they all failed to support the social-psychological
processes of privacy management within their HCI design.
The survey (Study 2) aimed to determine whether the design of privacy was usable by
finding out whether participants were aware of the presence of the mechanisms. It
was found that participants might not have been fully aware of the availability of
privacy mechanisms, how they could be used and what the impacts of using those
could be though they claimed to be sure of their actions. This could be because the
privacy design was not obvious enough to the social network end users. The
cognitive walkthrough (Study 3) on the other hand helped to provide possible
explanations, through a structured and hierarchical task analysis, about why such lack
of awareness exists in social network services. The cognitive walkthrough found
specific actions that lacked a means of making end users aware that they were
available, and how they can contribute to end users’ privacy goal. The interface
would require some representations that connect the action to end users’ goal or some
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form of feedback that might help to recognise a connection between a system
response and end users’ goal. The analysis helped to show that there would indeed be
a lack of awareness of privacy mechanisms’ availability and potential usefulness in
social network services. This could explain why those mechanisms were not widely
used and why privacy issues were still common in the press although Facebook had
an extensive privacy management interface in 2009.
The case-study design enabled a more thorough evaluation in Studies 4 and 5. A
socio-psychological framework was used to guide semiotic inspection. It was found
from Study 4 that internet browsers’ privacy tabs do not support the dialectical
requirement of end users to both disclose and to maintain a level of privacy
protection. Consequently although privacy mechanisms are available, end users
would be left to imagine disclosure scenarios. This in turn means that end users might
not identify the relevance of associating the privacy mechanisms to their possible
future disclosures and their privacy attitudes might not be activated and accessed from
memory. Therefore highlighting the personal relevance in terms of protection of
one’s privacy would be beneficial to better help end users place the use of privacy
mechanisms within perspective. This would in turn cause activation or enhance the
accessibility of end users’ privacy attitudes such that there would be a higher
likelihood that they can and will use the mechanisms and that their privacy actions
would match their concerns. This would also provide the motivational aspect, found
lacking in the analysis, that would facilitate the use of the mechanisms or support for
coordination of privacy rule such as ownership of disclosed information.
The E-Commerce websites of Study 5 provided the context of disclosure but there
was no clear link to privacy mechanisms that is there was no notice and choice within
the interaction design. Although the policy provided information about disclosures
and possible choices, these were not linked to the dynamic interactions in a way that
would encourage end users to go through the policy. End users would therefore not
understand the extent of their disclosures and how to benefit from the policy. End
users would also have no knowledge of the ownership and permeability of their
disclosed information. Therefore, although end users are involved within disclosure
actions, a link might still not be triggered to their privacy attitudes and they would not
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be able to associate these actions with the functionalities of the privacy approach.
Thus highlighting the benefits of being informed about their disclosures and possible
choice and the relevance to their privacy would help associate end users’ privacy
attitudes to the disclosures causing them to more likely take privacy actions that
follow their attitudes. This would consequently also improve effectiveness of the
mechanisms.
Therefore the proposal in the next chapter of this thesis is to provide the link between
disclosure and privacy. Doing so would not only contribute to the processes for
managing online privacy but would also activate or facilitate the accessibility of






The literature review of Chapter 2 identified a gap in research. The gap was that
previous research has not assessed privacy human-computer interactions through a
behavioural lens. It was argued that better understanding of the reasons behind end
users’ behaviour in response to privacy designs through a social psychological
perspective would be beneficial to effective privacy online. Such an approach would
guide designs and would help produce implementations that enable end users to more
easily connect with their privacy attitudes during interactions such that they can be
more able to use the mechanisms to engage in privacy behaviour. This stance was
substantiated by the research strategy (section 3.3.2) that elaborated on the structure
of attitudes and the link between attitudes and behaviour. Social psychology is of the
opinion that attitudes can guide behaviour and the extent and likelihood that they do
depends on the strength and accessibility of the attitudes (Fazio and Williams, 1986;
Fazio et al., 1986; Augoustinos et al., 2006).
Chapter 5 described the analytical evaluation of existing privacy designs. The
outcome of the evaluation was mainly that existing designs do not support the
156
attitude-behaviour link. The design of privacy in internet browsers was separated
from the context of disclosure and the privacy policy in E-Commerce was not easily
accessible during disclosure as were the privacy mechanisms of Facebook.
Discrepancies were also found in terms of what was communicated within the help
pages, static interface and dynamic interactions. Current designs hence make it
difficult to ensure that end users can take privacy behaviour such that end users have
to imagine their context of disclosure or the privacy protection means and expend
tremendous effort if they were to cognitively evaluate their public-private boundary.
However designing the dialectical tension that is providing for both disclosure
awareness and accessibility of privacy means is tricky since a high privacy salience
can upset the online service.
To summarise, the theoretical background underpinning this section of the thesis is
that activated and accessible privacy attitudes have a higher likelihood of resulting in
privacy behaviour than non-activated and less accessible privacy attitudes (as
discussed in section 3.3.2). This view is substantiated by the qualitative part of the
research (Chapters 4 and 5) that explained that the link with privacy attitudes can be
achieved by ensuring that designs provide the social psychological processes of
privacy management. This chapter describes two experimental studies that were
conducted to find out whether support for the processes of privacy management
through persuasive communication improves the effectiveness of privacy mechanisms
within an E-Commerce context. In other words, the chapter aims to find out whether
persuasive communication can affect privacy behaviour by influencing attitude
activation and accessibility. The studies were designed to answer research question
RQ3 that is ‘How does persuasive communication affect the effectiveness of online
privacy mechanisms?’. The selected context for the studies was E-Commerce since
the latter is not only an integral part of retail services but as discussed in the Literature
Review Chapter, it has been said to suffer from ineffective privacy designs (Milne and
Culnan, 2004; Cate, 2010). Enhancing effectiveness of privacy designs in E-
Commerce could help end users to distinguish between services that genuinely protect
their privacy from those who don’t. It could also help end users to participate in
managing their privacy, making them feel more at ease with the service provider.
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Due to legal requirements, E-Commerce websites have to provide end users with
information about data storage, processing and use. They also have to provide end
users with choices about the information they disclose. This method of providing
privacy in E-Commerce is often referred to as the ‘notice and choice’ approach
(Spiekerman and Cranor, 2009). Studies have shown that the notice provided through
the privacy policy is not effective since the policy is either not opened by end users
(Jensen et al., 2005) or if it is, it is not usable or useful (Anton et al., 2004; Jensen and
Potts, 2004; Milne and Culnan, 2004; Jensen et al., 2005). Without notice, end users
do not have adequate choice hence making the whole approach of providing privacy
in E-Commerce inadequate.
The first user study was a pilot designed to compare end users’ privacy behaviour
when using a prototype website with persuasive messages versus one without such
persuasive messages. The second user study was an improved experimental design
aimed to assess end users’ behaviour under four different persuasive conditions that
restricts persuasive messages in the design to one message so as to more
systematically assess the effect of persuasive communication on privacy behaviour
and hence effectiveness of privacy mechanisms. It also uses more valid
measurements of privacy behaviour. In the following sections, the method, results
and discussion for each study is presented followed by a summary and a formulation
of the contributions of these studies.
6.2 Study 6: Pilot User Study
In this pilot experimental user study, two versions of an E-Commerce website were
designed. The first one had a simple checkout page whereas the second one had
persuasive cues in the form of suggestions and reminders. This section elaborates on
the pilot study design and the results.
6.2.1 Method
In this section, the experiment design is described. The participants, the tools selected




The user study was designed as a within subject experiment that is the participants
took part in both the control task and the task with persuasive messages. The
independent variable was privacy attitude measured through privacy concern as
described by the Privacy Segmentation Index (Kumaraguru and Cranor, 2005). The
dependent variables were privacy related activity: whether the privacy policy was
opened and whether ‘Guest’ was selected at checkout instead of ‘Register’. The
hypothesis derived from RQ3 that is ‘How does persuasive communication impact the
effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms?’ is:
H1: Privacy mechanisms are more effective when persuasive communication is used
Subjects
The study was comprised of a total of 22 participants: 14 of them were affiliated to
the Jubilee Centre of Sunderland recruited through UKOnline and the other 8 were
members of staff of the Barrington Library of Cranfield University. The participants
were explained the purpose of the study without stressing on privacy and were given a
consent form to fill. The table below describes the spread of participants across the
different age groups and whether they started the study with the control version of the
website or the treatment version.
Table 30: Spread of participants for Pilot User Study 1
Age 18-25 26-29 30-39 40-49 50+ Total
Control 3 x 3 1 3 10
Treatment 3 1 1 3 4 12
Materials
The E-Commerce website was designed in two different versions of an online
bookstore. The difference between the two versions was within the checkout page.
The figure 21 below shows the control condition (without persuasive messages) and is
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followed with figure 22 which shows the treatment condition (with persuasive
messages).
Figure 21: The control checkout page
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Figure 22: The persuasive checkout page
The other materials of the user study included a pre-test questionnaire that assessed
the participants’ privacy attitudes and demographic data and a post-test questionnaire
aimed towards comparing the two versions of the website. These questionnaires are
provided in the Appendix E. Camtasia Studio 7.0 was also used to record
participants’ interactions during the test.
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Procedure
Participants were provided with a procedure to follow in which they were asked to
buy a book in control (or treatment) and then asked to buy another book in treatment
(or control). The procedure is provided in Appendix E.
About half (10) of the participants started with the control whilst the other half started
with the treatment. This was done to avoid any bias effect that might result from
taking a specific version of the study first. The experimental task consisted of
choosing a product, adding it to the shopping cart and proceeding to checkout. The
checkout page opened and the participants were required to fill in their name, address,
phone number, e-mail address for delivery and the card details provided in the
procedures.
After this exercise, they completed a single post-test questionnaire where they had the
opportunity to perform a comparative evaluation of the non-persuasive versus
persuasive version of the website. The aim was to find out whether participants
identified any privacy difference between the two websites.
6.2.2 Results
Only half of the participants claimed that it was easier to identify privacy features in
the persuasive condition. 7 participants opened the policy and only 6 participants
identified the ‘Guest’ versus ‘Register’ button to be a privacy choice. 14 participants
selected ‘Guest’ in the persuasive compared to 13 in control.
6.2.3 Discussion
The pilot user study did not show improved effectiveness in privacy mechanisms in
the persuasive version of the design. This might be because the comparative
evaluation was performed by non-expert privacy end users for whom it is difficult to
assess privacy designs. Therefore the next version of the user study would not require
participants to make comparisons between two versions. Instead participants would
take part in only one version of the study in a between subject design. This approach
would however require a much larger number of participants for a statistically sound
analysis.
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Another observation was that participants followed the procedure provided to them
very closely and did not explore the interface such that the information flow diagram
on the right of the checkout page (figure 22) and other cues were hardly noticed. The
participants were also made aware, before taking part in the study, that their
interactions on the researcher’s computer were being recorded by Camtasia Studio7.0.
They also took the study in the presence of the researcher. These aspects of the study
design made it difficult for participants to use the website as they would normally do
in their usual environment. The next version of the study design would consequently
benefit from not having a strict procedure for participants to follow and not placing
participants under such close scrutiny.
The other problem with the design of the pilot study was that improved effectiveness
of privacy mechanisms was measured in terms of higher number of opened privacy
policies, selection of ‘Guest’ rather than ‘Register’, whether participants found a
privacy choice and their stated evaluation of ease of use. The first three of these
measurements would not have much importance in terms of privacy behaviour when
considered separately since for instance selection of ‘Guest’ checkout over ‘Register’
does not mean that participants did so because of the privacy information provided in
the privacy policy. The next version of the design would aim to develop better
measures for effectiveness and privacy behaviour.
The persuasive version of the website also had a variety of persuasive cues that not
only resulted in a clearly different design from the control but also made it difficult to
distinguish between the effects of the different persuasive messages. The next version
of the study would hence design more controlled versions of the website that differ in
only one element of persuasive messages. Apart from privacy attitudes, other factors
related to participants such as age, gender, extent of prior E-Commerce use, education
level might also affect privacy behaviour and would be considered within the analysis.
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6.3 Study 7: User Study
This study design is an improvement on the previous version. In this experimental
study, four versions of an E-Commerce website were designed. The control did not
have any persuasive message whilst the three other versions each had a different
persuasive message. Privacy behaviour was observed in response to the different
types of persuasive conditions and was measured through an aggregate measure of
behaviour. This section describes the method and results.
6.3.1 Method
In this section, the experiment design is described. The participants, the tools selected
and materials designed are specified. The procedure set to participants is also
described.
Design
Persuasive design can include variations to the persuasive message in terms of the
source of the message, the positive or negative value associated with the message and
the content of the message itself (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Wegener,
1998). The four conditions of the experiment were first, an attractive source
suggesting the privacy action within the E-Commerce checkout page. Second, a weak
positive value associated with the privacy action is suggested and third, a strong
argument that would trigger thinking about the extent and consequences of disclosure
and suggesting privacy actions. The control was the absence of a specific persuasive
message within a simple checkout page reminding participants to read the privacy
policy.
The design was a between subject experiment. This is because privacy behaviour
resulting from four different conditions had to be compared and a within subject
approach, in which each participant would be subjected to all four conditions, would
suffer from carryover effects such as fatigue and practice effects such as enhanced
confidence. Also, as shown in the previous section, non-expert privacy participants
would have a hard time comparing different versions for privacy. The independent
variables were Westin’s privacy concern as described by the Privacy Segmentation
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Index (Kumaraguru and Cranor, 2005), age, gender, education level and extent of
previous E-Commerce use.
The dependent variable was privacy behaviour. It was an aggregate measure of
privacy behaviour defined as Behaviour Score. Behaviour Score consisted of two
privacy actions and the extent of notice and choice. Privacy actions were observed
whilst the extent of notice and choice was gathered from the post-task questionnaire
described in the apparatus and materials section below. The extent of notice and
choice was designed as shown in Table 31 and 32 below through Notice Level and
Choice Level scores. The type of data that could be generated by scores were of
ordinal type, that is for instance a value of 2 showed a higher score than a value of 1
but the difference between scores of 2 and 1 and scores of 1 and 0 were not
necessarily the same.
Notice Level was given a score level of 0 to 2. The Notice Level was zero when
participants did not know what was disclosed to whom. The score increased as more
information that might help an individual form privacy rule was identified as shown in
Table 31 below.
Table 31: Notice Definition and Scores
Notice components/stages Notice score
Knows neither of (what information is
disclosed, who has access to information)
0
Knows 1 of (what information is disclosed,
who has access to information)
1
Knows what information is disclosed and who
has access to the information.
2
Choice Level was given a score level of 0 to 1. The Choice Level was zero when
participants did not identify the means to restrict access and storage of their
information. The score increased when participants identified the means and made a
decision to take the more restrictive action or not take the more restrictive action as
shown in Table 32 below.
165
Table 32: Choice Level Definition and Scores
Choice level Choice score
Does not know about means to restrict access 0
Know about means, through guest and register
buttons and selected guest to protect privacy
1
Know about means, through the guest versus
register buttons and decided not to restrict
access to protect privacy
1
Two other measures that contributed to the design were privacy-related actions. They
referred to whether the privacy policy was opened and to the option selected at
checkout as shown in Table 33 below.
Table 33: Actions
Actions Score
Did not open the policy 0
Opened the policy 1
Selected Register at checkout 0
Selected Guest at checkout 1
Therefore, Behaviour Score was the sum of the scores obtained from whether the
policy was opened, the Notice Level Score, the checkout selection and the Choice
Level Score. This catered for evaluative consistency (described in section 3.3.2) by
enabling the comparison of general privacy attitude with an aggregate measure of
behaviour. Moreover, the privacy actions (whether policy was opened and the
checkout selection) were not considered as privacy behaviour on their own since the
fact that policy was opened or guest was clicked did not imply that these were done
purposefully for privacy reasons. Literal inconsistency was hence avoided by
ensuring that behavioural intentions matched actions.
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As explained in the introduction of this chapter (section 6.1) the study’s theory was
that if designs connect with end users’ attitudes, privacy attitudes might be accessed
or activated resulting in a higher likelihood of privacy behaviour than designs that do
not link with privacy attitudes. This research proposed persuasive communication to
trigger this link. The hypotheses derived from research questions RQ3 that is ‘How
does persuasive communication affect the effectiveness of online privacy
mechanisms?’ were:
H1: Privacy attitude has an effect on privacy behaviour
H1 refers to the definition of effective online privacy mechanisms given in section 1.2
that is, ‘an online privacy mechanism is effective if it enables end users to take
privacy actions that match their attitudes’.
H2: Persuasive communication affects privacy behaviour in E-commerce
Moreover, characteristics of the participant such as gender, age, education level and
extent of prior E-Commerce use might affect privacy behaviour. The corresponding
hypothesis is given in H3.
H3: Other factors have an effect on privacy behaviour.
These factors could also interact with persuasive communication when affecting
privacy behaviour. The corresponding hypothesis is as shown by H4.
H4: Other factors interact with persuasive communication to affect privacy
behaviour
Subjects
215 participants completed the E-Commerce simulation and answered the post-test
questions. The spread of participants across the different conditions were as follows:
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Table 34: Distribution of participants across conditions
Persuasive message Condition Frequency
Attractive source 1 63
Positive message 2 51




The apparatus and materials consisted of four websites designed in WordPress. The
difference between the websites was the message before the check box that aims to
trigger end users’ opening of the privacy policy. Figure 23 below shows the checkout
page and figures 24 to 27 show the different persuasive conditions that is a simple
reminder, a reminder with an attractive source, a weak message and strong argument.
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Figure 23: Checkout page without further persuasive message
The ‘Next’ button of figure 23 leads to a different page that reminds end users to open
the privacy policy. Figure 24 shows the fourth condition of the experiment with only
the check box and the message ‘I have read the privacy policy’ without any other
further persuasive element. The aim was to find out how a simple reminder would
affect behaviour compared with those with more persuasive intent.
The first persuasive condition as shown in figure
that suggested reading the policy before checking out. The aim of
source was to act as a cue that would encourage participants to open the policy
without the source itself having any specific connection to pri
source was selected over one with expert or credible links to security and privacy to
avoid causing an effect due to trust.
Figure
The second persuasive condition as s
message, that could be interpreted differently by different participants
reading the policy before checking out. The aim was to encourage participants to
open the privacy policy to benefit from a
is weak since ‘comfort’ in the context of online privacy would be more vague than the
use of ‘secure’ or ‘private’ while still being positive. This message also highlights
personal relevance and vested interest
online experience?’.
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Figure 24: Simple reminder
25 below had an attractive source
vacy. This type of
25: Attractive source persuasive message
hown in figure 26 below had a weak positive
,
comforting online experience. The message




Figure 26: Weak positive persuasive message
The third persuasive condition as shown in figure 27 below had a strong privacy
message that highlighted the reasons to open the privacy policy. The message was
strong because it did not only stress the importance of reading the policy but also
emphasised the personal relevance for the participants. The aim of this message was
to act as the argument for participants to elaborate about their privacy and scrutinise
the privacy afforded by the system.
Figure 27: Strong persuasive argument
Participants were invited to take part in the study via e-mail. The e-mail contained a
link to one condition of the study designed through Loop11 remote usability tool.
Loop11 is a web based un-moderated usability tool that does not enable real time
communication with researchers during participation and allowed participants to take
part in the study in their own time and environment. This method enabled the
involvement of a large number of participants in the study without taking them out of
their usual environment to a laboratory environment that could bias their behaviour
during the study.
171
Loop11 facilitated the design of a demographic survey before the task and a post test
questionnaire that followed the simulated task. The tool also recorded the user path
through the task. This was important because it provided information about whether
specific links were chosen or buttons were pressed. The data collected from the study
was mainly obtained from demographic questions, records of whether the privacy
policy was opened, which option was selected at checkout and the responses to
questions following the task. The pre-task questionnaire queried participants about
age, gender, education level and extent of E-Commerce use (as shown in Appendix
F). The post-test questionnaire assessed participants’ privacy attitudes using Westin’s
Segmentation Index, whether participants knew what information they had just
released, whether participants knew who would have access to the information,
whether participants knowingly selected the more private option to checkout that is
they had a choice and whether participants identified privacy features in the website.
Moreover, Loop11 was adequate for the needs of this study as video or audio
recordings of user activities were not required.
Procedure
Participants were invited through snowball sampling. They were sent a Loop11 link
that opened in their default browser. They received a welcome note to take part in a
shopping simulation and were instructed to answer a series of questions before being
presented with a task to complete. After completing the tasks, participants were asked
questions about the task just completed to assess their appreciation of the level of
notice and choice. The welcome note, instructions, questions, task definition were all
designed in Loop11. In the welcome note, instructions and pre-task questions,
participants were not informed or hinted that the study was about online privacy. This
was done to avoid biasing end users’ behaviour. The participants were however re-
assured at the end of the process that their personal details was not recorded by the
system and that the study was anonymous. Screenshots of the procedure including the
questions is provided in Appendix F.
The task consisted of choosing a product, adding it to the cart and proceeding to the
checkout. The checkout page opened and the participants were required to fill in their
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name, address, phone number, e-mail address for delivery. The card details were
preset into the checkout page so participants did not have to use their own financial
information.
6.3.2 Results
In this section, the data collected is described and explored. The hypotheses are tested
and the analysis is described. The results are further explained and discussed in the
next section.
Describing the data collected
The dependent variable was Behaviour Score which took values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The
aggregate measure, Behaviour Score, was calculated by adding the responses of the
following observations as shown in table 35 below.
Table 35: Components of dependent variable
Component of behaviour score Possible values
Policy opened 0, 1
Notice Level score 0, 1, 2
Choice Score 0, 1
Checkout selection 0, 1
The independent variables were education level, extent of prior E-Commerce use,
concern, age and gender. The values these took and the number of responses received
for each are shown in table 36 to 40 below.
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Table 36: Education Level




First degree 3 66
Post graduate degree 4 92
Total 215
Table 37: Extent of prior E-Commerce use
Prior E-Commerce Use Values N
Once 1 12
1-5 /year 2 43
1-5 /3 months 3 67
1-5 /1 month 4 61
>5 / 1 month 5 32
Total 215
Table 38: Privacy concern




















The ANOVA statistical test was used to analyse the collected data. Before testing the
hypotheses, the assumptions of ANOVA namely normality of data and homogeneity
of variance were verified. The distribution of the individual observations was found
to be roughly normal. For the privacy Behaviour Score for the different conditions,
the variances were equal for conditions A, B, C and D: F(3, 211) = .661, p>.01 that is
non-significant. Homogeneity of variance was confirmed by the variances. The
histogram of behaviour score and the table for the test of homogeneity of variance are
provided in Appendix G.
H1: Privacy attitude has an effect on privacy behaviour
Privacy attitude was measured through Westin’s Privacy Segmentation Index of
privacy concern and took values of 0, 1 or 2 as explained in table 38 above. Privacy
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behaviour was measured through the aggregate measure, Behaviour Score and could
take values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5.
A one-way independent ANOVA was performed to determine the effect of privacy
concern on privacy behaviour. Privacy concern was found to have a significant effect
on privacy Behaviour Score with F(2, 212) = 4.891, p <.05. The tables below show
the SPSS output for the ANOVA.















0 19 1.95 1.079 .247 1.43 2.47 0 4
1 137 2.50 1.207 .103 2.29 2.70 0 5
2 59 2.76 1.119 .146 2.47 3.05 0 5
Total 215 2.52 1.187 .081 2.36 2.68 0 5
It was also clear from the Descriptives table above, from lower bound and upper
bound comparison of mean that participants with Concern = 2 (privacy
fundamentalists) had higher mean behaviour score than participants with Concern = 0
(privacy unconcerned). Fundamentalists’ lowest mean behaviour score matched
unconcerned participants highest mean Behaviour Score.
Table 42: Test of Homogeneity of Variances
BehaviourScore
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
1.225 2 212 .296
The above table shows the test for homogeneity of variance, an assumption to be
satisfied for ANOVA. The significance level enabled acceptance of the null
hypothesis that the variances across the different levels of variable Concern were
equal.
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(Combined) 9.782 2 4.891 3.553 .030
Linear
Term
Unweighted 9.554 1 9.554 6.940 .009
Weighted 8.974 1 8.974 6.518 .011
Deviation .809 1 .809 .587 .444
Within Groups 291.874 212 1.377
Total 301.656 214
Table 43 above shows the significant effect of variable Concern on privacy Behaviour
Score with F(2, 212) = 4.891, p <.05. The multiple comparisons table 44 below
shows that the privacy Behaviour Score of unconcerned participants (Concern = 0) is
significantly different from fundamentalists (Concern = 2) with p=.027. Hence,
irrespective of persuasive condition, privacy fundamentalists exhibited a significantly
higher behaviour score than privacy unconcerned in this user study. This is depicted
in the mean plots graph in figure 28 below.
Table 44: Multiple comparisons for concern
BehaviourScore
(I) Concern (J) Concern
Mean
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
0 1 -.549 .287 .172 -1.24 .14
2 -.815* .310 .027 -1.56 -.07
1 0 .549 .287 .172 -.14 1.24
2 -.266 .183 .439 -.71 .17
2 0 .815* .310 .027 .07 1.56
1 .266 .183 .439 -.17 .71
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Means Plots
Figure 28: Mean plot of Behaviour score for each level of Concern
H2: Persuasive communication affects privacy behaviour in E-
Commerce
The persuasive communication conditions were conditions 1 (attractive source
message), 2 (weak message), 3 (strong message) and 4 (no message). Notice and
choice was measured by Behaviour Score which took values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. The
mean Behaviour Score of each persuasive condition 1, 2, 3 and the control were
compared to find out how the different persuasive conditions affected privacy
behaviour. A one-way independent ANOVA was performed. A significant effect of
condition on privacy behaviour score was found with F(3, 211) = 9.839, p <.05.
The tables 45 to 48 below show the SPSS output for the ANOVA. It is clear from the
Descriptives table 45 below, from lower bound and upper bound comparison of mean
that participants taking part in conditions 1 (that is with attractive source message)
and 4 (that is no message) had much lower privacy Behaviour Score than participants
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taking part in conditions 2 (that is with weak message) and condition 3 (that is with
strong message). The upper bound mean value of conditions 1 and 4 fell well under
the lower bound mean value for conditions 2 and 3.















1 63 2.19 1.176 .148 1.89 2.49 0 5
2 51 3.10 1.063 .149 2.80 3.40 1 5
3 56 2.75 1.100 .147 2.46 3.04 1 5
4 45 2.04 1.127 .168 1.71 2.38 0 4
Total 215 2.52 1.187 .081 2.36 2.68 0 5
Table 46: Test of Homogeneity of Variance
BehaviourScore
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
.661 3 211 .577
Table 47: ANOVA for Condition x Behaviour score
BehaviourScore
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 37.021 3 12.340 9.839 .000
Within Groups 264.635 211 1.254
Total 301.656 214
From the multiple comparisons table below, it can be seen that condition 2, with M =
3.10, gave significantly higher Behaviour Score than condition 1 with M = 2.19, p
<.05 and condition 4 with M = 2.04, p <.05. Also condition 3, with M = 2.75 gives
significantly higher behaviour score than condition 1 with M = 2.19, p <.05 and
condition 4 with M = 2.04, p <.05.
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Table 48: Multiple comparisons for the levels of Condition
BehaviourScore
(I) Condition (J) Condition
Mean
Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -.908* .211 .000 -1.47 -.35
3 -.560* .206 .042 -1.11 -.01
4 .146 .219 1.000 -.44 .73
2 1 .908* .211 .000 .35 1.47
3 .348 .217 .659 -.23 .93
4 1.054* .229 .000 .44 1.66
3 1 .560* .206 .042 .01 1.11
2 -.348 .217 .659 -.93 .23
4 .706* .224 .011 .11 1.30
4 1 -.146 .219 1.000 -.73 .44
2 -1.054* .229 .000 -1.66 -.44
3 -.706* .224 .011 -1.30 -.11
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Means Plots
Figure 29: Mean plot of Behaviour score for each level of Condition
The difference in mean behaviour score is clearly shown in Figure 29 above. The
mean plot provides a visual representation of the means for each condition and their
relationship.
H3: Other factors have an effect on privacy behaviour
All the independent variables were skimmed through to find out if they have an effect
on privacy behaviour and whether they interacted with each other to influence
behaviour score.
H3.1: E-Commerce use affects privacy behaviour score
A one-way ANOVA found a significant main effect of the extent of prior E-
Commerce use on the privacy behaviour score, F(4, 210) = 2.971, p<.05. This is
described in tables 49 to 51 below.
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Table 49: ANOVA for E-Commerce use x Behaviour Score
Source
Type III Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 16.159a 4 4.040 2.971 .020
Intercept 848.902 1 848.902 624.417 .000
EcomUse 16.159 4 4.040 2.971 .020
Error 285.497 210 1.360
Total 1668.000 215
Corrected Total 301.656 214
a. R Squared = .054 (Adjusted R Squared = .036)
Table 50: Mean Behaviour score for each level of E-Commerce use
EcomUse Mean Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 1.667 .337 1.003 2.330
2 2.256 .178 1.905 2.606
3 2.627 .142 2.346 2.908
4 2.590 .149 2.296 2.884
5 2.844 .206 2.437 3.250
The post hoc test, from the multiple comparisons table 51 below, it can be seen that
the significant difference is mainly due to the mean Behaviour Score difference
between EcomUse = 1 and EcomeUse = 5, that is when extent of prior E-Commerce
use is only once versus more than 5 times per month.
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1 2 -.59 .381 1.000 -1.67 .49
3 -.96 .365 .092 -2.00 .08
4 -.92 .368 .129 -1.97 .12
5 -1.18* .395 .032 -2.30 -.06
2 1 .59 .381 1.000 -.49 1.67
3 -.37 .228 1.000 -1.02 .28
4 -.33 .232 1.000 -.99 .32
5 -.59 .272 .319 -1.36 .18
3 1 .96 .365 .092 -.08 2.00
2 .37 .228 1.000 -.28 1.02
4 .04 .206 1.000 -.55 .62
5 -.22 .251 1.000 -.93 .49
4 1 .92 .368 .129 -.12 1.97
2 .33 .232 1.000 -.32 .99
3 -.04 .206 1.000 -.62 .55
5 -.25 .255 1.000 -.98 .47
5 1 1.18* .395 .032 .06 2.30
2 .59 .272 .319 -.18 1.36
3 .22 .251 1.000 -.49 .93
4 .25 .255 1.000 -.47 .98
Based on observed means.
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 1.360.
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
The profile plot in figures 30 and 31 below shows that privacy Behaviour Score
generally increases with an increase in extent of prior E-Commerce use. However,
the error bars graph re-iterates the multiple comparison table in showing that the main
difference is caused when extent of prior E-Commerce use is 1 versus 5.
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Figure 30: Plot of mean Behaviour Score for each level of E-Commerce use
Figure 31: Error bars for Behaviour Score for each level of E-Commerce use
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H3.2: Education level interacts with condition in affecting privacy
behaviour score
A two-way independent sample ANOVA was run through the GLM univariate option
of SPSS. The aim was to determine the interaction effect of persuasive condition and
education level in influencing privacy behaviour. There was a significant main effect
of persuasive condition on behaviour score, F(3, 197) = 6.619, p<.001. There was
also a significant main effect of education level on behaviour score, F(4, 197) = 2.598,
p<.05.
A significant interaction effect was also observed between persuasive condition and
education level on privacy Behaviour Score, F(10, 197) = 2.075, p<.05. This
indicates that participants with different education levels were affected differently by
persuasive condition. The analysis is described in tables 52 to 54 below.
Table 52: Two-way ANOVA for the interaction effects of Condition and Education level x
Behaviour score
Source
Type III Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Corrected Model 77.305a 17 4.547 3.993 .000
Intercept 596.048 1 596.048 523.384 .000
Condition 22.616 3 7.539 6.619 .000
EducationLevel 11.836 4 2.959 2.598 .038
Condition * EducationLevel 23.636 10 2.364 2.075 .028
Error 224.350 197 1.139
Total 1668.000 215
Corrected Total 301.656 214
a. R Squared = .256 (Adjusted R Squared = .192)
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Table 53: Comparison between the different conditions







Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -.91* .201 .000 -1.44 -.37
3 -.56* .196 .029 -1.08 -.04
4 .15 .208 1.000 -.41 .70
2 1 .91* .201 .000 .37 1.44
3 .35 .207 .561 -.20 .90
4 1.05* .218 .000 .47 1.64
3 1 .56* .196 .029 .04 1.08
2 -.35 .207 .561 -.90 .20
4 .71* .214 .007 .14 1.27
4 1 -.15 .208 1.000 -.70 .41
2 -1.05* .218 .000 -1.64 -.47
3 -.71* .214 .007 -1.27 -.14
Based on observed means.
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 1.139.
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Table 53 compares Behaviour Score under conditions 1 to 4 within the interaction
model. Significant different in behaviour score is noticed between conditions 1 and
2, 1 and 3, 4 and 2 and 4 and 3.
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Figure 32: Behaviour score x education level graph for the interaction model
The graph above shows that the mean behaviour score generally increases when
education level increases. The table below shows the mean behaviour score for each
condition for participants with different education levels. For condition 1 (that is
attractive source message) and condition 3 (strong message), privacy Behaviour Score
increases with education level. Condition 2 shows fluctuations in Behaviour Score for
the different education levels, but it can be seen that participants with O and A level
education (education level 1 and 2) had higher Behaviour Score than graduates
(education level 3 and 4). However, no such patterns can be discerned for the
fluctuations of Behaviour Score in condition 4 (no persuasive message).
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Table 54: Mean Behaviour score for each combination of Condition x Education level
Condition EducationLevel Mean Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 0 1.500 .534 .448 2.552
1 1.692 .296 1.109 2.276
2 1.429 .403 .633 2.224
3 2.550 .239 2.079 3.021
4 2.579 .245 2.096 3.062
2 0 .a . . .
1 3.333 .616 2.118 4.548
2 3.800 .477 2.859 4.741
3 2.500 .308 1.892 3.108
4 3.194 .192 2.816 3.572
3 0 .a . . .
1 1.800 .477 .859 2.741
2 2.333 .436 1.474 3.193
3 2.588 .259 2.078 3.099
4 3.107 .202 2.709 3.505
4 0 1.500 .534 .448 2.552
1 3.000 .616 1.785 4.215
2 1.286 .403 .490 2.081
3 2.118 .259 1.607 2.628
4 2.286 .285 1.723 2.848
a. This level combination of factors is not observed, thus the corresponding population
marginal mean is not estimable.
6.3.3 Discussion and conclusion
This study simulated an E-Commerce task and did not inform end users before the
study that it was aimed at assessing privacy behaviour. This was done to avoid
privacy salience that would affect participants’ behaviour and make it difficult to
determine effects of the conditions of the design. Although the study has the
advantage of not taking participants away from their environment to a research
laboratory, it could be said to suffer from not being a real life situation. The study did
not record the personal details entered by participants and the study was anonymous;
it was not possible to determine whether participants entered their own details as they
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would in an E-Commerce transaction. Financial details were also preset in the task.
However a more real life approach would have been unfeasible within the scope of
the research in terms of expense and time and recording of end user data.
In section 6.3.2, the testing of the first hypothesis that is whether privacy attitude has
an effect on privacy behaviour, it was found that irrespective of persuasive condition
privacy attitude, measured in the experiment through Westin’s Privacy Segmentation
Index, did affect privacy behaviour, measured through the Behaviour Score.
Fundamentalists had significantly higher Behaviour Score than privacy unconcerned.
This is because privacy fundamentalists have stronger privacy attitudes that is more
accessible privacy attitudes and consequently more easily activated attitudes. These
have a higher chance of predicting behaviour compared to less easily activated
attitudes such as those of privacy unconcerned end users. Attitude accessibility is also
related to the extent to which the attitude is perceived as personally important and
relevant which in turn influences the extent to which the person is motivated to devote
cognitive resources to evaluate the privacy situation. Furthermore, end users with
more accessible attitudes would possibly have higher attitude-relevant knowledge of
an issue. These might explain why fundamentalists exhibited more privacy
behaviour. This finding is important since designing privacy mechanisms in such a
way that allows end users to use privacy mechanisms according to their privacy
requirements paves the way for effective use of privacy designs.
However, the sample of 215 participants was not divided into an equal number of
privacy unconcerned, pragmatists and fundamentalists. The distribution of privacy
attitudes within the sample followed Westin’s findings in having a much higher
number of pragmatists than unconcerned and fundamentalists (Kumaraguru and
Cranor, 2005) but had approximately three times the number of fundamentalists to
unconcerned. It would not have been feasible to collect the exact proportion of
different types of privacy concern participants as expected by Westin’s breakdown
since this method would have involved selection of participants according to their
privacy concern. Selecting participants using this method would have required
querying participants about their privacy attitudes at a much earlier time to the user
study to avoid contaminated behaviour and would make it difficult to separate effects
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of the experimental conditions from those of the screening questionnaire. Moreover,
if the study queried participants about their attitudes at a much earlier time to
observing their behaviour, the study would have suffered from evaluative
inconsistency as explained in section 3.3.2 in the Methodology Chapter.
Irrespective of their privacy concerns, end users can behave more privately under
certain design conditions as found by testing the second hypothesis. The distribution
of privacy unconcerned, pragmatists and fundamentalists in the four conditions
followed the distribution of the sample population, that is an average of 63% of
pragmatists. Condition 1, the attractive source that reminded participants to read the
privacy policy generated a significantly lower privacy Behaviour Score than the more
positive and personally relevant conditions 2 and 3, but similar effect as the simple
reminder of condition 4. This finding shows that having an attractive source, with a
reminder of privacy action, that is not personally relevant to end users, do not
influence end users towards privacy behaviour by acting as a heuristic cue (as
expected from such persuasive messages). This might be because this type of
message fails to connect with end users’ privacy attitude but instead distracts them
from their privacy concerns. This type of design would result in a similar effect to not
having a particular message added to the usual reminder and consent check as in
condition 4.
Another aspect of the findings was the significantly higher behaviour caused by
conditions 2 and 3 compared to conditions 1 and 4. That is condition 2 which was a
weak message in terms of privacy but highlighted personal relevance and vested
interest by the way the message was framed had a similarly high behaviour score to
condition 3 which was a strong privacy argument that also hinted personal relevance.
The mean plot of figure 29 also showed that condition 2 caused higher behaviour
score than condition 3, although not significant. Since the message in condition 2
started with ‘Would you like a comforting online experience?’, the effect of condition
2 might be caused by additional elements to personal relevance that biases behaviour
such as the fear of losing one’s comfort or that comfort is an obvious choice
irrespective of privacy concern. It would be further interesting to determine the long
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term effects of reinforcing the link between privacy attitudes to behaviour of these
two types of messages.
Other factors can also impact end users’ online privacy behaviour and consequently
the effectiveness of notice and choice in E-Commerce. There was a definite
difference in Behaviour Score between those who have used E-Commerce only once
before and those who used it at least five times within a month. This might hint that
the more individuals use E-Commerce, the more they are aware of the privacy options
of the service provider and the more they take privacy actions. Although it does not
necessarily mean that they are more able to relate their privacy behaviour to their
attitudes, this finding might be because the frequency of prior exposure to an attitude
object affects end users’ knowledge of the object and their attitude accessibility.
These would in turn influence end users’ elaboration of persuasive messages that can
influence behaviour.
The other finding was that education level of participants interacted with persuasive
condition. In conditions 1 (attractive source) and 3 (privacy argument), Behaviour
Score increased with education level. That is within condition 1, as education level
increased, the message with the attractive source was less of a distraction but more
informative and within condition 3, as education increased, the strong privacy
argument was seen as being more valuable. An increase in education level might be
linked with having more information and hence being better equipped to assess a
situation with regards to privacy. However, condition 2 was more effective in biasing
the behaviour of participants with an O and A level than graduates.
To summarise, although not involving real life purchases, the study simulated an E-
Commerce task that did not happen within a laboratory environment and consequently
alleviated the pressure on participants. The study found that privacy attitude has an
effect on behaviour when privacy management is linked to the disclosure context with
the help of persuasive triggers. It was also found that some persuasive conditions can
cause more private behaviour than others while others can distract end users from
privacy behaviour. Furthermore education level of end users interacts with condition
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of the design in affecting privacy behaviour whilst the extent of prior E-Commerce
use affects behaviour on their own.
6.4 Contributions
In this section, the contributions of the study are underlined. The substantive
contributions are provided followed by the methodological contributions.
6.4.1 Substantive
A major contribution of this study is the finding that privacy attitude does have an
effect on privacy behaviour when privacy management processes are linked to the
context of disclosure with the help of persuasive triggers. Under such conditions
privacy fundamentalists can take more privacy behaviour than privacy unconcerned as
expected from their privacy attitudes.
This finding is important since it is different from those of previous research that
found that individuals do not behave according to their concern online and
fundamentalists can even behave opposite to their concerns under certain conditions.
This study showed that under conditions that make one’s attitude more accessible,
fundamentalists would behave as expected. It also shows that under these conditions,
privacy mechanisms can be more effective and hence more usable.
Another finding was that the messages associated with reminding end users of privacy
actions are important in determining privacy behaviour. The framing of the messages
can be distracting, have not much to do with privacy but bias towards privacy
behaviour or serve as the argument that reinforces privacy behaviour. However,
although the design of these messages is important, the study showed that other
factors such as end users’ education level and their extent of prior E-Commerce use
add to the complexity of whether end users would use privacy mechanisms.
6.5.2 Methodological
Study 7’s design contributes to user study design within the research space. The first
methodological contribution of the study was that it was not conducted within a
laboratory environment. Participants were able to take part within their own
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environment. This contributed to them taking the simulated E-Commerce task as
close as they would normally do. Other contributions involve measurement of
privacy behaviour. Privacy behaviour itself was measured compared to other
previous research that observed disclosure behaviour as an indication of privacy. The
study also compared general privacy concern to an aggregate measure of privacy
behaviour to cater for evaluative consistency as opposed to comparing general privacy





Previous research addressed the requirement of ensuring end user privacy online via
different angles. They catered for the legal and technological requirements, but online
privacy mechanisms remain in-effective in ensuring end users’ privacy protection. As
reviewed in Chapter 2, possible explanations were found for the in-effectiveness
ranging from end users’ irrational behaviour, end users’ need for immediate
gratification, end users’ trust in the service provider together with un-usable and
unhelpful privacy designs. Enhancements were suggested to design that would
facilitate the communication of disclosure information to end users or aid privacy task
completion. The effect of these enhancements in aiding end users’ understanding of
disclosure information and in completing privacy related actions such as opening the
privacy policy were explored and end users’ choice of different methods of presenting
privacy settings and the privacy policy were compared. The role of these
enhancements as influence methods that could activate privacy attitudes or make
privacy attitudes accessible and as the means to help in providing for the socio-
psychological processes of privacy management were however not considered. The
role of persuasive triggers in supporting privacy management processes were not
looked into and an assessment of whether existing designs provided for these
processes in the first place was not done. Previous research did not look into the
prospect of using those to link the design with end users’ privacy attitudes, that is
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research was not conducted in enhancing the effectiveness of privacy mechanisms by
enabling end users to take privacy actions that match their privacy attitudes. They
consequently also did not look into the effects of different types of influence or
persuasive communication methods on privacy behaviour.
Following identification of the research gap, the research within this thesis conducted
7 studies (including 2 pilots) to answer three research questions. The research
questions are:
 RQ1: What are the requirements for usable online privacy mechanisms?
 RQ2: How usable are existing online privacy mechanisms?
 RQ3: How does persuasive communication impact the effectiveness of online
privacy mechanisms?
This chapter first presents a model that depicts the findings of the research. It then
discusses the findings in the context of the research gap and their contribution to the
model and examines the extent to which the studies’ findings help to answer each of
the research questions. It elaborates on the significance of these findings and
proposes ways of addressing the limitations in the findings.
7.2 Model of privacy attitude-behaviour link
A model of how persuasive communication supports the attitude-behaviour link
within privacy design is introduced following the literature review, exploratory
analysis and experimental study of this thesis. The model accounts for the
components of attitudes, namely: cognition, affect and behaviour and shows the path
through which persuasive communication links privacy attitude to behaviour as
shown in figure 33 below. This section describes the main tenets of the model
whereas the following sections review the research findings in terms of the model and
research gaps.
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Figure 33: Model of how persuasive communication support the privacy attitude-behaviour link
Privacy attitude is a cognitive construct residing in memory that can be activated if it
is linked with a context of disclosure that requires control of access to personal
information. In the ‘affect’ part of the model, automatic activation of privacy attitude
can happen with privacy cues within the design that biases attitude object evaluation.
For example the presence or absence of privacy representations such as the presence
of the privacy policies in Jensen et al. (2005) influenced the choice and consequently
behaviour of end users. The presence of privacy cues and the presumed support for
privacy protection can also cause a connection with the trust attitude such as in
Joinson et al. (2010). This thesis showed that a simple reminder and one with an
attractive source provided no support in influencing privacy behaviour but one with a
‘comforting experience’ message was significantly valuable in triggering privacy
behaviour possibly acting as a peripheral cue that biased privacy behaviour.
In the ‘cognition’ part of the model persuasive communication can trigger information
transfer that is present information, symbols and nudges that support the social-
psychological processes of privacy management and ease end users’ effort in building
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a mental picture of their privacy. This type of design can aid or ease evaluation of an
object or context in terms of privacy attitudes causing privacy attitudes to be activated
or to enhance their accessibility resulting in increased likelihood of them showing in
behaviour. The mental model that end users are to build includes principles of CPM
that was found to be particularly important in Studies 4 and 5: awareness of disclosure
together with availability of means that support ownership and permeability
negotiation. As shown by Study 7, persuasive communication can provide the
cognition part of the model in the form of an argument that supports privacy
evaluation or enhances scrutiny of the context with respect to privacy. In previous
research, proposed enhancements to designs such as better presentation of the privacy
policy (McDonald et al.,2009; Kelley et al., 2009; Richter-Lipford et al., 2010), better
interfaces for specific privacy enhancing technologies (Cranor et al., 2006) and
enhanced visual feedback (Richter-Lipford et al., 2008) are example of means that
support formation of the mental model by providing better privacy-disclosure
information within a context.
7.3 Research question 1
In the literature review, it was found that there was a lack of clear literature on what it
means for online privacy to be usable in general. In particular there were no
endeavours specifically aimed at exploring usability design requirements for privacy
that would guide proposals and evaluations. Such an exploration benefits from a
multidisciplinary perspective that does not restrict the process to a legal or
technological perspective. This research answered RQ1 that is ‘What are the
requirements of usable online privacy?’ through Study 1.
Study 1 was designed to elaborate on the requirements of online privacy design from
a multidisciplinary perspective by involving a group of privacy experts who belong to
various research disciplines. Experts were selected over end users to enable a deep
reflection on the issue of usability of privacy designs and also because, as was
previously found (VOME, 2012b), end users cannot clearly explain privacy and
therefore its requirements especially without a context or situation.
197
This section explains the extent to which the first study answers the first research
question and contributes to the model of figure 33. It then explores the significance
and implications of these findings for the theory in the research space and the practice
of designing usable online privacy. This is followed by identifying the limitations of
the findings and suggesting how they can be addressed.
Findings of Study 1
The outcome of Study 1 was a list of requirements, suggested by privacy experts, that
is expected to enhance the usability of online privacy. An important element of the
list was end user control. It was suggested that end user control should however run
in parallel to system services and require minimum user effort. Experts stressed on
the complexity and challenge of designing usable online privacy which supports and
explains the findings of the literature review that is online privacy designs suffer from
a large amount of usability issues. To address the challenge, the experts suggested a
list of ways that can help to provide for the conflicting requirements of end user
control and minimum effort in balance with system services and advised on carefully
considering the context of use during design. These were predefined custom privacy
levels, standard privacy methods across systems, default privacy, explicit opt-in and
feedback and could be considered as nudges or persuasive element.
Experts’ suggestions that, irrespective of context or privacy solution, enabling end
user control of what is shared with whom under what circumstances would ensure
usability, imply that end users should be directly involved in managing their privacy.
This outcome of Study 1 contributes to the model of figure 33 because direct
involvement would force or trigger cognitive evaluation of the interactions enabling
end users to categorise the interactions as an experience requiring control of access to
the self that is in terms of privacy attitudes. Alternatively, the act of being involved in
controlling one’s privacy might enhance the ease with which end users’ privacy
attitudes are retrieved from memory that is privacy attitudes might be accessible.
Activated or accessible privacy attitudes can be expected to have a high chance of
being reflected in behaviour.
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Significance and limitations of the findings of Study 1
The findings of Study 1 are significant because such a study, involving the
collaboration of a varied group of privacy experts sharing opinions and reviewing
those opinions, was not conducted before in the online privacy research space. These
findings are also significant for designers who need to find ways to cater for the
requirements of usable online privacy. It is also significant to build theory around the
ways through which HCI can help to cater for these requirements such as the
approach used within this thesis that taps into social-psychology to devise ways for
making privacy attitudes active or accessible.
Given that RQ1 is framed as a general question not specific to a context, the
qualitative exploration of Study 1 identified the essential but non-exhaustive list of
requirements for usable online privacy. Therefore, when applying these requirements,
the context of the privacy designs have to be carefully considered to determine the
ways of providing for user control with minimum effort while not disrupting system
services. For instance, as suggested by the privacy experts, end users could be nudged
towards privacy but the nudges should be designed specifically for each context.
7.4 Research question 2
Although end users seamlessly and instinctively manage their privacy offline, they are
not able to do so online. The literature review discussed a variety of usability issues
associated with online privacy design. Study 1 provided a list of requirements
suggested to ensure the usability of online privacy mechanisms. Studies 3, 4 and 5
were designed to assess whether existing privacy designs can be expected to be usable
that is whether they provided for the processes that would support the requirements of
end user control of their privacy within the bounds of minimum effort that is enable
end users to manage their privacy as seamlessly as they are used to offline. They
answered RQ2 that is ‘How usable are existing online privacy mechanisms?’.
This section explains the extent to which Studies 3, 4 and 5 answer the second
research question and contribute to the model of figure 33. It then explores the
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significance and implications of these findings and follows by identifying the
limitations of the studies and suggests how they can be addressed.
Findings of Studies 3, 4 and 5
Through a cognitive walkthrough approach designed to find out whether end users
would be able to manage their privacy by completing the privacy tasks in Facebook,
Study 3 explored whether the design helped end users in identifying and learning to
use privacy mechanisms. The study determined whether the interface and interaction
design of Facebook would enable a cognitive connection with the effect end users are
trying to achieve that is sharing of personal information while protecting their privacy
and whether they would be able to link the presence of privacy mechanisms with their
privacy requirements. Therefore the study determined whether Facebook contributed
to the cognition part of the model of figure 33 that would help to link privacy
behaviour with attitudes. Facebook was found to require design modifications for its
privacy design to enable end users to do so. However, the cognitive walkthrough
method suffers from researcher bias and the design was limited to only the awareness
aspect of the social psychological process of privacy management. A more systematic
evaluation was consequently designed for studies 4 and 5.
The more systematic approach took the main findings of Study 1 into account that is
the requirement for end user control and minimum effort within a context of use.
Since it is difficult to evaluate the extent of end user effort required by the design
without involving end users in the analytical evaluation, the principles of a social-
psychological theory (CPM) that depicts seamless privacy management was mapped
to online privacy design. Semiotic inspection was guided by the principles of CPM
(Communication Privacy Management) to explicate how privacy designs provided for
the processes of privacy management and the social-psychological link to end users’
privacy attitudes, that is the connection between attitudes and behaviour as in the
model of figure 33. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Methodology), CPM views the
process of disclosure as inherently dialectical that is disclosure is seen as the process
of revealing private information yet always in relationship to concealing private
information. Privacy information is also conceptualised in terms of possession such
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that individuals believe they own their private information and consequently have the
right to control it. CPM provides the metaphor of boundaries to illustrate that
although there is a flow of private information to others; borders mark ownership lines
within a boundary management system. This illustration and the simultaneous nature
of wanting to tell and also wanting to conceal not only makes CPM theory valuable to
understand how people navigate privacy but also makes it helpful to assess whether
online interaction designs caters for both processes of revealing and concealing
private information. Catering for both of these is essential to enable end user privacy
management without disrupting system services. These components of CPM and
system services (context) make up the cognition part of the model.
Study 4 evaluated the internet browser privacy tabs and Study 5 E-Commerce
websites’ notice and choice design. The findings from Studies 4 and 5 showed that
two different context of designing privacy, within internet browsers and E-Commerce,
suffered from communication breakdowns that would affect end user control. While
internet browsers’ privacy tabs provided for the mechanisms to protect one’s privacy,
it does not make the disclosure part of the dialectical tension clear to end users. End
users would not be able to picture what would be disclosed to whom and how since
the static interface and the dynamic interactions of internet browsers do not provide
this support. The lack of support for the disclosure context would make it tricky for
end users to cognitively evaluate their private-public boundary hence rendering the
availability of the privacy mechanisms not useful in enabling end users to manage
their boundaries. As shown in the model, a missing part of the cognition component
might hamper the link between privacy attitude and behaviour since it would also be
difficult for end users to associate their available privacy attitudes with an imaginary
disclosure context. This would result in end users not equipped to protect their
privacy, using internet browsers’ privacy tabs, to the extent expected by their privacy
attitudes. The E-Commerce websites provided the disclosure context but it was not
clear who would own the revealed personal information and how it can be further
spread to other parties. Although end users’ privacy attitudes might be activated
during interaction with the websites, there was no clear, visible and relevant means to
protect their privacy. According to the model, although privacy attitude is activated, a
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lack of means in cognition will not enable end users to react with privacy behaviour.
That is end users would not be able to associate their disclosure of private content to
the use of the provided notice and choice and not be able to see the relevance of these
to their privacy leading to their inability to exercise their privacy boundary
management.
Apart from providing for the dialectical grounds for disclosure of private information
and privacy protection, designs should also ensure consistent information is
communicated via help documentation, static interfaces and dynamic interactions.
The designs should enable end users to grasp the personal relevance and vested
interest in using privacy mechanisms. These could contribute to more easily
accessible attitudes that have a higher chance of reflecting in behaviour through either
the cognition or affect part of the model. However, the effort or hassle value must not
overburden end users. For instance in the case of internet browsers privacy tabs, end
users must be able to access their privacy attitudes during each browsing activity
without straining end users. These conditions might be practically impossible to
achieve without the use of persuasive communication which can facilitate or enable
the cognitive effort required to evaluate a given circumstance as requiring privacy
protection and ease the access and activation of end users’ privacy attitudes to
exercise privacy protection.
Significance and limitations of the findings of Studies
3, 4 and 5
The findings of Studies 3, 4 and 5 are significant in demonstrating why privacy
mechanisms are reputed to be in-effective that is by not enabling end users to behave
according to their privacy attitudes. The findings of Studies 3, 4 and 5 are also
significant for the research space since they suggest the need for further research that
would explore and cater for the dialectical tension required within privacy design.
However providing the dialectical tension might not be an easy task since enabling
end user privacy management should not disrupt system services. Too high privacy
salience can cause end users to shun away from disclosing any personal information
and consequently affect service provision.
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More research is needed to understand privacy interactions as a form of human-
computer interactions. The real-life conceptual framework (CPM) was mapped onto
privacy HCI and identified key issues. Although (CPM) was helpful for the purpose
of the evaluation, a revised privacy management framework within HCI that accounts
for the limitations and constraints of the online environment could be useful.
Moreover, although Studies 3, 4 and 5 answered RQ2 from an effectiveness and
communication perspective of usability, there is however a variety of other
perspectives through which usability can be assessed and these might be useful for
future research. The perspective selected by this research however contributed to
identifying communication breakdowns in the different context that can be useful
when designing more persuasive privacy. Studies 3, 4 and 5 also only considered
three contexts within which privacy management are embedded. Further research
might provide valuable insight when evaluating stand-alone privacy solutions within
different contexts.
7.5 Research question 3
The literature review identified a research gap that is that previous research has not
looked into the contributions of persuasive communication on assisting the activation
and accessibility of end users’ privacy attitudes. This would ease privacy attitude’s
reflection on privacy behaviour and effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms
would be improved as shown in the model.
To ease cognitive effort, provide the dialectical tension (found to be absent in Studies
3, 4 and 5), enable depiction of a mental model, and moderate the attitude-behaviour
relationship, persuasive communication is proposed. Persuasive communication can
trigger, bias or ease cognitive evaluation such as highlighting the personal relevance
or personal interest, or by diverting attention, persuasive communication can enable
user control of disclosed private information. As shown in the model, this would link
privacy behaviour with attitudes. Given that the ability to behave according to one’s
privacy attitudes is an indication of the effectiveness of privacy mechanisms, Study 7
observed privacy behaviour under different conditions to find out whether those
conditions contribute to privacy behaviour and answered RQ3 that is ‘How does
203
persuasive communication impact the effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms?’.
This section discusses the findings of Study 7 in terms of the research gap and the
proposed model.
Findings of Study 7
Study 7 answered RQ3 by showing that persuasive communication can affect the
usability of online privacy mechanisms by enabling end users to behave according to
their privacy attitudes. This was shown by privacy fundamentalists scoring more
private behaviour than privacy unconcerned. Privacy fundamentalists have strong
privacy attitudes (because they consistently evaluate a situation as requiring privacy
protection), and have higher privacy attitude accessibility than privacy unconcerned.
They have a higher likelihood that their privacy attitude will be automatically
activated from memory upon mere encounter with the attitude object and may more
easily detect the need to exercise privacy or be prepared to spend cognitive effort.
Attitude accessibility also determines the extent to which the attitude is perceived as
personally important and relevant which in turn influences the extent to which the
person is motivated to devote cognitive resources to evaluate the privacy situation.
Furthermore, end users with more accessible attitudes would possibly have higher
attitude-relevant knowledge of an issue. This might also explain why fundamentalists
exhibited more private behaviour. Therefore under favourable conditions stronger
privacy attitudes will predict behaviour. The significance is that designs should be
carefully thought of or implemented such that available attitudes are retrieved from
memory and associated with the context of use.
The study also showed end users’ privacy behaviour response was different for each
message. Some persuasive conditions (design conditions) were observed to cause
more private behaviour than others or to distract end users from privacy behaviour.
Condition 1, the attractive source seemed to distract participants from privacy
behaviour while significantly higher behaviour was caused by conditions 2 and 3.
Condition 2 was a weak message in terms of privacy but highlighted personal
relevance and vested interest by the way the message was framed. It had a similarly
high behaviour score to condition 3 which was a strong privacy argument that also
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hinted personal relevance. Conditions 2 and 3 show different routes from attitude to
behaviour within the model.
Study 7 also highlighted the contribution of education level and extent of prior E-
Commerce use on privacy behaviour. There was a definite difference in behaviour
score between those who have used E-Commerce only once before and those who
used it at least five times within a month. This might hint towards a link between
extent of E-Commerce use and privacy behaviour such that higher frequency of E-
Commerce use led to more private behaviour. This might be bacause the frequency of
prior exposure to an attitude object affects end users’ knowledge of the object and
their attitude accessibility. These would in turn influence end users’ elaboration of
persuasive messages that can influence behaviour.
Education level was also found to affect privacy behaviour. Under two conditions,
higher education level was linked with higher behaviour score. Therefore individuals
who have more information or knowledge of online privacy would also benefit from
conditions that appeal more in terms of socio-psychological processes for managing
privacy.
Significance and limitations of the findings of Study 7
These findings are significant because they showed that privacy behaviour can vary
and consequently also effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms under different
persuasive design conditions. Some persuasive condition can ease activation of
available privacy attitude or enhance accessibility more that is help end users to
categorise the experience in terms of their attitude from memory or to retrieve the
attitude from memory more easily than others. This is done by easing end users’
allocation of cognitive resources required to evaluate the situation or bias evaluation
or provide the arguments necessary such that attitudes prediction of behaviour is also
facilitated. Therefore some persuasive communication can help end users to manage
their privacy with relative ease whereas other conditions are less helpful. This is
because when a person has a highly accessible attitude, that attitude is quickly and
relatively effortlessly retrieved from memory when the person is exposed to the
corresponding attitude object.
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The study is also significant in showing that having an attractive source who reminds
end users of a privacy action and reminders that are not personally relevant to end
users, do not influence end users towards privacy behaviour by acting as a heuristic
cue (as would be expected from such persuasive messages). This might be because
this type of message fails to associate end users’ attitude with the experience or
facilitate retrieval of attitude from memory but instead distracts them from their
privacy concerns. This type of design would result in a similar effect to not having a
particular message added to the usual reminder and consent check as in condition 4
and should be avoided in designs.
The findings of this study are important for the research space to trigger further
research in the use of persuasive communication on privacy attitude accessibility and
activation. It also suggests the benefit of considering the social psychological
relationship between attitude and behaviour for privacy design and HCI design in
general.
Study 7 is limited because only one aspect of usability that is effectiveness was under
investigation. It was also limited to the context of E-Commerce. Further research
could investigate persuasive communication in other contexts of privacy design. The
user study was also designed with only four different persuasive conditions. A more





Privacy is a human right but effectiveness of online privacy mechanisms is a real
world problem that upsets the assurance of end users’ privacy protection. Privacy
being an interactional process, privacy behaviour online is a response to components
of the design. Privacy behaviour is therefore highly dependent on HCI. Moreover,
although it has been shown that end users’ privacy behaviour rarely match their
privacy attitudes online, no empirical effort has harnessed the capability of HCI
designs to link privacy attitudes with behaviour.
This thesis explored the requirements for usable online privacy and assessed online
privacy designs. The findings were that existing designs do not provide for the social
psychological processes that would activate privacy attitudes or make privacy
attitudes accessible. These findings support the research approach of aiming to
connect privacy attitudes with behaviour via the design. The research provided
empirical evidence that privacy behaviour depends highly on the framing of messages
in the design and contributes to the development of a better communication approach
through the use of persuasive technology.
This chapter presents and reflects upon the contributions of the research conducted in
this thesis and proposes future directions of research. It starts by restating the
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research problem and follows by highlighting the contributions of the thesis. It then
critically reviews the research before concluding with proposals for future research.
8.2 The problem restated
In section 2.6, the research gap was identified. Previous research has not identified
the requirements of usable online privacy from a multidisciplinary perspective that
could help to guide usability evaluations and proposals for enhancements. Although
online privacy designs were evaluated and enhancements proposed, previous research
has not identified issues with online designs’ contributions to the social psychological
processes of privacy management. They have also not proposed better ways of
contributing to these processes.
The research within this thesis addressed the research gap. Privacy is a tacit
behavioural concept ingrained within real life communication and the research takes
the challenge of enabling HCI designs to mediate the link between end users’ privacy
attitudes and the evaluation of an online context as requiring management of privacy
and disclosure that enables end users to engage in privacy behaviour. However HCI
designs of privacy not only have to connect with end users’ privacy attitudes but also
to run in parallel to system services, to provide for system usability requirements such
as ease of use and to cater for requirements of privacy such as user control and
intuitiveness.
Means aimed to invoke privacy attitudes such as persuasive communication can cause
different effects such as enhancing privacy behaviour or distracting end users from
privacy behaviour. This is because they can ease or trigger cognitive evaluation of a
situation; provide the arguments to support a course of action or bias behaviour. The
thesis answered the following research questions:
 RQ1: What are the requirements of usable online privacy?
 RQ2: How usable are existing online privacy mechanisms?
 RQ3: How does persuasive communication affect the effectiveness of online
privacy mechanisms?
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8.3 Contributions of Thesis
This section re-asserts the contributions of the thesis to the research space. It presents
the contributions of the thesis by reviewing the findings in answering each of three
research questions and the approach designed to answer the research questions.
8.3.1 Substantive
In the substantive contributions section, the findings of the research in the process of
answering the three research questions are recapitulated. The contributions are
valuable in promoting better privacy designs and motivating further understanding of
the social psychological dimension of the online privacy management process. The
section starts with the usability requirements suggested by privacy experts followed
by the outcome of assessing online designs and concludes with privacy behaviour
under the influence of persuasive communication.
Requirements for usable online privacy
The outcome of iteratively reviewing experts’ opinions was a list of usability
requirements for online privacy. The main aspect of the list was the necessity of the
privacy design to provide for end user control of personal information while
demanding minimum end user effort. The privacy experts explored these
contradictory requirements of privacy design that is made even more challenging with
the need of privacy mechanisms to co-exist with system functions such as collecting
personal information to enable provision of services. The privacy experts suggested
ways of dealing with the challenges such as predefined custom privacy levels,
standard interfaces, default privacy, explicit opt-in and feedback. These suggestions
are examples of persuasive communication methods that can motivate towards or
facilitate privacy behaviour.
Assessment of usability of online privacy mechanisms
By answering the second research question, the thesis contributed to exploring
whether end users could be expected to use existing privacy mechanisms effectively,
that is whether online designs enabled the social psychological process of privacy
management. Studies 2 to 5 provided the findings that assisted the design of a model
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depicting how persuasive communication can support the link between privacy
attitudes and behaviour and enforce effective online privacy.
 Pilot Study 2 (in Chapter 5) showed that the use of the privacy mechanisms of
Facebook was not clear to end users. This was supported by Study 3 that
found that the design of the interface did not help end users to identify and
learn how to use the privacy mechanisms of Facebook that is did not provide a
cognitive connection with privacy. By enabling a breakdown of the identified
tasks into their action sequence and assessing each of the actions, it was
possible to point out where modifications, that would help end users relate
their disclosure actions to the privacy possibilities, would be required within
the design.
 Another finding was that privacy mechanisms are not consistent in their
communication of privacy information that could help end users to manage
their privacy effectively. Study 4 (in Chapter 5) showed that internet browsers
provided clearer privacy information in the help pages that were difficult to
access from the static interface and dynamic interactions. Also the dialectical
tension between disclosure and privacy was absent that is privacy mechanisms
were not linked to a disclosure context leaving end users to imagine the
context. This would make it difficult for end users to assess their private-
public boundary such that using the privacy mechanisms to manage privacy
according to their attitudes is made unfeasible. According to the evaluation’s
analytical criteria, changes to the communication of internet browsers’ privacy
information such as coherent information in all instances together with
visibility and easy access to privacy mechanisms would enhance effectiveness
and hence usability of the privacy design of internet browsers.
 In a similar analytical evaluation of E-Commerce websites within Study 5 (in
Chapter 5), it was found that the websites hardly communicated privacy
information that could help end users relate their disclosure interactions to the
privacy choices provided by the websites. They also did not consistently
provide information such that more privacy information was provided in the
privacy policy and practically none within the disclosure context. The
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interaction flow of the checkout function did not give end users any reason to
read the privacy policy. It was concluded that E-Commerce privacy design
would be more effective if the interaction flow was linked with the privacy
means such that privacy attitudes can be activated and the personal relevance
and vested interest in using the privacy mechanisms is highlighted. Activated
or accessed privacy attitudes also have a higher likelihood of being transferred
into behaviour.
These findings were important in proposing a model of how persuasive
communication (figure 33) can help to make the connection between privacy attitudes
and behaviour. It either enables an ‘affect’ link that biases end users towards privacy
behaviour or facilitates provision of the ‘cognition’ component that supports the social
psychological processes of privacy management.
Privacy behaviour within persuasive privacy design
A major contribution of the experimental part of the thesis in Study 7 (of Chapter 6) is
the finding that privacy attitude does have an effect on privacy behaviour and under
persuasive conditions privacy mechanisms can be more effective and hence more
usable. Moreover under conditions that make one’s attitude more accessible, privacy
fundamentalists do take more privacy behaviour than privacy unconcerned as
expected from their privacy attitudes. This finding is important since it is different
from those of previous research that found that end users do not behave according to
their concern online.
Another finding was that the messages associated with reminding end users of privacy
actions are important in determining privacy behaviour. The framing of the messages
can either be distracting and result in poor privacy behaviour or have not much to do
with privacy but still bias towards privacy behaviour or serve as the argument that
reinforces privacy behaviour. This is depicted by the ‘affect’ and ‘cognition’ of the
model of figure 33. The study also showed that other factors such as end users’
education level and their extent of prior E-Commerce use add to the complexity of
whether end users would use privacy mechanisms.
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Therefore whilst showing that persuasive communication can help to bridge the gap
between privacy attitudes and behaviour, the thesis also shows that effectiveness and
consequently usability of online privacy mechanisms can be improved. It however
also hints that further research is needed to understand how influencing the socio-
psychological link between attitudes and behaviour can further help HCI designs.
8.3.2 Methodological
The thesis’ methodology contributes to research design within the online privacy
research space. A panoply of HCI research methods were designed through a mixed
method approach that started with grounded theory to gain insight into the complexity
of usable online privacy. It was followed by analytical evaluation of existing design
through a social-psychological framework of privacy management. The thesis also
involved social-psychological understanding of the relationship between attitudes and
behaviour that guided the design of a quantitative empirical investigation. This
section describes how the methodology design is innovative to the research space.
The first methodological contribution is the design of the exploration for requirements
of usable online privacy that produced rich data. A multidisciplinary group of
academic and professional privacy experts were involved in a small debate within a
Delphi structure that involved iterative reviews of experts’ opinions. The participants
were anonymous to each other and the analysis was performed through grounded
theory coding techniques. Delphi has been used before in information systems
research to untangle complex problems but not within the online privacy or security
research space.
The second contribution was the systematic evaluation design within a case-study
approach aimed to analyse the communicability of HCI designs of privacy
mechanisms. It used the principles of a real world framework of privacy
management; Communication Privacy Management which describes the processes
used by individuals to seamlessly manage their privacy, to find out whether privacy
online is designed in a similarly effective way. The approach helped to maintain the
researcher’s interpretation bias to a minimum.
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The third methodological contribution of the research was the design of an
experimental user study that involved a simulated task within a real world setting
rather than a laboratory environment that takes end users away from their usual
environment. This contributed to participants taking the simulated E-Commerce task
as close as they would normally do. Participants were not informed beforehand that it
was a privacy study to avoid biasing their behaviour. Moreover privacy behaviour
itself was measured and general privacy concern was compared to an aggregate
measure of privacy behaviour to cater for evaluative consistency. This is an
enhancement on previous research that observed disclosure behaviour as an indication
of privacy.
8.4 Critical review
In this section, the research presented in this thesis is critiqued. Limitations with the
research approach are identified and discussed. The section starts with the sampling
approach and ends with the ethical issues.
Sampling
The analytical evaluations were conducted in 2009 and 2010. Since then Facebook
has changed continuously. Internet browsers have also added features such as ‘Do
Not Track’. The problem with these technologies is that they keep evolving due to
new technological advances and to user needs and it would not be possible to evaluate
each version of changes. However, the analytical evaluation presents an assessment
for Facebook and the privacy tab only for internet browsers at a point in time.
InPrivate browsing was not considered since only selecting private browsing mode
does not actually protect end users (Aggarwal et al., 2010) or ensure they can manage
their privacy. The thesis also only reviewed social network service, internet browsers
and E-Commerce websites which are popular contexts or media of disclosure, rather
than stand alone privacy mechanisms. This was because it was difficult to gain access
to and evaluate other mechanisms such as those that provide for pseudonymity within
a disclosure context. Also only one context was designed within the user experiment.
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The E-Commerce context was chosen for the experiment since the design of privacy
within such an essential business service has been claimed to be ineffective.
Evaluation did not involve real world scenario
The assessment of the impact of persuasive communication involved an E-Commerce
context but involved a simulation rather than a real world scenario. It could be argued
that the findings would be different if it was designed within an existing live E-
Commerce website. Although the experimental study simulated a real world scenario
as close as possible, the only way to ascertain that the findings would replicate in the
real world would be to compare the findings of study 7 with those designed on a
service provider’s website. This could be done in future research that would cater for
the resources required.
Ethical aspect
Participants of the experimental studies were not informed of the true aim of the study
beforehand that is they were not informed that the study is specifically aimed at
observing and assessing their privacy behaviour. This characteristic of the design was
a necessity since any mention of privacy would have affected participants’ responses
and behaviour making it more difficult to ascertain whether the observed behaviour
was due to persuasive conditions in the design. However, the study designs made
sure that any personal information entered during the study, such as name and
address, was not being saved by the website and the usability software used for data
collection. Study 6 obtained consent from participants who were explained the full
purpose of the study at the end of their participation. Study 7 clearly reassured
participants about the anonymity of the process at the end of the study.
8.5 Further research directions
This section elaborates on research ideas that emanate from the current research.
These can form the foundation for future research in the field.
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Habit formation
Study 7 investigated the one time effect of persuasive communication on privacy
behaviour. Further research could determine the impact of the persuasive message on
other E-Commerce interactions in a longitudinal study. It would also be valuable to
determine how the strength of the persuasive message (with respect to privacy) affects
current and future privacy behaviour. This would enable exploration of the cascading
effects of persuasive messages on end users’ privacy decision making and ability to
distinguish between service providers.
Effect of prior experience and education on privacy behaviour
End users who have suffered a privacy breach might be more careful in their online
behaviour because of recently activated or more accessible privacy attitudes. An
understanding of the relation between the type of previous experience (and extent of
personal affliction) and privacy behaviour could help in designing effective and long
term programmes aimed at educating end users of online privacy risks. Following-up
on the research, further research could also dig into the mechanisms of the interaction
between education level and persuasive communication and explore the possibility of
designing systems that would not disfavour certain group of users.
Type of cognitive processing involved
Determining whether privacy fundamentalists, pragmatists and unconcerned
individuals use central or peripheral processing with respect to the type or strength of
persuasive message would help privacy designers and service providers to ensure end
users are informed and receive the same level of service irrespective of their privacy
concern. Future research could investigate how different types of privacy concern end
users cognitively process persuasive messages and the impact of these cognitive
processes on their behaviour.
Real world service provider
The research can be extended to explore its benefits within a real world service
provider’s website. This will help to apply and compare the findings of the research
within a practical context.
215
Security, health and energy conservation context
Persuasive communication research is popular in health and energy conservation
contexts. However the specific approach of activating and improving accessibility of
attitudes as a link to behaviour can be further investigated. Information security
would also benefit from this perspective to not only further investigate usable security
methods but also to better understand and mitigate social engineering threats.
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Appendix A
Appendix A expands on Chapter 4 and the Study 1. It provides the questionnaire for
the second round of the Delphi study as presented to participants.
Round II questionnaire
In this section, the list of identified factors that have the potential to enhance the
usability of privacy online for each of the above categories is provided.
Please indicate whether you agree with the factors by pointing how important those
are according to you on a scale of 0 to 7; 0 being least important and 7 being most
important and you agree completely. If you have comments or additions to the
provided lists, please fill in the comment section.
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1. User
Factors Explanation Importance Level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Control Users are autonomous individuals who require control of their activities and
hence their disclosure and privacy. Enabling user control can enhance the
usability of privacy online.
Disclosure Level Users have different disclosure levels pertaining to different relationships in
different contexts. Usable privacy designs must allow for different disclosure
levels.
Minimum Effort Users expect to be able to exercise their privacy with minimum effort.
Privacy designs should require the least effort possible.
Secondary Goal Privacy is a secondary goal within online interactions hence not constantly
and explicitly thought of. Designing privacy such that it is not obtrusive to
the primary goal would help towards ensuring usability.
Assumption Users assume they are provided with a level of privacy; hence online designs




Factors Explanation Importance Level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Who Interactions designed in a way to enable users to understand who
handles and has access to their disclosures would enhance the
usability of privacy online.
Consequences Interactions designed in a way to enable users to understand the
immediate consequences of disclosing would enhance the usability of
privacy online.
Risks Interactions designed in a way to enable users to understand the future
risks to them in disclosing would enhance the usability of privacy
online.
Possibilities Interactions designed in a way to enable users to understand the
possibilities available in maintaining privacy would enhance the
usability of privacy online.
Different User
Groups
Interactions designed in a way to enable different groups of users to
understand disclosures and privacy would enhance the usability of
privacy online.
Transparent Clear, transparent and easy to see through disclosure/privacy
interactions would enhance the usability of privacy online.
Explicit Clear and precisely expressed data processing practices would
enhance the usability of privacy online.
Service Provider
Liability
Service providers made liable to explain data processing,
consequences and future risks of disclosure clearly and in an





Factors Explanation Importance Level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ease of Use Ease of use would enhance the usability of privacy online.
Standard Standardised interfaces/interactions would enhance the usability of privacy
online.
Embedded Privacy features embedded within system/technology would enhance the




Factors Explanation Importance Level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Default
Privacy




Explicit opt-in for disclosures would enhance the usability of privacy online.
Feedback Feedback of what has been disclosed, to whom and the level of privacy
applied would enhance the usability of privacy online.
Pseudonyms Different pseudonyms for different privacy purposes (pseudonym
management, different levels of anonymity) would enhance the usability of
privacy online.





Ensuring minimum data collection would enhance the usability of privacy
online.





Factors Explanation Importance Level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Legal
framework
A legal framework that clearly defines liability and fit with the evolving




Appendix B expands on Chapter 4 and the Study 1. It provides the questionnaire for
the third round of the Delphi study as presented to participants.
Round III questionnaire
The collected responses from Round II have been collated and analysed. We also
reviewed the coding of Round I responses again with respect to the comments and
importance levels of Round II. A combination of these two processes helped us to
review the initial list of factors identified. We however also identified a few
conflicting points regarding several factors.
While we understand that answering each of these questions might require further
research, we would like to invite you to answer the below with Yes or No. If you
have comments or other sub-questions please fill in the comments section.
Please consider the following questions with respect to the usability of online privacy
tools/features where usability,
1. as defined from ISO 9241:Part11, is “the extent to which a product can be
used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness,
efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use” and/or
2. as described by academics, is the “learnability, efficiency, memorability, error
and satisfaction”
The conflicts identified are:
1. Should privacy features/tools run in the background?
Questions Yes No
a. Should users be protected against themselves, hence give them
very little or no control by having privacy to run in the
background?
b. Or should it offer some predefined privacy options that users
can be aware of and control to some extent?
c. Or should privacy be obtrusive for users to think about it and
act privately because else they will not?
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Comments:
2. Should privacy designs opt for minimum effort?
(The issue raised for minimum effort was that it might lead to over-simplification
and hence the danger of neglecting user needs. And also if systems have high
benefits, users might accept more effort.)
Questions Yes No
a. Should all privacy systems opt for minimum effort as a usability
measure?
b. Could predefined privacy levels provide for minimum effort
without too much simplification?
Comments:
3. The control factor, to whom, what, how and potential risks, is very
important but
Questions Yes No
a. Is guidance for understanding the choices users make a
prerequisite to control?
b. Can control be un-obtrusive?
c. Can we provide fine-grained control plus pre-defined levels
without the user being tempted to use defaults all the time?




4. Can standard interfaces help users easily recognise and interpret privacy
features
Questions Yes No
a. Without the standard approach being a vulnerability?
b. That suit different types of systems, grouped into categories?
c. That suit expert and novice users?
Comments:
5. Would having the default set to maximum privacy, that is, no disclosure
Questions Yes No
a. Enhance usability of online privacy tools?





Appendix C provides additional material for the evaluation of Facebook. It gives the
survey designed for pilot Study 2.
Facebook survey
Survey applicable to Facebook users only
1. How strongly do you agree or disagree to the following statement?
“Consumers have lost control over how personal information is collected and used
by companies.”
○ Strongly agree ○ Somewhat disagree
○ Somewhat agree ○ Strongly disagree
2. How strongly do you agree or disagree to the following statement?
“Most businesses handle the personal information they collect about consumers in
a proper and confidential way.”
○ Strongly agree ○ Somewhat disagree
○ Somewhat agree ○ Strongly disagree
3. How strongly do you agree or disagree to the following statement?
“Existing laws and organisational practices provide a reasonable level of protection
for consumer privacy today.”
○ Strongly agree ○ Somewhat disagree
○ Somewhat agree ○ Strongly disagree
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profile ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Write on
















○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
5. How would you protect who can access or add to your contents on Facebook?
6. Which of the following most closely reflect how often you have restricted who can
search, view or write on your Facebook profile?
○ Never ○ More than once ○ Very often
○ Once ○ Often
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Answer the questions below only if the answer to question 6 is not ‘Never’.
7. If the answer to question 6 is not‘Never’, what did you protect on your profile?
8. If the answer to question 6 is not‘Never’, how strongly are you sure or not sure of
the outcome?
○ Strongly sure ○ Somewhat not sure
○ Somewhat sure ○ Strongly not sure
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Appendix D
Appendix D provides additional material for the evaluation of Facebook. It adds to
the cognitive walkthrough description of Study 3.
Cognitive walkthrough
Task 2: Photo-sharing through upload and tag with the aim of sharing photos
with specific friends only through internet explorer browser on a desktop or
laptop
Sub-goal c: Set access control
The interface display for actions c.i and c.ii is as shown in the figure below.
Figure 34: Click on who can see this and select Customise
Task 3: Comment to friend’s post with aim of the comment being viewable
only by the friend
The interface display for actions b.ii and b.iii is as shown in the figure below.
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Figure 35: Type comment and click on Comment button
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Appendix E
Appendix E contains the pre-test questionnaire and the post-test questionnaire for
pilot user Study 6. These are followed by the procedure set to participants.
Pre-test Questionnaire
Please fill in the following questionnaire.
1. Name:




 40 - 49
 50 +
3. Your gender is:
Male  Female
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4. The highest level of education you completed is:
 None
 GCSE or O-Level
 A-Level or equivalent
 First degree (university or vocational)
 Postgraduate degree (Masters or PhD, Postgraduate Diploma or Certificate
or vocational equivalent)
 Other – please specify:
5. You often use the internet for
 Email
 Online shopping
 Social network (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc)
Web Development/Design
 Other – please specify:









Consumers have lost control over
how personal information are
collected and used by companies.
Most businesses handle the
personal information they collect
about consumers in a proper and
confidential way.
Existing laws and organisational
practices provide a reasonable level





Website 1 Website 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Website was terrible wonderful terrible wonderful
2. Website was difficult easy difficult easy
3. Website was frustrating satisfying frustrating satisfying
4. Website was dull stimulating dull stimulating
5. Reading characters on the screen hard easy hard easy
6. Highlighting simplifies task not at all very much not at all very much
7. Organisation of information confusing very clear confusing very clear
8. Use of terms through website inconsistent consistent inconsistent consistent
9. Presence of terminology related to task never always never always
10. Position of messages on screen inconsistent consistent inconsistent consistent
11. Learning to operate the website difficult easy difficult easy
12. Exploring new features by trial and
error
difficult easy difficult easy
13. Performing tasks is straightforward never always never always
14. Designed for all levels of users never always never always
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SECTION 2
1. Who will have access to the information that you entered?
2. What personal information has the site asked for?
3. What option did you select to checkout? Why?
Website 1
Website 1
Website 1Website 2Website 2Website 2
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4. Were there any privacy options in the website?
5. How confident are you that you were able to set the level of privacy you required?
Website 1 Website 2
Least Most confident Least Most confident




6. How easy was it to find privacy features?
Website 1 Website 2
Difficult Easy Difficult Easy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. What online privacy breaches are you aware of (that you or someone you know suffered, or that you heard about)?
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Procedure
Please follow the following instructions:
Go to site 1
1. Go to Products
2. Select Books
3. Add “Gulliver’s Travels” to cart
4. Select “Go to Checkout”
5. Fill in the Checkout page and proceed accordingly
6. Use the credit card details below.
7.
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Go to site 2
8. Go to Products
9. Select Books
10. Add “Oliver Twist” to cart
11. Select “Go to Checkout”
12. Fill in the Checkout page and proceed accordingly
13. Use the credit card details below.
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Appendix F










Testing the assumptions of the ANOVA
Normality of data
The distribution of the individual observations was roughly normal as shown in the
below.
Figure 36: Histogram of behaviour score
Homogeneity of variance
For the privacy behaviour score for the different conditions, the variances were equal
for conditions A, B, C and D: F(3, 211) = .661, p>.01 that is non-significant. This is
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shown in the table 11 below. Homogeneity of variance was confirmed by the
variances in table 41.
Table 55: Test of homogeneity of Variance
Levene
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
BehaviourScore Based on Mean .661 3 211 .577
Based on Median .495 3 211 .686
Based on Median and
with adjusted df
.495 3 209.949 .686
Based on trimmed
mean
.571 3 211 .635
